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Author SHA1 Message Date
Renato Alcara f5c07163f8 fix: address PR review — parallelize LID resolution, use helper consistently
- normalizeGroupMetadata: resolve participant LIDs with Promise.all
  instead of sequential loop (perf on large groups)
- handleCall: resolve participant JIDs with Promise.all
- handleBadAck: use normalizeKeyLidToPn() helper instead of manual
  resolveLidToPn + assignment (consistency with other code paths)
- CB:relay: resolve callCreator LID→PN before emitting

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-01 17:39:52 -03:00
Renato Alcara 0a43ad849d fix: normalize LID→PN in handleBadAck, media retry, and PDO recovery
Additional leak points found during final audit:
- handleBadAck: key.remoteJid from ack stanza could be LID
- messages.media-update: media retry key JIDs not normalized
- CTWA PDO recovery: webMessageInfo.key from phone response not normalized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-01 17:29:22 -03:00
Renato Alcara ac7bb321d4 feat: centralized LID→PN normalization for all emitted events
WhatsApp's server increasingly uses LID (Linked ID) as the primary
addressing format. Consumers (ZPRO, etc.) expect phone numbers (PN),
not opaque LID identifiers. This adds comprehensive LID→PN resolution
across all ev.emit() paths so downstream consumers always receive PN.

Key changes:

- Add resolveLidToPn() and normalizeKeyLidToPn() centralized helpers
  in process-message.ts for consistent LID→PN resolution

- normalizeMessageJids() fast path: use alt JID directly from stanza
  attributes (zero I/O, eliminates race condition with LIDMappingStore)

- Await storeLIDPNMappings() before normalization in message receipt
  flow (was fire-and-forget, could race with subsequent getPNForLID)

- Normalize LID→PN in all event emission points:
  * messages.upsert (keys, nested reaction/poll keys, participantAlt)
  * presence.update (jid + participant)
  * message-receipt.update (key + userJid)
  * contacts.update (picture notifications)
  * blocklist.update (blocklist JIDs)
  * call events (chatId, from)
  * group metadata (participants, owner, subjectOwner)
  * group notifications (acting participant, add/remove/promote/demote)
  * newsletter notifications (author, user JIDs)
  * sync actions (mutation index normalization)

- Make handlePresenceUpdate and handleGroupNotification async to
  support await on LID resolution

- Add normalizeGroupMetadata() helper in groups.ts for all
  extractGroupMetadata call sites

Performance: ~0.01ms per message (LRU cache hit). No impact on
message sending. First-contact resolution ~2-5ms (one-time per contact).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-01 17:25:14 -03:00
14 changed files with 113 additions and 349 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package proto;
/// WhatsApp Version: 2.3000.1034427372
/// WhatsApp Version: 2.3000.1034274421
message ADVDeviceIdentity {
optional uint32 rawId = 1;
+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
{"version":[2,3000,1038487394]}
{"version":[2,3000,1034279434]}
+1 -24
View File
@@ -56,33 +56,10 @@ export const PROCESSABLE_HISTORY_TYPES = [
// 6 hours in milliseconds
const SIX_HOURS_MS = 6 * 60 * 60 * 1000
/**
* Resolves the default browser tuple from the BAILEYS_BROWSER env var.
* Default: Android companion (SMB_ANDROID) matches upstream PR #2201.
* Pair code auto-detects Android and falls back to Chrome in socket.ts.
*
* unset / 'android' Browsers.android('14')
* 'android:15' Browsers.android('15')
* 'chrome' / 'macos' Browsers.macOS('Chrome')
*/
const resolveDefaultBrowser = (): [string, string, string] => {
const env = process.env.BAILEYS_BROWSER?.trim().toLowerCase()
if (env === 'chrome' || env === 'macos') {
return Browsers.macOS('Chrome')
}
if (env?.startsWith('android:')) {
const apiLevel = env.split(':')[1] || '14'
return Browsers.android(apiLevel)
}
return Browsers.android('14')
}
export const DEFAULT_CONNECTION_CONFIG: SocketConfig = {
version: version as WAVersion,
versionCheckIntervalMs: SIX_HOURS_MS,
browser: resolveDefaultBrowser(),
browser: Browsers.macOS('Chrome'),
waWebSocketUrl: 'wss://web.whatsapp.com/ws/chat',
connectTimeoutMs: 20_000,
keepAliveIntervalMs: 15_000,
+13 -79
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@@ -302,25 +302,6 @@ export function makeLibSignalRepository(
// Promise instead of each spawning their own DB transactions.
const migrationInFlight = new Map<string, Promise<{ migrated: number; skipped: number; total: number }>>()
// Resolve PN JID to its canonical LID JID for transaction locking.
// This prevents PN/LID race conditions where concurrent operations for the
// same logical contact acquire different mutex locks because one uses PN
// and the other uses LID. (Aligned with WABA behavior — all operations use LID internally.)
const resolveCanonicalJid = async(jid: string): Promise<string> => {
if (isAnyLidUser(jid)) {
return jid
}
if (isAnyPnUser(jid)) {
const lid = await lidMapping.getLIDForPN(jid)
if (lid) {
return lid
}
}
return jid
}
const repository: SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore = {
decryptGroupMessage({ group, authorJid, msg }) {
const senderName = jidToSignalSenderKeyName(group, authorJid)
@@ -415,24 +396,23 @@ export function makeLibSignalRepository(
return result
}
// Use canonical JID (PN→LID resolved) as transaction key to prevent
// PN/LID race conditions on the same logical session.
const canonicalJid = await resolveCanonicalJid(jid)
// If it's not a sync message, we need to ensure atomicity
// For regular messages, we use a transaction to ensure atomicity
return parsedKeys.transaction(async () => {
return await doDecrypt()
}, canonicalJid)
}, jid)
},
async encryptMessage({ jid, data }) {
const addr = jidToSignalProtocolAddress(jid)
const cipher = new libsignal.SessionCipher(storage, addr)
const canonicalJid = await resolveCanonicalJid(jid)
// Use transaction to ensure atomicity
return parsedKeys.transaction(async () => {
const { type: sigType, body } = await cipher.encrypt(data)
const type = sigType === 3 ? 'pkmsg' : 'msg'
return { type, ciphertext: Buffer.from(body, 'binary') }
}, canonicalJid)
}, jid)
},
async encryptGroupMessage({ group, meId, data }) {
@@ -674,10 +654,9 @@ export function makeLibSignalRepository(
// Session exists (guaranteed from device discovery)
const fromSession = libsignal.SessionRecord.deserialize(pnSession)
if (fromSession.haveOpenSession()) {
// Queue for bulk update: copy to LID, retain PN session.
// WABA retains both PN and LID sessions during migration to avoid
// No Session errors if messages arrive via PN before migration completes.
// Queue for bulk update: copy to LID, delete from PN
sessionUpdates[lidAddrStr] = fromSession.serialize()
sessionUpdates[pnAddrStr] = null
migratedCount++
}
@@ -797,13 +776,6 @@ function signalStorage(
return id
}
// Delayed PreKey deletion: grace period to handle race conditions
// where two pkmsg with the same preKeyId arrive nearly simultaneously.
// WABA deletes immediately (33ms), but we add a 5-min grace period
// because we can't handle "Invalid PreKey ID" errors at the native level.
const PREKEY_GRACE_PERIOD_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000 // 5 minutes
const pendingPreKeyDeletions = new Map<string, ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>>()
return {
loadSession: async (id: string) => {
try {
@@ -836,26 +808,7 @@ function signalStorage(
}
}
},
removePreKey: (id: number) => {
const keyId = id.toString()
// Clear any existing timer for this key
const existing = pendingPreKeyDeletions.get(keyId)
if (existing) {
clearTimeout(existing)
}
// Schedule deletion after grace period
const timer = setTimeout(async () => {
pendingPreKeyDeletions.delete(keyId)
try {
await keys.set({ 'pre-key': { [id]: null } })
} catch {
// Keystore may be destroyed if connection closed — safe to ignore
}
}, PREKEY_GRACE_PERIOD_MS)
pendingPreKeyDeletions.set(keyId, timer)
},
removePreKey: (id: number) => keys.set({ 'pre-key': { [id]: null } }),
loadSignedPreKey: () => {
const key = creds.signedPreKey
return {
@@ -945,24 +898,14 @@ function signalStorage(
// IDENTITY KEY CHANGED - contact reinstalled WhatsApp or switched devices
const previousFingerprint = generateKeyFingerprint(existingKey)
// Delete old session and save new identity key atomically.
// Store identity in BOTH LID and PN addresses (WABA stores in both
// recipient_account_type=0 and type=1 with CONFLICT_REPLACE).
const identityUpdates: Record<string, Uint8Array> = { [wireJid]: identityKey }
if (wireJid !== id) {
identityUpdates[id] = identityKey
}
// Delete old session and save new identity key atomically
await keys.set({
session: { [wireJid]: null },
'identity-key': identityUpdates
'identity-key': { [wireJid]: identityKey }
})
// Update cache for both addresses
// Update cache
identityKeyCache.set(wireJid, identityKey)
if (wireJid !== id) {
identityKeyCache.set(id, identityKey)
}
// Record metrics
metrics.signalIdentityChanges?.inc({ type: 'changed' })
@@ -998,19 +941,10 @@ function signalStorage(
if (!existingKey) {
// NEW CONTACT - Trust On First Use (TOFU)
// Store in both LID and PN addresses (aligned with WABA dual identity storage)
const identityUpdates: Record<string, Uint8Array> = { [wireJid]: identityKey }
if (wireJid !== id) {
identityUpdates[id] = identityKey
}
await keys.set({ 'identity-key': { [wireJid]: identityKey } })
await keys.set({ 'identity-key': identityUpdates })
// Update cache for both addresses
// Update cache
identityKeyCache.set(wireJid, identityKey)
if (wireJid !== id) {
identityKeyCache.set(id, identityKey)
}
// Record metrics
metrics.signalIdentityChanges?.inc({ type: 'new' })
+9 -137
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ import {
aesDecryptCTR,
aesEncryptGCM,
cleanMessage,
cleanupCorruptedSession,
Curve,
decodeMediaRetryNode,
decodeMessageNode,
@@ -42,7 +41,6 @@ import {
encodeSignedDeviceIdentity,
extractAddressingContext,
getCallStatusFromNode,
getDecryptionJid,
getHistoryMsg,
getNextPreKeys,
getStatusFromReceiptType,
@@ -69,7 +67,7 @@ import {
recordMessageReceived,
recordMessageRetry
} from '../Utils/prometheus-metrics.js'
import { isTcTokenExpired, resolveTcTokenJid, storeTcTokensFromIqResult } from '../Utils/tc-token-utils'
import { isTcTokenExpired, resolveTcTokenJid } from '../Utils/tc-token-utils'
import {
areJidsSameUser,
type BinaryNode,
@@ -164,12 +162,6 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
const TC_TOKEN_PRUNE_TS_KEY = '__prune_ts'
const tcTokenKnownJids = new Set<string>()
const tcTokenRetriedMsgIds = new Set<string>()
// Deduplicates retry requests per JID within a short window.
// When a burst of Bad MAC errors arrives for the same contact,
// only the first retry request is sent — the peer resends everything
// with a single pkmsg, avoiding the close-session cascade.
const retryRequestActiveJids = new Set<string>()
let tcTokenIndexSaveTimer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined
let lastTcTokenPruneTs = 0
@@ -1217,50 +1209,12 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
const { key: msgKey } = fullMessage
const msgId = msgKey.id!
// Per-JID deduplication: when multiple messages from the same contact
// fail with Bad MAC simultaneously, only send ONE retry request.
// The peer will resend all failed messages when it receives the retry receipt.
// For group messages, scope by participant (each participant has its own Signal session).
const retryDedupeJid = msgKey.participant
? jidNormalizedUser(msgKey.participant)
: jidNormalizedUser(node.attrs.from!)
if (retryRequestActiveJids.has(retryDedupeJid)) {
logger.debug(
{ fromJid: retryDedupeJid, msgId },
'Skipping duplicate retry request — already in-flight for this JID'
)
return
}
if (messageRetryManager) {
// Check if we've exceeded max retries using the new system
if (messageRetryManager.hasExceededMaxRetries(msgId)) {
logger.debug({ msgId }, 'reached retry limit with new retry manager, clearing')
messageRetryManager.markRetryFailed(msgId)
recordMessageFailure('retry', 'max_retries_reached')
// Safety net: clean up corrupted sessions only after all retries exhausted.
// This avoids the cascading delete loop that occurs when cleanup runs
// on every Bad MAC in the hot path (decode-wa-message.ts).
// The Signal Protocol recovers naturally via retry+pkmsg for most cases;
// this cleanup only runs as a last resort.
// For group messages, use participant JID (Signal sessions are per-participant, not per-group).
if (autoCleanCorrupted) {
const senderJid = msgKey.participant ? jidNormalizedUser(msgKey.participant) : jidNormalizedUser(node.attrs.from!)
try {
const decryptionJid = await getDecryptionJid(senderJid, signalRepository)
const deletedCount = await cleanupCorruptedSession(decryptionJid, signalRepository, logger)
if (deletedCount > 0) {
logger.info(
{ msgId, jid: decryptionJid, targetedDevices: deletedCount },
`🔄 Session cleanup (retry exhausted) | Targeted: ${deletedCount} devices`
)
}
} catch (cleanupErr) {
logger.warn({ msgId, senderJid, err: cleanupErr }, 'Failed to cleanup session after retry exhaustion')
}
}
return
}
@@ -1279,18 +1233,6 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
logger.debug({ retryCount, msgId }, 'reached retry limit, clearing')
await msgRetryCache.del(key)
recordMessageFailure('retry', 'max_retries_reached')
// Safety net cleanup (same as new system above)
if (autoCleanCorrupted) {
const senderJid = msgKey.participant ? jidNormalizedUser(msgKey.participant) : jidNormalizedUser(node.attrs.from!)
try {
const decryptionJid = await getDecryptionJid(senderJid, signalRepository)
await cleanupCorruptedSession(decryptionJid, signalRepository, logger)
} catch (cleanupErr) {
logger.warn({ msgId, senderJid, err: cleanupErr }, 'Failed to cleanup session after retry exhaustion')
}
}
return
}
@@ -1299,11 +1241,6 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
recordMessageRetry('retry')
}
// Register dedup AFTER early-return checks so that max-retries paths
// don't block subsequent messages from the same JID for 5 seconds.
retryRequestActiveJids.add(retryDedupeJid)
setTimeout(() => retryRequestActiveJids.delete(retryDedupeJid), 5_000)
const key = `${msgId}:${msgKey?.participant}`
const retryCount = (await msgRetryCache.get<number>(key)) || 1
@@ -1314,7 +1251,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
let shouldRecreateSession = false
let recreateReason = ''
if (enableAutoSessionRecreation && messageRetryManager && retryCount >= 1) {
if (enableAutoSessionRecreation && messageRetryManager && retryCount > 1) {
try {
// Check if we have a session with this JID
const sessionId = signalRepository.jidToSignalProtocolAddress(fromJid)
@@ -1453,7 +1390,6 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
})
// When a session is refreshed (identity change), re-issue tctoken fire-and-forget
// WABA Android: reissue stores senderTimestamp + realIssueTimestamp after IQ success
if (result.action === 'session_refreshed') {
const normalizedJid = jidNormalizedUser(from)
resolveTcTokenJid(normalizedJid, getLIDForPN)
@@ -1463,36 +1399,9 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
if (entry?.token?.length && !isTcTokenExpired(entry.timestamp)) {
const senderTs = unixTimestampSeconds()
logTcToken('reissue', { jid: normalizedJid, reason: 'session_refreshed' })
getPrivacyTokens([normalizedJid], senderTs)
.then(async (iqResult) => {
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result: iqResult,
fallbackJid: normalizedJid,
keys: authState.keys,
getLIDForPN,
onNewJidStored: (storedJid) => {
tcTokenKnownJids.add(storedJid)
scheduleTcTokenIndexSave()
}
})
// Persist senderTimestamp + realIssueTimestamp after IQ success
const currentData = await authState.keys.get('tctoken', [tcJid])
const currentEntry = currentData[tcJid]
await authState.keys.set({
tctoken: {
[tcJid]: {
...currentEntry,
token: currentEntry?.token ?? Buffer.alloc(0),
senderTimestamp: senderTs,
realIssueTimestamp: 0
}
}
})
logTcToken('reissue_ok', { jid: normalizedJid, reason: 'session_refreshed' })
})
.catch(err => {
logTcToken('reissue_fail', { jid: normalizedJid, error: err?.message })
})
getPrivacyTokens([normalizedJid], senderTs).catch(err => {
logTcToken('reissue_fail', { jid: normalizedJid, error: err?.message })
})
}
})
.catch(() => {
@@ -1940,10 +1849,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
[storageJid]: {
...existing,
token: Buffer.from(content),
timestamp,
// WABA Android: resets real_issue_timestamp when a new incoming token arrives
// (UPDATE wa_trusted_contacts_send SET real_issue_timestamp=null)
realIssueTimestamp: null
timestamp
}
}
})
@@ -2033,7 +1939,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
let shouldRecreateSession = false
let recreateReason = ''
if (enableAutoSessionRecreation && messageRetryManager && retryCount >= 1) {
if (enableAutoSessionRecreation && messageRetryManager && retryCount > 1) {
try {
const sessionId = signalRepository.jidToSignalProtocolAddress(participant)
@@ -2265,6 +2171,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
authState.creds.me!.lid || '',
signalRepository,
logger,
autoCleanCorrupted
)
const alt = msg.key.participantAlt || msg.key.remoteJidAlt
@@ -2854,24 +2761,6 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
const jid = jidNormalizedUser(attrs.from)
logTcToken('error_463', { jid, msgId })
// WABA Android: error 463 triggers getPrivacyTokens() fire-and-forget
// to ensure token is available for the retry below
getPrivacyTokens([jid])
.then(async (result) => {
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result,
fallbackJid: jid,
keys: authState.keys,
getLIDForPN,
onNewJidStored: (storedJid) => {
tcTokenKnownJids.add(storedJid)
scheduleTcTokenIndexSave()
}
})
logTcToken('fetched', { jid, reason: 'error_463' })
})
.catch(() => { /* fire-and-forget */ })
// Single-retry: wait 1.5s for the server's tctoken notification to arrive,
// then resend. A Set prevents infinite retry loops.
// Composite key (jid:msgId) ensures retries are isolated per destination.
@@ -2907,24 +2796,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
return
}
} else if (attrs.error === SERVER_ERROR_CODES.SmaxInvalid) {
const jid479 = jidNormalizedUser(attrs.from)
logTcToken('error_479', { jid: jid479, msgId: attrs.id })
// WABA Android: error 479 (SmaxInvalid) also triggers token re-fetch
getPrivacyTokens([jid479])
.then(async (result) => {
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result,
fallbackJid: jid479,
keys: authState.keys,
getLIDForPN,
onNewJidStored: (storedJid) => {
tcTokenKnownJids.add(storedJid)
scheduleTcTokenIndexSave()
}
})
logTcToken('fetched', { jid: jid479, reason: 'error_479' })
})
.catch(() => { /* fire-and-forget */ })
logTcToken('error_479', { jid: attrs.from, msgId: attrs.id })
} else {
logger.warn({ attrs }, 'received error in ack')
}
+1 -4
View File
@@ -1611,8 +1611,6 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
// Persist senderTimestamp unconditionally — WA Web stores it in the chat table
// regardless of whether a token exists. Spread preserves token+timestamp if present.
// WABA Android: INSERT INTO wa_trusted_contacts_send (jid, sent_tc_token_timestamp, real_issue_timestamp)
// VALUES (?, ?, 0) — realIssueTimestamp=0 means issued but not yet confirmed by server
const currentData = await authState.keys.get('tctoken', [tcTokenJid])
const currentEntry = currentData[tcTokenJid]
await authState.keys.set({
@@ -1620,8 +1618,7 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
[tcTokenJid]: {
...currentEntry,
token: currentEntry?.token ?? Buffer.alloc(0),
senderTimestamp: issueTimestamp,
realIssueTimestamp: 0
senderTimestamp: issueTimestamp
}
}
})
+6 -25
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ import {
signedKeyPair,
xmppSignedPreKey
} from '../Utils'
import { getPlatformId, isAndroidBrowser } from '../Utils/browser-utils'
import { getPlatformId } from '../Utils/browser-utils'
import {
CircuitBreaker,
CircuitOpenError,
@@ -634,6 +634,8 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}
helloMsg = proto.HandshakeMessage.fromObject(helloMsg)
logger.info({ browser, helloMsg }, 'connected to WA')
const init = proto.HandshakeMessage.encode(helloMsg).finish()
const result = await awaitNextMessage<Uint8Array>(init)
@@ -1350,25 +1352,6 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
id: jidEncode(phoneNumber, 's.whatsapp.net'),
name: '~'
}
// Pair code companion_platform_id must be Chrome (1) when using Android
// browser preset. ANDROID_PHONE (16) causes silent timeout (server ignores),
// UWP (21) causes "cannot connect device" rejection. Only Chrome (1) works
// for pair code via web protocol (WA\x06\x03). The device still appears as
// "Android" in linked devices because DeviceProps.platformType=ANDROID_PHONE
// is set separately in the registration node.
const isAndroid = isAndroidBrowser(browser)
const pairPlatformId = isAndroid ? getPlatformId('Chrome') : getPlatformId(browser[1])
const pairPlatformDisplay = isAndroid ? 'Chrome (Mac OS)' : `${browser[1]} (${browser[0]})`
logger.info({
pairCode: pairingCode,
jid: authState.creds.me.id,
companionPlatformId: pairPlatformId,
companionPlatformDisplay: pairPlatformDisplay,
isAndroid,
}, `pair code requested | companion: ${pairPlatformDisplay} | ${isAndroid ? 'android override -> Chrome' : 'native platform'}`)
ev.emit('creds.update', authState.creds)
await sendNode({
tag: 'iq',
@@ -1401,12 +1384,12 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
{
tag: 'companion_platform_id',
attrs: {},
content: pairPlatformId
content: getPlatformId(browser[1])
},
{
tag: 'companion_platform_display',
attrs: {},
content: pairPlatformDisplay
content: `${browser[1]} (${browser[0]})`
},
{
tag: 'link_code_pairing_nonce',
@@ -1536,9 +1519,7 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
})
// login complete
ws.on('CB:success', async (node: BinaryNode) => {
const isAndroid = isAndroidBrowser(browser)
const phoneId = authState.creds.me?.id?.split(':')[0]?.split('@')[0] || 'new session'
logger.info(`${isAndroid ? '\uD83D\uDCF1' : '\uD83D\uDDA5\uFE0F'} Connected to WA | ${phoneId} | platform: ${isAndroid ? 'SMB_ANDROID' : 'MACOS'} | device: ${isAndroid ? 'Android' : 'Desktop'} | platformType: ${isAndroid ? 'ANDROID_PHONE' : 'CHROME'}`)
logger.info('opened connection to WA')
clearTimeout(qrTimer) // will never happen in all likelyhood -- but just in case WA sends success on first try
ev.emit('creds.update', { me: { ...authState.creds.me!, lid: node.attrs.lid } })
+1 -1
View File
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ export type SignalDataTypeMap = {
'app-state-sync-version': LTHashState
'lid-mapping': string
'device-list': string[]
tctoken: { token: Buffer; timestamp?: string; senderTimestamp?: number; realIssueTimestamp?: number | null }
tctoken: { token: Buffer; timestamp?: string; senderTimestamp?: number }
/** Identity key for Signal Protocol - used for detecting contact reinstalls */
'identity-key': Uint8Array
}
-1
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ export type BrowsersMap = {
baileys(browser: string): [string, string, string]
windows(browser: string): [string, string, string]
appropriate(browser: string): [string, string, string]
android(apiLevel: string): [string, string, string]
}
export enum DisconnectReason {
+3 -20
View File
@@ -94,13 +94,7 @@ const BROWSER_TO_PLATFORM_ID: ReadonlyMap<string, string> = (() => {
}
}
const map = new Map(entries)
// ANDROID → ANDROID_PHONE alias (DeviceProps.PlatformType has ANDROID_PHONE but not ANDROID)
if (!map.has('ANDROID') && map.has('ANDROID_PHONE')) {
map.set('ANDROID', map.get('ANDROID_PHONE')!)
}
return map
return new Map(entries)
})()
// ============================================================
@@ -337,8 +331,7 @@ export const Browsers: BrowsersMap = {
macOS: (browser: string): [string, string, string] => ['Mac OS', browser, OS_VERSIONS.macOS],
windows: (browser: string): [string, string, string] => ['Windows', browser, OS_VERSIONS.windows],
baileys: (browser: string): [string, string, string] => ['Baileys', browser, OS_VERSIONS.baileys],
appropriate: (browser: string): [string, string, string] => [getPlatformName(), browser, getAppropriateVersion()],
android: (apiLevel: string): [string, string, string] => [apiLevel, 'Android', '']
appropriate: (browser: string): [string, string, string] => [getPlatformName(), browser, getAppropriateVersion()]
} as const
/**
@@ -385,7 +378,7 @@ export const getPlatformId = (browser: unknown): string => {
* properties like 'toString' or 'constructor'.
*
* @param value - Value to check
* @returns True if value is a valid browser preset key ('ubuntu', 'macOS', 'windows', 'baileys', 'appropriate', 'android')
* @returns True if value is a valid browser preset key ('ubuntu', 'macOS', 'windows', 'baileys', 'appropriate')
*
* @example
* isValidBrowserPreset('ubuntu') // true
@@ -398,16 +391,6 @@ export const getPlatformId = (browser: unknown): string => {
* const config = Browsers[userInput]('MyApp')
* }
*/
/**
* Checks if the browser tuple represents an Android companion device.
*
* @param browser - Browser tuple [os, platform, version]
* @returns True if platform is 'Android' (case-insensitive)
*/
export const isAndroidBrowser = (browser: [string, string, string]): boolean => {
return browser[1]?.toUpperCase() === 'ANDROID'
}
export const isValidBrowserPreset = (value: unknown): value is keyof BrowsersMap => {
return typeof value === 'string' && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Browsers, value)
}
+68 -18
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import {
isJidStatusBroadcast,
isLidUser,
isPnUser,
jidDecode
// transferDevice
} from '../WABinary'
import { unpadRandomMax16 } from './generics'
@@ -275,6 +276,7 @@ export const decryptMessageNode = (
meLid: string,
repository: SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore,
logger: ILogger,
autoCleanCorrupted = true
) => {
const { fullMessage, author, sender } = decodeMessageNode(stanza, meId, meLid)
return {
@@ -420,19 +422,34 @@ export const decryptMessageNode = (
if (isRetryExhausted) {
logger.error(
errorContext,
`⚠️ Session corrupted after ${err.attempts} attempts. Retry+pkmsg flow will recover.`
`⚠️ Session corrupted and recovery failed after ${err.attempts} attempts. Auto-cleanup will attempt to recover.`
)
} else {
// First occurrence - log as warning since auto-recovery will attempt
logger.warn(errorContext, '⚠️ Corrupted session detected - attempting auto-recovery')
}
// Session cleanup is deferred to retry exhaustion (safety net).
// The Signal Protocol handles recovery naturally via retry+pkmsg:
// Bad MAC -> retry receipt -> sender re-sends as pkmsg -> new session.
// Deleting sessions here (hot path) causes cascading failures when
// multiple messages from the same contact arrive simultaneously.
// See: messages-recv.ts sendRetryRequest() for deferred cleanup.
// Automatic cleanup of corrupted session (if enabled)
// eslint-disable-next-line max-depth
if (autoCleanCorrupted) {
// eslint-disable-next-line max-depth
try {
const deletedCount = await cleanupCorruptedSession(decryptionJid, repository, logger)
// Mask only user portion of JID for privacy (preserve domain info)
const { user, server } = jidDecode(decryptionJid) || {}
const maskedUser =
user && user.length > 8 ? `${user.substring(0, 4)}****${user.substring(user.length - 4)}` : user
const maskedJid = maskedUser && server ? `${maskedUser}@${server}` : decryptionJid
logger.info(
{ jid: decryptionJid, maskedJid, targetedDevices: deletedCount },
`🔄 Session Reset | JID: ${maskedJid} | Targeted: ${deletedCount} devices | Will recreate on next message`
)
} catch (cleanupErr) {
logger.error({ decryptionJid, err: cleanupErr }, '❌ Failed to cleanup corrupted session')
}
}
} else if (isSessionRecord) {
// Session record errors are transient - retry should handle them
// eslint-disable-next-line max-depth
@@ -487,20 +504,53 @@ export function isCorruptedSessionError(error: any): boolean {
}
/**
* Clean up corrupted session for a specific device JID.
* WABA behavior: DELETE sessions WHERE recipient_id=? AND device_id=?
* Only deletes the exact device that was corrupted, not all devices.
*
* NOTE: This should NOT be called on every Bad MAC error (hot path).
* Instead, let the retry+pkmsg flow handle recovery naturally (like WhatsApp does).
* Only call this as a safety net when retries are exhausted.
* Clean up corrupted session by deleting all device sessions for a JID
* Signal Protocol will automatically recreate the session on next message
*/
export async function cleanupCorruptedSession(
async function cleanupCorruptedSession(
jid: string,
repository: SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore,
logger: ILogger
): Promise<number> {
await repository.deleteSession([jid])
logger.info({ jid }, 'Cleaned up corrupted session for specific device')
return 1
const { user, device } = jidDecode(jid) || {}
if (!user) {
logger.warn({ jid }, 'Cannot cleanup session - invalid JID')
return 0
}
// Build list of JIDs to delete (primary + secondary devices)
const jidsToDelete: string[] = []
// Determine domain type correctly (handle hosted JIDs)
// JID formats:
// - PN: user@s.whatsapp.net
// - LID: user@lid
// - Hosted PN: user@hosted
// - Hosted LID: user@hosted.lid
const isLID = jid.endsWith('@lid') || jid.endsWith('@hosted.lid')
const isHosted = jid.includes('@hosted')
let domain: string
if (isLID) {
domain = isHosted ? 'hosted.lid' : 'lid'
} else {
domain = isHosted ? 'hosted' : 's.whatsapp.net'
}
// Primary device (0)
jidsToDelete.push(`${user}@${domain}`)
// Secondary devices (1-5 common range for Web/Desktop/etc)
for (let i = 1; i <= 5; i++) {
jidsToDelete.push(`${user}:${i}@${domain}`)
}
// If specific device was identified and > 5, ensure it's included
if (device !== undefined && device > 5) {
jidsToDelete.push(`${user}:${device}@${domain}`)
}
await repository.deleteSession(jidsToDelete)
return jidsToDelete.length
}
+4 -22
View File
@@ -211,33 +211,15 @@ export class MessageRetryManager {
}
}
// MAC errors require session recreation, but rate-limited to prevent loops.
// When multiple messages fail with Bad MAC simultaneously, only the first
// should trigger recreation; subsequent ones within the cooldown window
// piggyback on the same new session established by the retry+pkmsg flow.
// MAC errors require IMMEDIATE session recreation regardless of history
// This handles the case where contact reinstalled WhatsApp (identity key changed)
if (errorCode !== undefined && MAC_ERROR_CODES.has(errorCode)) {
const now = Date.now()
const prevTime = this.sessionRecreateHistory.get(jid)
const MAC_ERROR_COOLDOWN_MS = 1_000 // 1 second — WABA recovers faster
if (prevTime && now - prevTime < MAC_ERROR_COOLDOWN_MS) {
const reasonName = RetryReason[errorCode] || `code_${errorCode}`
this.logger.debug(
{ jid, errorCode: reasonName, msSinceLast: now - prevTime },
'MAC error session recreation skipped — cooldown active'
)
return {
reason: '',
recreate: false
}
}
this.sessionRecreateHistory.set(jid, now)
this.sessionRecreateHistory.set(jid, Date.now())
this.statistics.sessionRecreations++
const reasonName = RetryReason[errorCode] || `code_${errorCode}`
metrics.signalMacErrors?.inc({ action: 'session_recreation' })
metrics.signalSessionRecreations?.inc({ reason: 'mac_error' })
this.logger.warn({ jid, errorCode: reasonName }, 'MAC error detected, recreating session')
this.logger.warn({ jid, errorCode: reasonName }, 'MAC error detected, forcing immediate session recreation')
return {
reason: `MAC error (${reasonName}) - contact may have reinstalled WhatsApp`,
recreate: true
+1 -4
View File
@@ -159,10 +159,7 @@ export async function storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
[storageJid]: {
...existingEntry,
token: Buffer.from(tokenNode.content),
timestamp: tokenNode.attrs.t,
// WABA Android: resets real_issue_timestamp to null when storing a new token
// (UPDATE wa_trusted_contacts_send SET real_issue_timestamp=null)
realIssueTimestamp: null
timestamp: tokenNode.attrs.t
}
}
})
+4 -12
View File
@@ -14,12 +14,6 @@ import { encodeBigEndian } from './generics'
import { createSignalIdentity } from './signal'
const getUserAgent = (config: SocketConfig): proto.ClientPayload.IUserAgent => {
// Always use MACOS/Desktop identity for UserAgent — we connect via web
// protocol (WA\x06\x03) so the server expects a web-like UserAgent.
// Using SMB_ANDROID here causes pair code registration to fail with
// "não é possível conectar" even though the phone shows the confirmation.
// Android identity is only set in DeviceProps (registration node) which
// determines the display name in "Linked Devices".
return {
appVersion: {
primary: config.version[0],
@@ -32,6 +26,7 @@ const getUserAgent = (config: SocketConfig): proto.ClientPayload.IUserAgent => {
device: 'Desktop',
osBuildNumber: '0.1',
localeLanguageIso6391: 'en',
mnc: '000',
mcc: '000',
localeCountryIso31661Alpha2: config.countryCode
@@ -60,10 +55,11 @@ const getClientPayload = (config: SocketConfig) => {
const payload: proto.IClientPayload = {
connectType: proto.ClientPayload.ConnectType.WIFI_UNKNOWN,
connectReason: proto.ClientPayload.ConnectReason.USER_ACTIVATED,
userAgent: getUserAgent(config),
webInfo: getWebInfo(config)
userAgent: getUserAgent(config)
}
payload.webInfo = getWebInfo(config)
return payload
}
@@ -88,10 +84,6 @@ export const generateLoginNode = (userJid: string, config: SocketConfig): proto.
const getPlatformType = (platform: string): proto.DeviceProps.PlatformType => {
const platformType = platform.toUpperCase()
if (platformType === 'ANDROID') {
return proto.DeviceProps.PlatformType.ANDROID_PHONE
}
return (
proto.DeviceProps.PlatformType[platformType as keyof typeof proto.DeviceProps.PlatformType] ||
proto.DeviceProps.PlatformType.CHROME