Renato Alcara
5351dce3a5
Aligns with Baileys upstream PR #2480. WhatsApp is rolling out an inbound username field that maps to the user's LID. This change is purely additive — it captures and propagates the new optional field through types, decoders, USync queries, and group/contact events. Skipped intentionally to preserve InfiniteAPI's LID/PN customization: - handleGroupNotification in messages-recv.ts (custom LID->PN flow on groups.upsert / participants.map). Username for these specific events still flows via process-message's emitParticipantsUpdate (reads message.key.participantUsername added in decode-wa-message). Carousel/buttons code (messages.ts, messages-send.ts) untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
528 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
528 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
import { Boom } from '@hapi/boom'
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import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js'
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import type { WAMessage, WAMessageKey } from '../Types'
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import type { SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore } from '../Types/Signal'
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import {
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areJidsSameUser,
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type BinaryNode,
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isHostedLidUser,
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isHostedPnUser,
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isJidBroadcast,
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isJidGroup,
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isJidMetaAI,
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isJidNewsletter,
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isJidStatusBroadcast,
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isLidUser,
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isPnUser,
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// transferDevice
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} from '../WABinary'
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import { unpadRandomMax16 } from './generics'
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import type { ILogger } from './logger'
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import { retry, RetryExhaustedError, type RetryOptions } from './retry-utils'
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export const getDecryptionJid = async (sender: string, repository: SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore): Promise<string> => {
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if (isLidUser(sender) || isHostedLidUser(sender)) {
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return sender
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}
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const mapped = await repository.lidMapping.getLIDForPN(sender)
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return mapped || sender
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}
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const storeMappingFromEnvelope = async (
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stanza: BinaryNode,
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sender: string,
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repository: SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore,
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decryptionJid: string,
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logger: ILogger
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): Promise<void> => {
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// TODO: Handle hosted IDs
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const { senderAlt } = extractAddressingContext(stanza)
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if (senderAlt && isLidUser(senderAlt) && isPnUser(sender) && decryptionJid === sender) {
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try {
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await repository.lidMapping.storeLIDPNMappings([{ lid: senderAlt, pn: sender }])
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await repository.migrateSession(sender, senderAlt)
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logger.debug({ sender, senderAlt }, 'Stored LID mapping from envelope')
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} catch (error) {
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logger.warn({ sender, senderAlt, error }, 'Failed to store LID mapping')
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}
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}
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}
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export const NO_MESSAGE_FOUND_ERROR_TEXT = 'Message absent from node'
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export const MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT = 'Key used already or never filled'
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export const BAD_MAC_ERROR_TEXT = 'Bad MAC'
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// Retry configuration for failed decryption
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export const DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG = {
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maxRetries: 3,
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baseDelayMs: 100,
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sessionRecordErrors: ['No session record', 'SessionError: No session record'],
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corruptedSessionErrors: ['Bad MAC', 'MessageCounterError', MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT]
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}
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/**
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* Retry options for decryption operations
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* Uses exponential backoff with jitter to handle transient failures
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*/
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export const DECRYPTION_RETRY_OPTIONS: RetryOptions = {
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maxAttempts: 3,
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baseDelay: 200, // 200ms base delay
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maxDelay: 2000, // 2s max delay
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backoffStrategy: 'exponential',
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backoffMultiplier: 2,
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jitter: 0.2, // 20% jitter
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collectMetrics: false, // No Prometheus metrics
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operationName: 'message_decryption',
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shouldRetry: (error: Error, attempt: number) => {
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const errorMsg = error?.message || ''
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// Always retry on session record errors (session might be syncing)
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if (DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG.sessionRecordErrors.some(err => errorMsg.includes(err))) {
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return attempt < 3 // Retry up to 3 times
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}
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// Don't retry on corrupted session errors (need cleanup first)
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if (DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG.corruptedSessionErrors.some(err => errorMsg.includes(err))) {
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return false
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}
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// Retry other transient errors
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return attempt < 2 // Retry up to 2 times for unknown errors
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}
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}
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export const NACK_REASONS = {
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ParsingError: 487,
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UnrecognizedStanza: 488,
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UnrecognizedStanzaClass: 489,
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UnrecognizedStanzaType: 490,
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InvalidProtobuf: 491,
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InvalidHostedCompanionStanza: 493,
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MissingMessageSecret: 495,
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SignalErrorOldCounter: 496,
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MessageDeletedOnPeer: 499,
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UnhandledError: 500,
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UnsupportedAdminRevoke: 550,
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UnsupportedLIDGroup: 551,
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DBOperationFailed: 552,
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CorruptedSession: 553
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}
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export const SERVER_ERROR_CODES = {
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MissingTcToken: '463',
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SmaxInvalid: '479',
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StaleGroupAddressingMode: '421',
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NewChatMessagesCapped: '475'
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}
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type MessageType =
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| 'chat'
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| 'peer_broadcast'
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| 'other_broadcast'
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| 'group'
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| 'direct_peer_status'
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| 'other_status'
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| 'newsletter'
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export const extractAddressingContext = (stanza: BinaryNode) => {
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let senderAlt: string | undefined
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let recipientAlt: string | undefined
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const sender = stanza.attrs.participant || stanza.attrs.from
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const addressingMode = stanza.attrs.addressing_mode || (sender?.endsWith('lid') ? 'lid' : 'pn')
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if (addressingMode === 'lid') {
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// Message is LID-addressed: sender is LID, extract corresponding PN
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// without device data
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senderAlt = stanza.attrs.participant_pn || stanza.attrs.sender_pn || stanza.attrs.peer_recipient_pn
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recipientAlt = stanza.attrs.recipient_pn
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// with device data
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//if (sender && senderAlt) senderAlt = transferDevice(sender, senderAlt)
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} else {
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// Message is PN-addressed: sender is PN, extract corresponding LID
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// without device data
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senderAlt = stanza.attrs.participant_lid || stanza.attrs.sender_lid || stanza.attrs.peer_recipient_lid
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recipientAlt = stanza.attrs.recipient_lid
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//with device data
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//if (sender && senderAlt) senderAlt = transferDevice(sender, senderAlt)
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}
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return {
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addressingMode,
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senderAlt,
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recipientAlt
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}
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}
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/**
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* Decode the received node as a message.
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* @note this will only parse the message, not decrypt it
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*/
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export function decodeMessageNode(stanza: BinaryNode, meId: string, meLid: string) {
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let msgType: MessageType
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let chatId: string
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let author: string
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let fromMe = false
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const msgId = stanza.attrs.id
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const from = stanza.attrs.from
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if (!from) {
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throw new Boom('Missing from attribute in message', { data: stanza })
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}
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const participant: string | undefined = stanza.attrs.participant
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const recipient: string | undefined = stanza.attrs.recipient
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const addressingContext = extractAddressingContext(stanza)
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const isMe = (jid: string) => areJidsSameUser(jid, meId)
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const isMeLid = (jid: string) => areJidsSameUser(jid, meLid)
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if (isPnUser(from) || isLidUser(from) || isHostedLidUser(from) || isHostedPnUser(from)) {
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if (recipient && !isJidMetaAI(recipient)) {
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if (!isMe(from) && !isMeLid(from)) {
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throw new Boom('receipient present, but msg not from me', { data: stanza })
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}
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if (isMe(from) || isMeLid(from)) {
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fromMe = true
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}
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chatId = recipient
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} else {
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chatId = from
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}
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msgType = 'chat'
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author = from
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} else if (isJidGroup(from)) {
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if (!participant) {
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throw new Boom('No participant in group message')
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}
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if (isMe(participant) || isMeLid(participant)) {
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fromMe = true
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}
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msgType = 'group'
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author = participant
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chatId = from
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} else if (isJidBroadcast(from)) {
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if (!participant) {
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throw new Boom('No participant in group message')
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}
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const isParticipantMe = isMe(participant)
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if (isJidStatusBroadcast(from)) {
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msgType = isParticipantMe ? 'direct_peer_status' : 'other_status'
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} else {
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msgType = isParticipantMe ? 'peer_broadcast' : 'other_broadcast'
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}
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fromMe = isParticipantMe
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chatId = from
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author = participant
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} else if (isJidNewsletter(from)) {
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msgType = 'newsletter'
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chatId = from
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author = from
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if (isMe(from) || isMeLid(from)) {
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fromMe = true
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}
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} else {
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throw new Boom('Unknown message type', { data: stanza })
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}
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const pushname = stanza?.attrs?.notify
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const key: WAMessageKey = {
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remoteJid: chatId,
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remoteJidAlt: !isJidGroup(chatId) ? addressingContext.senderAlt : undefined,
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remoteJidUsername: !isJidGroup(chatId)
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? stanza.attrs.peer_recipient_username || stanza.attrs.recipient_username
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: undefined,
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fromMe,
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id: msgId,
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participant,
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participantAlt: isJidGroup(chatId) ? addressingContext.senderAlt : undefined,
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participantUsername: stanza.attrs.participant ? stanza.attrs.participant_username : undefined,
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addressingMode: addressingContext.addressingMode,
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...(msgType === 'newsletter' && stanza.attrs.server_id ? { server_id: stanza.attrs.server_id } : {})
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}
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const fullMessage: WAMessage = {
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key,
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category: stanza.attrs.category,
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messageTimestamp: +(stanza.attrs.t ?? 0),
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pushName: pushname,
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broadcast: isJidBroadcast(from)
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}
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if (key.fromMe) {
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fullMessage.status = proto.WebMessageInfo.Status.SERVER_ACK
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}
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return {
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fullMessage,
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author,
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sender: msgType === 'chat' ? author : chatId
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}
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}
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export const decryptMessageNode = (
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stanza: BinaryNode,
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meId: string,
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meLid: string,
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repository: SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore,
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logger: ILogger,
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) => {
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const { fullMessage, author, sender } = decodeMessageNode(stanza, meId, meLid)
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return {
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fullMessage,
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category: stanza.attrs.category,
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author,
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async decrypt() {
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let decryptables = 0
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if (Array.isArray(stanza.content)) {
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for (const { tag, attrs, content } of stanza.content) {
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if (tag === 'verified_name' && content instanceof Uint8Array) {
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const cert = proto.VerifiedNameCertificate.decode(content)
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if (cert.details) {
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const details = proto.VerifiedNameCertificate.Details.decode(cert.details)
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fullMessage.verifiedBizName = details.verifiedName
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}
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}
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if (tag === 'unavailable' && attrs.type === 'view_once') {
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fullMessage.key.isViewOnce = true // TODO: remove from here and add a STUB TYPE
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}
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if (attrs.count && tag === 'enc') {
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fullMessage.retryCount = Number(attrs.count)
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}
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if (tag !== 'enc' && tag !== 'plaintext') {
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continue
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}
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if (!(content instanceof Uint8Array)) {
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continue
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}
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decryptables += 1
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let msgBuffer: Uint8Array
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const decryptionJid = await getDecryptionJid(author, repository)
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if (tag !== 'plaintext') {
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// TODO: Handle hosted devices
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await storeMappingFromEnvelope(stanza, author, repository, decryptionJid, logger)
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}
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try {
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const e2eType = tag === 'plaintext' ? 'plaintext' : attrs.type
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// Wrap decryption in retry logic for transient failures
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switch (e2eType) {
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case 'skmsg':
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msgBuffer = await retry(
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() =>
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repository.decryptGroupMessage({
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group: sender,
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authorJid: author,
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msg: content
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}),
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{
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...DECRYPTION_RETRY_OPTIONS,
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onRetry: (error, attempt, delay) => {
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logger.debug(
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{ error: error.message, attempt, delay, group: sender, author },
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'Retrying group message decryption'
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)
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}
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}
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)
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break
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case 'pkmsg':
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case 'msg':
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msgBuffer = await retry(
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() =>
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repository.decryptMessage({
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jid: decryptionJid,
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type: e2eType,
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ciphertext: content
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}),
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{
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...DECRYPTION_RETRY_OPTIONS,
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onRetry: (error, attempt, delay) => {
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logger.debug(
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{ error: error.message, attempt, delay, jid: decryptionJid, type: e2eType },
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'Retrying message decryption'
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)
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}
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}
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)
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break
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case 'plaintext':
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msgBuffer = content
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break
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default:
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throw new Error(`Unknown e2e type: ${e2eType}`)
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}
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let msg: proto.IMessage = proto.Message.decode(
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e2eType !== 'plaintext' ? unpadRandomMax16(msgBuffer) : msgBuffer
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)
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msg = msg.deviceSentMessage?.message || msg
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if (msg.senderKeyDistributionMessage) {
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//eslint-disable-next-line max-depth
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try {
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await repository.processSenderKeyDistributionMessage({
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authorJid: author,
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item: msg.senderKeyDistributionMessage
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})
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} catch (err) {
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logger.error({ key: fullMessage.key, err }, 'failed to process sender key distribution message')
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}
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}
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if (fullMessage.message) {
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Object.assign(fullMessage.message, msg)
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} else {
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fullMessage.message = msg
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}
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// Detect view-once media on stanza 1 received by linked device.
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// viewOnceMessage wrapper is also used for interactive messages
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// (interactiveMessage, listMessage, nativeFlowMessage) -- those do NOT have
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// imageMessage.viewOnce / videoMessage.viewOnce / audioMessage.viewOnce = true.
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// Only real view-once media carries viewOnce: true on the inner media message.
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const viewOnceInner =
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msg.viewOnceMessage?.message ||
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msg.viewOnceMessageV2?.message ||
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msg.viewOnceMessageV2Extension?.message
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if (
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viewOnceInner?.imageMessage?.viewOnce ||
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viewOnceInner?.videoMessage?.viewOnce ||
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viewOnceInner?.audioMessage?.viewOnce
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) {
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fullMessage.key.isViewOnce = true
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}
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} catch (err: any) {
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// Check if this is a final failure after all retries exhausted
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const isRetryExhausted = err instanceof RetryExhaustedError
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const originalError = isRetryExhausted ? err.originalError : err
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const isCorrupted = isCorruptedSessionError(originalError)
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const isSessionRecord = isSessionRecordError(originalError)
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const errorContext = {
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key: fullMessage.key,
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err: originalError,
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messageType: tag === 'plaintext' ? 'plaintext' : attrs.type,
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sender,
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author,
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decryptionJid,
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isSessionRecordError: isSessionRecord,
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isCorruptedSession: isCorrupted,
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...(isRetryExhausted && { retriesExhausted: true, attempts: err.attempts })
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}
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// Smart logging based on error type and retry status
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if (isCorrupted) {
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// Corrupted session errors are expected and auto-recovered
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// Only log as ERROR if retries exhausted, otherwise WARN on first attempt
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// eslint-disable-next-line max-depth
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if (isRetryExhausted) {
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logger.error(
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errorContext,
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`⚠️ Session corrupted after ${err.attempts} attempts. Retry+pkmsg flow will recover.`
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)
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} else {
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// First occurrence - log as warning since auto-recovery will attempt
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logger.warn(errorContext, '⚠️ Corrupted session detected - attempting auto-recovery')
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}
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// Session cleanup is deferred to retry exhaustion (safety net).
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// The Signal Protocol handles recovery naturally via retry+pkmsg:
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// Bad MAC -> retry receipt -> sender re-sends as pkmsg -> new session.
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// Deleting sessions here (hot path) causes cascading failures when
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// multiple messages from the same contact arrive simultaneously.
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// See: messages-recv.ts sendRetryRequest() for deferred cleanup.
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} else if (isSessionRecord) {
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// Session record errors are transient - retry should handle them
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// eslint-disable-next-line max-depth
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if (isRetryExhausted) {
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logger.error(errorContext, `Failed to decrypt: No session record found after ${err.attempts} attempts`)
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} else {
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logger.debug(errorContext, 'No session record - will retry')
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}
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} else {
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// Unknown/unexpected errors (protobuf, parsing, etc.)
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// These don't go through retry, so always log as ERROR
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// Type-safe explicit logging instead of dynamic property access
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logger.error(
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errorContext,
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isRetryExhausted
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? `Failed to decrypt message after ${err.attempts} attempts`
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: 'Failed to decrypt message'
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)
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}
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fullMessage.messageStubType = proto.WebMessageInfo.StubType.CIPHERTEXT
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// Safe coercion handling edge cases where message might be undefined
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fullMessage.messageStubParameters = [String(originalError?.message ?? originalError)]
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}
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}
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}
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// if nothing was found to decrypt
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if (!decryptables && !fullMessage.key?.isViewOnce) {
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fullMessage.messageStubType = proto.WebMessageInfo.StubType.CIPHERTEXT
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fullMessage.messageStubParameters = [NO_MESSAGE_FOUND_ERROR_TEXT]
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}
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}
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}
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}
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/**
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* Utility function to check if an error is related to missing session record
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*/
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function isSessionRecordError(error: any): boolean {
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const errorMessage = error?.message || error?.toString() || ''
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return DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG.sessionRecordErrors.some(errorPattern => errorMessage.includes(errorPattern))
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}
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/**
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* Utility function to check if an error indicates a corrupted session
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* (Bad MAC, MessageCounterError, Key already used)
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*/
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export function isCorruptedSessionError(error: any): boolean {
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const errorMessage = error?.message || error?.toString() || ''
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return DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG.corruptedSessionErrors.some(errorPattern => errorMessage.includes(errorPattern))
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}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Clean up corrupted session for a specific device JID.
|
|
* WABA behavior: DELETE sessions WHERE recipient_id=? AND device_id=?
|
|
* Only deletes the exact device that was corrupted, not all devices.
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE: This should NOT be called on every Bad MAC error (hot path).
|
|
* Instead, let the retry+pkmsg flow handle recovery naturally (like WhatsApp does).
|
|
* Only call this as a safety net when retries are exhausted.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function cleanupCorruptedSession(
|
|
jid: string,
|
|
repository: SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore,
|
|
logger: ILogger
|
|
): Promise<number> {
|
|
await repository.deleteSession([jid])
|
|
logger.info({ jid }, 'Cleaned up corrupted session for specific device')
|
|
return 1
|
|
}
|