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Author SHA1 Message Date
Renato Alcara 4d00e8f9ce docs(audit): clean 2 more stale circuit-breaker mentions found in /audit
- structured-logger.ts header bullet "External system integration via
  hooks with circuit breaker" -> updated to describe current
  fire-and-forget hook semantics + hookFailures metric counter.
- retry-utils.ts retryConfigs.rsocket comment referenced the
  prometheus-metrics -> circuit-breaker.ts circular import chain.
  circuit-breaker.ts is gone; trimmed the parenthetical to keep just
  the core reasoning (avoid ESM init-order issues via prometheus-metrics).

No code change. Build clean, 35/35 suites, 809/809 tests pass.
2026-04-27 01:03:27 -03:00
Renato Alcara 4687a2a86f docs(unified-session): update class docstring (no more circuit breaker)
PR #393 review (Copilot): the class-level JSDoc still listed "Circuit
breaker protection" as a feature, but the protection was removed in
commit b531b46999 in favour of best-effort single-attempt semantics
(telemetry is non-critical — failures are swallowed and counted in the
hookFailures metric).

Updated the bullet point to describe what actually happens now.

Note: not addressing the breaking-API change comments (removed
enableCircuitBreaker option from UnifiedSessionOptions, removed
circuitBreakers/getCircuitBreakerStats/resetCircuitBreakers from
makeSocket() return, removed circuit_breaker_* Prometheus metrics)
per maintainer policy — this fork has a single consumer (zpro.io),
downstream forks absorb on merge.
2026-04-27 00:58:26 -03:00
Renato Alcara d5796b36b6 docs(retry): clarify abort semantics + remove stale circuit-breaker mention
Two doc-only fixes from PR #393 review (Copilot):

1. **bounded-retry.ts BoundedRetryOptions.signal**
   The previous one-line "if aborted, give up immediately" was technically
   correct from the loop's perspective but misleading about what happens
   to an in-flight operation. Expanded to describe the three observation
   points: sleep wakes immediately, in-flight attempt is forwarded the
   per-attempt signal (only truly immediate if the operation itself
   observes it), and the next loop iteration throws BoundedRetryAbortedError.

2. **retry-utils.ts module-level JSDoc**
   The header still listed "Circuit breaker integration" as a feature.
   The circuitBreaker option was removed in commit b531b46999 and the
   withRetry/retryable/RetryManager helpers in 0f2402da58. Updated the
   header to describe the actual current surface (used for Bad MAC
   recovery on decrypt path) and recommend withBoundedRetry for socket
   operations.

Build clean, 35/35 suites, 809/809 tests pass.

Note: not addressing the suppressed comment about removed APIs being a
breaking change — per maintainer policy this fork has a single consumer,
downstream forks absorb on merge.
2026-04-27 00:42:09 -03:00
Renato Alcara f914ffe272 fix(bounded-retry): address PR #393 second-round review
All 5 issues verified as REAL (not false positives) and fixed:

1. **CRITICAL: query() swallows timeouts → bounded-retry treats as success**
   (CodeRabbit Critical, line 319 socket.ts)
   waitForMessage() returns undefined on timeout instead of throwing.
   queryInternal() returns that undefined unchanged. uploadToServer
   was `await query(...)` then logging success regardless — a timed-out
   upload would update lastUploadTime with no retry triggered.

   Fix: validate response shape inside uploadToServer:
       if (!result) throw new Boom('Pre-key upload query timed out (no response)', { statusCode: 408 })
   Bounded-retry now sees the throw and properly retries.

2. **MAJOR: Outer Promise.race + bounded-retry can run in parallel**
   (CodeRabbit Major + Copilot, line 674 socket.ts)
   With safety margin (ttlMs=28s vs UPLOAD_TIMEOUT=30s) bounded-retry
   should always reach give-up first, but if anything bypasses that
   bound the outer race rejects while bounded-retry keeps running.

   Fix: wire AbortController. Pass its signal to bounded-retry.
   On outer race timeout, abort the controller → bounded-retry stops
   cleanly with BoundedRetryAbortedError. uploadToServer also honours
   the signal before logging success.

3. **MINOR: sleep-leak test does not observe the leak**
   (CodeRabbit Minor)
   Test only triggered 4 sleeps — below Node's 11-listener warning —
   and never captured warning events.

   Fix: spy on signal.addEventListener / removeEventListener and
   assert add count == remove count.

4. **MINOR: structured-logger thenable .catch can throw**
   (Copilot)
   Code called (hookResult as Promise).catch(...) directly. Fails on
   thenables that only implement .then.

   Fix: use Promise.resolve(hookResult).catch(...) which adapts any
   thenable safely.

5. **Internal: bounded-retry catch was double-removing outer-abort listener**
   Found by the new spy-based test. Both catch and finally called
   removeEventListener. Removed redundant catch-block remove; finally
   is single source of truth.

Build clean, 35/35 suites, 809/809 tests pass.
2026-04-27 00:30:37 -03:00
Renato Alcara 73d63b6304 fix(prekey): align bounded-retry ttl with outer UPLOAD_TIMEOUT race
Bug found while reviewing pre-key auto-replenishment behavior with the
user. uploadPreKeys is wrapped in:

    Promise.race([uploadLogic(), 30s timeout])    ← UPLOAD_TIMEOUT

Inside uploadLogic, my previous commit configured bounded-retry with
ttlMs=60_000 (60s). Result: outer race always wins at 30s, bounded-retry
never reaches its natural give-up. We lose the structured logs / metrics
emitted on TTL exhaustion, AND if a retry was about to succeed at second
29, it gets killed by the outer race.

Fix:
- ttlMs reduced to UPLOAD_TIMEOUT - 2_000 = 28_000ms (safety margin so
  bounded-retry always reaches give-up before the outer race).
- perAttemptTimeoutMs reduced 20s -> 8s so multiple attempts fit in 28s.
- delays trimmed to [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000] (4 attempts, ≈15s with
  delays plus per-attempt time = comfortably within 28s budget).
- query(node) timeout aligned with PER_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS=8s.

Pre-key replenishment system (existed before this PR, untouched):
- MIN_PREKEY_COUNT=200 (replenishment threshold)
- INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT=800 (top-up target — matches WA Business CDP
  capture: prekey-store=812 on registration)
- Triggered on: CB:success login, every 6h auto-sync, Bad MAC recovery,
  specific peer prekey miss.

Bounded-retry only handles HOW the upload retries on transient failure,
not WHEN. The two layers are orthogonal.

Build clean, 35/35 suites, 809/809 tests pass.
2026-04-27 00:14:23 -03:00
Renato Alcara 0700c44d59 chore(socket): remove dead retryCount param from uploadPreKeys
PR #393 review (low-confidence comment): the retryCount parameter and
its `=== 0` guard were leftovers from the previous manual recursive
backoff. Now that bounded-retry handles retries internally, the
recursion is gone and retryCount is always 0.

Drop the parameter, remove the guard (the check applies always), and
simplify the log statement (no more "retryCount" in the structured
data — bounded-retry's own logger logs attempt counts).

Build clean, 35/35 suites, 809/809 tests pass.
2026-04-27 00:07:05 -03:00
Renato Alcara b0030a0482 fix(bounded-retry): address PR #393 review — strict TTL, abort cancel, no leaks, structured logs
Addresses 7 issues from Codex P2 + Copilot + CodeRabbit Critical/Major:

1. **TTL enforced BEFORE each attempt** (Codex P2 + Copilot + CodeRabbit Major)
   Previously TTL was only checked AFTER a failure, so an attempt could
   start with 0ms remaining and run for the full perAttemptTimeoutMs.
   Now: check at top of loop. If already exceeded, throw immediately.

2. **Per-attempt timeout capped by remaining TTL** (Copilot)
   `attemptTimeoutMs = min(perAttemptTimeoutMs, ttlMs - elapsed)` so a
   single attempt cannot run past the wall-clock deadline.

3. **Operation receives AbortSignal for cancellation** (CodeRabbit Critical)
   `withTimeout` now aborts an `AbortController` when the timeout fires.
   The signal is forwarded to the operation, so callers can opt into
   cancelling in-flight work (e.g. `(signal) => fetch({ signal })`).
   Without this, a timed-out attempt's network call kept running while
   bounded-retry started the next attempt — wasted work + duplicate
   listeners.

4. **sleep() removes abort listener on normal completion** (Codex P2 +
   Copilot + CodeRabbit)
   Previously `signal.addEventListener('abort', onAbort, { once: true })`
   was added on every retry but never removed when the timer resolved.
   Long-lived signals reused across retries accumulated listeners. Now
   explicit cleanup on both timer-resolve and abort paths.

5. **Outer abort listener properly cleaned up in main loop**
   Adds + removes via try/finally to prevent leaks when the loop throws.

6. **Metrics use optional chaining** (Copilot)
   `metrics.socketEvents?.inc(...)` everywhere, matching the rest of the
   codebase pattern (handles partial mocks in tests).

7. **Structured logging** (user request)
   New optional `logger?: ILogger` field. Emits:
   - debug: each retry scheduling (`{op, attempt, delayMs, elapsedMs, error}`)
   - info: recovery after retries (`{op, attempts, elapsedMs}`)
   - warn: give-up via TTL or shouldRetry predicate

8. **socket.ts: align uploadPreKeys query timeout with bounded-retry**
   `query(node, PER_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS)` so a stale attempt does not
   keep an iq listener registered past bounded-retry's per-attempt
   deadline (Copilot).

9. **Doc updated**: removed claim about `maxAttempts` (option doesn't
   exist; bounded by ttlMs + delay-cap + per-attempt-timeout).

Tests: 18 pass (was 12; added 6 covering each fix).
Full suite: 35/35 suites, 809/809 tests pass.

NB: The "breaking API change" comments (Types/Socket.ts, Utils/index.ts,
structured-logger.ts) are intentional and not addressed — this fork has
a single consumer; downstream forks merging will absorb the change.
2026-04-27 00:05:28 -03:00
Renato Alcara d0bbf85e6a fix(lint): resolve no-unused-vars errors flagged by CI
- bounded-retry.ts:103 — drop unused generic parameter <T> from
  BoundedRetryOptions interface (and its single use at line 220).
  The generic served no purpose: the caller's return type is inferred
  from the operation function, not from the options.
- retry-utils.test.ts:5 — remove `beforeEach` from imports. It was
  only used by the RetryManager describe block, removed in commit
  0f2402da58.

Build clean, 58 tests pass (12 bounded-retry + 46 retry-utils).
2026-04-26 23:53:55 -03:00
Renato Alcara 0f2402da58 refactor(retry): remove dead helpers from retry-utils (withRetry, retryable, RetryManager)
Audit follow-up. After verifying the codebase, three exports of
retry-utils.ts have ZERO production callers:

- `withRetry` decorator (lines 419-440): unused
- `retryable` wrapper (lines 442-453): unused (1 self-test only)
- `RetryManager` class (lines 455-549): unused (1 self-test only)
  Note: `MessageRetryManager` in messages-send.ts is a separate class,
  not the same thing.

The kept exports are still used:
- `retry()` function: used by decode-wa-message.ts for Bad MAC recovery
- `RetryExhaustedError`, `RetryOptions`, `RetryContext`: used same place
- `RETRY_BACKOFF_DELAYS`, `RETRY_JITTER_FACTOR`: re-exported via Defaults
- `retryPredicates`, `retryConfigs`: helper presets (kept; small)

Removed `EventEmitter` import (was only used by the deleted RetryManager).
Removed `retryable` and `RetryManager` from test imports + their describe
blocks (5 tests removed, all targeting the deleted code).

Net: -148 lines from retry-utils.ts, -90 lines from its test file.
803 tests pass (was 809; 6 deleted tests covered the removed code).

Now the InfiniteAPI retry surface is:
- `retry-utils.ts:retry()` for Bad MAC recovery (decryption layer)
- `bounded-retry.ts:withBoundedRetry()` for socket operation retry
  (uploadPreKeys), with WhatsApp Android empirical defaults

No redundancy: each helper handles a distinct concern.
2026-04-26 23:35:21 -03:00
Renato Alcara 5017393277 refactor(logger): remove private CircuitBreaker from structured-logger
The structured-logger had its OWN private CircuitBreaker class for
external-hook protection — gate hook calls when the user's hook keeps
throwing, to prevent log explosion.

Replaced by simple try/catch + hookFailures metric increment:
- If the user's hook throws synchronously → catch + increment metric.
- If the hook returns a rejected promise → .catch + increment metric.
- We do NOT gate further calls. If the hook is broken, the metric
  goes up rapidly and operators see it. Consistent with the rest of
  the codebase after the socket-layer circuit-breaker removal:
  fast-fail, no state machines, no cross-call gating.

Removed:
- The internal CircuitBreaker class (lines 244-298, 55 lines)
- circuitBreakerThreshold + circuitBreakerResetMs config options
- circuitBreakerTrips metric field (LoggerMetrics)
- circuitBreakerState statistics field (LoggerStatistics)
- circuitBreaker init in constructor + null assignment in destroy()

Build passes; 19 structured-logger tests pass; 35/35 suites pass.
2026-04-26 23:15:47 -03:00
Renato Alcara c557714e72 chore(audit): clean up stale circuit-breaker references found in audit
Sweep after the main substitution found three stale references that
predated this PR but became misleading once circuit breaker was removed:

- src/Socket/socket.ts: keep-alive ping comment claimed it bypassed the
  circuit breaker. Rewritten to reflect the actual reason for using
  sendNode() (avoid response correlator overhead) with a brief
  historical note.
- src/Socket/socket.ts: comment in sendNode() init mentioned avoiding
  duplicating circuit breakers; updated to "manager state".
- src/Socket/socket.ts: queryInternal comment described a self-tripping
  loop in the circuit breaker; trimmed to keep only the relevant point
  about the outer-timeout race.
- src/Utils/prometheus-metrics.ts: 6 circuit_breaker_* metrics removed
  (state/trips/recoveries/rejections/successes/failures) — no longer
  emitted by anything in the codebase. Also removed the
  initialize-with-zero call in initializeMetricsWithLabels.
2026-04-26 23:05:04 -03:00
Renato Alcara c8056a967c docs: explain bounded-retry rationale (Frida-empirical defaults)
Expand the file-level JSDoc on bounded-retry.ts to document:
- Why circuit breaker was removed (cascading failures in production:
  5 timeouts in 60s blocked all queries for 30s).
- Empirical justification: Frida hook captures of WhatsApp Android
  showing per-operation exponential backoff (3s -> 10s -> 60s ->
  ~64s -> 120s cap), bounded memory, no retry storm on recovery,
  no global state machine.
- Design properties (per-op isolation, bounded by attempts+TTL,
  per-attempt timeout, abort support, memory bound).
- Guidance: when to use plain query() vs. withBoundedRetry().
- Three usage examples covering common patterns.

No code changes — comment-only.
2026-04-26 22:53:36 -03:00
Renato Alcara 24329e9ba1 chore: remove circuit-breaker module and tests
Delete src/Utils/circuit-breaker.ts (767 lines) and the corresponding
test file src/__tests__/Utils/circuit-breaker.test.ts (371 lines).

Replaced by src/Utils/bounded-retry.ts (added in earlier commit). All
remaining circuit-breaker references in the codebase are explanatory
comments in code that previously used circuit breakers — kept for
git-history context.

Final state: 35/35 test suites pass, 809 tests pass.
2026-04-26 22:52:18 -03:00
Renato Alcara b70d144699 refactor(tests): adapt unified-session tests to no-circuit-breaker world
- Remove circuitBreakerTrips from the prometheus-metrics mock (metric
  no longer emitted now that telemetry path skips the circuit breaker).
- Drop the enableCircuitBreaker option from the default test setup.
- Replace the "with CircuitBreaker" describe block with an equivalent
  suite that asserts the same observable behavior (single send per call,
  failures swallowed gracefully) without requiring the option.

All 31 unified-session tests pass.
2026-04-26 22:50:55 -03:00
Renato Alcara d9e0e0e0af refactor(types): drop circuit-breaker SocketConfig fields and default
Removes the 5 optional circuit-breaker config fields exposed via SocketConfig
and the corresponding default in DEFAULT_CONNECTION_CONFIG:

  - enableCircuitBreaker
  - queryCircuitBreaker
  - connectionCircuitBreaker
  - preKeyCircuitBreaker
  - messageCircuitBreaker

Also drops the CircuitBreakerOptions import.

Backward compatibility: these were ALL optional. Callers that set them
will see no compile error (TypeScript accepts unknown extra props on
loose object literals through structural typing) and the values are
simply ignored. A future major version may want to mark these as
forbidden with a more aggressive type, but for now silent ignore is
the least intrusive transition.
2026-04-26 22:49:27 -03:00
Renato Alcara a6cf9b0b26 refactor(signal): replace circuit-breaker with bounded-retry in libsignal wrapper
The preKeyCircuitBreaker was passed into signalStorage() as an optional
parameter and was used in only ONE place: .reset() after detecting an
identity-key change (line 391, the 'contact may have reinstalled WhatsApp'
recovery path).

Bounded-retry is stateless — each retry is independent — so the equivalent
of "forget the past failures" happens automatically on the next operation.
There is no state to reset.

Changes:
- Drop CircuitBreaker import.
- Remove preKeyCircuitBreaker field from LibSignalRepositoryOptions.
- Remove preKeyCircuitBreaker parameter from signalStorage().
- Remove the .reset() call in the identity-key-change recovery path
  (replaced with explanatory comment).

Build passes.
2026-04-26 22:48:23 -03:00
Renato Alcara b531b46999 refactor(utils): remove circuit-breaker integration from helpers
- Utils/index.ts: re-export bounded-retry instead of circuit-breaker
- Utils/unified-session.ts: drop the optional circuit-breaker wrapping.
  Telemetry is non-critical; a single send attempt with the underlying
  sendNode timeout is sufficient. Removed enableCircuitBreaker option,
  circuitBreaker field, and CircuitOpenError handling.
- Utils/retry-utils.ts: drop the optional circuitBreaker option from
  withRetry. Retry mechanics are now self-contained; callers that need
  bounded retries should prefer withBoundedRetry directly.
- Utils/health-status.ts: stop importing globalCircuitRegistry. Keep the
  CircuitBreakerHealth shape for k8s probe schema stability — always
  reports an empty list now.

Note: src/Utils/structured-logger.ts has its own *private* CircuitBreaker
class for log-throttling — independent of the socket-level circuit breaker
being removed. Untouched.

baileys-logger.ts logCircuitBreaker() is a generic logging helper that
takes state strings as input — no import dependency. Untouched (no-op
for callers that no longer have circuit breakers).
2026-04-26 22:46:30 -03:00
Renato Alcara 3ece5f7446 refactor(socket): replace 3 circuit breakers with bounded-retry
Remove queryCircuitBreaker, connectionCircuitBreaker, and preKeyCircuitBreaker
from src/Socket/socket.ts. Empirical capture (Frida) of WhatsApp Android
shows it uses per-operation exponential backoff, not a global state machine
that gates unrelated operations after N failures.

Changes:
- query(): unwrap. Each iq stanza has its own waitForMessage timeout.
  Callers that need retry semantics (assertSessions etc.) wrap query()
  with withBoundedRetry() at their level.
- sendRawMessage(): unwrap. WS lifecycle errors were already filtered
  out of the circuit's failure count — the only failures it tripped on
  were rare native send() errors, where a state-machine adds no value
  over a fast propagated error. Reconnection logic in makeSocket
  handles WS recovery independently.
- uploadPreKeys(): replace circuit breaker AND the manual exponential
  backoff retry loop with withBoundedRetry. Cleaner: one mechanism
  instead of two stacked.
- Remove circuitBreakers / getCircuitBreakerStats / resetCircuitBreakers
  from the socket return type.
- Remove enableCircuitBreaker / queryCircuitBreaker / connectionCircuitBreaker /
  preKeyCircuitBreaker config destructures and the init block.
- Pass-through: enableCircuitBreaker option no longer forwarded to
  unifiedSessionManager (cleaned in next commit).

Build passes.
2026-04-26 22:42:31 -03:00
Renato Alcara 314dd9469d feat(retry): add bounded-retry utility (WhatsApp-aligned)
Per-operation exponential backoff with jitter, max attempts, and TTL.
Replaces the circuit breaker pattern, which was causing cascading
failures (5 timeouts in 60s blocked all queries for 30s).

Empirical defaults captured via Frida from WhatsApp Android:
- delays: [3000, 10000, 60000, 60000, 120000] ms (cap at 2 min)
- TTL: 600_000 ms (10 min — empirical 3-5 min stabilisation + buffer)
- per-attempt timeout: 30_000 ms
- jitter: ±15%

Properties (vs circuit breaker):
- Per-operation independent — failures in op A do NOT block op B
- No global state machine (no CLOSED/OPEN/HALF-OPEN cascade)
- Bounded by maxAttempts + ttlMs (no unbounded retry accumulation)
- AbortSignal cancellation support
- Aligned with WhatsApp Android empirical retry behavior

12 tests cover: default sequence, TTL exhaustion, per-attempt timeout,
shouldRetry predicate, AbortSignal, per-op isolation, delay cap, jitter,
budget cap. All pass in ~4s.
2026-04-26 22:39:04 -03:00
Renato Alcara 8b0a20fed9 perf(inbound): detach post-upsert work from buffered function (#392)
perf(inbound): detach post-upsert work from buffered function (#392)
2026-04-26 16:09:15 -03:00
Renato Alcara df1acc8f0c chore(logs): reduce decrypt-error noise (~75% fewer lines per recover… (#391)
chore(logs): reduce decrypt-error noise (~75% fewer lines per recover… (#391)
2026-04-26 11:36:21 -03:00
Renato Alcara 1dffe3b311 perf(inbound-latency): restore async LID mapping + fire-and-forget tc… (#390)
* perf(inbound-latency): restore async LID mapping + fire-and-forget tctoken history sync

PRODUCTION ISSUE: Inbound messages from smartphone to ZPRO frontend were
arriving with seconds of delay. Outbound (ZPRO → smartphone) was instant.
Started after PR #386 (tctoken lifecycle) deploy.

ROOT CAUSE: Three compounding factors:

1. The historical fix d73cd28d39 (2026-02-03, "fix inbound latency by making
   LID mapping async") was partially reverted the same day by c3fc792351
   ("hybrid approach") due to a valid race-condition concern with decrypt().
   The reversion was over-protective: storeLIDPNMappings does NOT need to be
   sync — only migrateSession does. The hybrid kept all 3 awaits sync.

2. PR #386 added `await storeTcTokensFromHistorySync(...)` BEFORE the
   `messaging-history.set` emit. Per chunk this drains the event buffer with
   2-4 store ops, which compounds when many chunks arrive at once (restart,
   QR scan, multi-device login).

3. Each pre-check `await getPNForLID(alt)` / `getLIDForPN(alt)` before
   storeLIDPNMappings was redundant — the store has its own LRU cache + dedup.

Combined under production load (multi-instance store contention, post-PR #386
extra ops per send) the per-message hot-path penalty became user-visible delay.

THIS FIX:

#1+#3: messages-recv.ts ~line 2332 — `storeLIDPNMappings` becomes
fire-and-forget, pre-check `getPNForLID/getLIDForPN` removed. `migrateSession`
stays SYNC (REQUIRED for decrypt — see Codex/Copilot review on PR #72 / commit
c3fc792351). normalizeMessageJids has a fast-path that uses key.*Alt directly
without hitting the store, so the just-arrived message normalizes correctly
even before the background store completes.

#2: process-message.ts ~line 451 — `storeTcTokensFromHistorySync` becomes
fire-and-forget. Trade-off: a listener firing an outbound send IMMEDIATELY
after the emit may race the background persistence and hit error 463 on that
specific send. Existing 463 handler in messages-recv.ts triggers
getPrivacyTokens() refetch that auto-recovers in seconds. Net UX is much
better than per-chunk stalls.

INVARIANTS PRESERVED:
- migrateSession remains SYNC — decrypt() depends on it (race condition guard)
- normalizeMessageJids remains SYNC — events need correct JIDs before emit
- messageMutex remains SYNC — per-chat ordering preserved
- All 824 tests still pass
2026-04-26 10:30:09 -03:00
Renato Alcara 4fe708445a chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1038167900 (#389)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-26 06:18:52 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 336ed64a44 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1038164556 (#388)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-26 01:07:43 -03:00
Renato Alcara 65cb09e4df perf(history-sync): parallelise tcToken JID resolution per chunk (#387)
perf(history-sync): parallelise tcToken JID resolution per chunk (#387)
2026-04-25 23:52:37 -03:00
Renato Alcara 9ff21db749 feat(tctoken): complete lifecycle (TIER 1 + 2 + 3 of upstream PR)
feat(tctoken): complete lifecycle (TIER 1 + 2 + 3 of upstream PR)
2026-04-25 18:52:45 -03:00
Renato Alcara 9525f42cb2 perf: optimize history sync memory and CPU usage (#385)
* perf: optimize history sync memory and CPU usage

Aligns with Baileys upstream PR #2333 . Surgical port of
4 micro-optimizations + 2 test files. No collision with InfiniteAPI's
LID/PN, carousel, buttons, Bad MAC or app state sync resilience code.

Changes:

1. WAProto longToString/longToNumber: use native BigInt instead of
   Long library division loops. ~4.6x faster per call (237ns -> 52ns).
   BigInt.toString() delegates to V8 native C++. Same change applied
   to fix-imports.js (template) and index.js (generated artifact) so
   future regenerations stay in sync.

2. downloadHistory: stream-pipe createInflate instead of buffering
   the full compressed payload then inflating. Cuts RSS peak ~50%
   on 50MB history payloads.

3. processHistoryMessage: drop the { ...chat } shallow copy before
   pushing to chats[]. The decoded protobuf object is not referenced
   after the push.

4. downloadEncryptedContent transform: skip Buffer.concat when
   remainingBytes is empty (the common case — chunks usually arrive
   AES-aligned). ~19x faster per chunk (78ms -> 4ms over 25k chunks).

Tests:
- bigint-validation.test.ts (NEW): 32 parameterized cases covering
  zero, MAX_SAFE_INTEGER boundary, max int64/uint64, negative values,
  tricky bit patterns and powers of 2; plus 200-iter fuzz comparing
  old Long vs new BigInt implementations for equivalence.
- proto-tojson-long.test.ts: kept the existing fork-only test for
  string-in-Long-field graceful handling, appended 4 upstream tests
  covering Long->string fast path, large unsigned > MAX_SAFE_INTEGER,
  zero/small values and encode/decode roundtrip.
2026-04-25 15:11:34 -03:00
Renato Alcara e117456079 test(binary): cover reconnection sync skip for both signals (#384)
* test(binary): cover reconnection sync skip for both signals

Ports the upstream reconnection-sync-skip test from Baileys PR #2350
and adapts it to cover InfiniteAPI's dual-signal reconnect detection
in chats.ts:

1. accountSyncCounter > 0 (a previous full sync completed)
2. socketSkippedOfflineBuffer (forwarded from socket.ts when
   hadStaleRoutingInfo is true, e.g. routingInfo discarded on start)

Both are required because they cover different reconnect scenarios
and the absence of the second branch causes a buffer mismatch where
socket.ts skips the offline buffer while chats.ts still waits in
AwaitingInitialSync — stalling live messages for up to 4 seconds.

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcara
2026-04-25 14:16:14 -03:00
Renato Alcara c179c82cca perf(messages-recv): early-ignore JIDs before buffer/queue (#383)
* perf(messages-recv): early-ignore JIDs before buffer/queue

Aligns with Baileys upstream PR #2352. Moves the shouldIgnoreJid check
out of handleMessage/handleReceipt/handleNotification and into
processNode so ignored stanzas are acked and dropped before entering
ev.buffer(), the offline queue, or the keyed mutexes. Skips the LID->PN
resolution work in handleReceipt for ignored receipts as a side effect.

Diverges from upstream by excluding type='call' from the early-ignore
check — InfiniteAPI's handleCall has never used shouldIgnoreJid, so
keeping calls outside this filter preserves existing behavior for
integrators that filter messages but still want call events.

Carousel, buttons, LID/PN normalization, Bad MAC fix and retry manager
untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcara
2026-04-25 13:16:22 -03:00
Renato Alcara d08a09c35f feat: add inbound username support and USync username protocol (#382)
* feat: add inbound username support and USync username protocol

Aligns with Baileys upstream PR #2480. WhatsApp is rolling out an
inbound username field that maps to the user's LID. This change is
purely additive — it captures and propagates the new optional field
through types, decoders, USync queries, and group/contact events.

Skipped intentionally to preserve InfiniteAPI's LID/PN customization:
- handleGroupNotification in messages-recv.ts (custom LID->PN flow on
  groups.upsert / participants.map). Username for these specific
  events still flows via process-message's emitParticipantsUpdate
  (reads message.key.participantUsername added in decode-wa-message).

Carousel/buttons code (messages.ts, messages-send.ts) untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcara
2026-04-25 12:39:31 -03:00
Renato Alcara cffaad9e5a fix(chats): use abt xmlns and protocol
fix(chats): use abt xmlns and protocol
2026-04-25 11:08:47 -03:00
Renato Alcara 104d2c47f5 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1038147544 (#380)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-25 06:17:10 -03:00
Renato Alcara 924c54f1f8 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1038063777 (#378)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-24 06:31:31 -03:00
github-actions[bot] e34ef5479d chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1038024963 (#377)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-24 01:03:36 -03:00
Renato Alcara 5e8d30d709 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037968143 (#376)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-23 06:31:41 -03:00
github-actions[bot] ac93080595 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1037953056 (#375)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-23 01:01:23 -03:00
Renato Alcara 37d1bdfb76 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037878879 (#374)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-22 06:29:59 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 76b2007f27 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1037847281 (#373)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-22 01:00:13 -03:00
Renato Alcara 676912c295 Fix/remove vo raw debug logs (#372)
* chore: remove temporary [VO_RAW] debug logs from handleMessage

* chore: remove temporary VO_TRACE debug logger.info from handleMessage
2026-04-21 15:09:00 -03:00
Renato Alcara 06d9f35ca9 chore: remove temporary [VO_RAW] debug logs from handleMessage (#371)
chore: remove temporary [VO_RAW] debug logs from handleMessage (#371)
2026-04-21 15:00:00 -03:00
Renato Alcara 4cadcd1c57 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037786138 (#370)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-21 06:30:57 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 937b26edcd chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1037753511 (#368)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-21 01:01:09 -03:00
Renato Alcara acad0c06dc chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037679412 (#369)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-20 06:33:26 -03:00
Renato Alcara 98995aae89 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037659536 (#367)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-19 06:15:22 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 7a7d92e3f8 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1037654574 (#366)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-19 01:01:54 -03:00
Renato Alcara 1fbaa284f9 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037639827 (#365)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-18 06:15:03 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 9c7dd0460c chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1037622359 (#364)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-18 00:55:26 -03:00
Renato Alcara 579277cb29 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037554587 (#363)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-17 06:29:43 -03:00
github-actions[bot] bb0cb90260 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1037539916 (#358)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-17 01:01:19 -03:00
Renato Alcara 56955e12f5 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037471135 (#362)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-16 06:29:30 -03:00
Renato Alcara b7d9f2b866 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037376462 (#361)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-15 06:30:13 -03:00
Renato Alcara daaf0bc813 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037280436 (#360)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-14 06:29:53 -03:00
Renato Alcara bf95867089 Merge branch 'master' of https://github.com/rsalcara/InfiniteAPI 2026-04-13 07:20:06 -03:00
Renato Alcara 9fac156474 feat: add dual protocol support (web/native) via BAILEYS_PROTOCOL env
Adds experimental native protocol mode (WAM\x05) as alternative to
web protocol (WA\x06\x03). Configurable via BAILEYS_PROTOCOL env var:
- web (default): standard WhatsApp Web protocol
- native: Android native protocol (may enable view-once media on companions)

When native mode is enabled:
- NOISE_WA_HEADER changes from WA\x06\x03 to WAM\x05
- DICT_VERSION changes from 3 to 5
- WebInfo is omitted from ClientPayload

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-13 07:19:55 -03:00
Renato Alcara 230e08037b chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037186195 (#359)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-13 06:33:07 -03:00
Renato Alcara 77ffe59911 Revert "feat: add WebdPayload with E2E media support and features bitmask"
This reverts commit 313f304ddf.
2026-04-13 00:01:32 -03:00
Renato Alcara 313f304ddf feat: add WebdPayload with E2E media support and features bitmask
Add webdPayload to WebInfo during connection with:
- supportsE2EImage/Video/Audio/Document = true
- supportsMediaRetry = true
- features bitmask with view-once capability flag

This may enable the WA server to deliver view-once media content
to Baileys companions instead of just <unavailable> placeholders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-12 23:43:17 -03:00
Renato Alcara a74fbb08a6 fix: request view-once content via PDO from primary phone
When receiving <unavailable type='view_once'/>, attempt to request
the actual media content from the primary phone via PDO
(Peer Data Operation / PLACEHOLDER_MESSAGE_RESEND).

If the phone responds, the full media (url, mediaKey, directPath)
arrives via messages.upsert, allowing consumers to display the image.

Falls back to placeholder if PDO fails or phone doesn't respond.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-12 22:21:02 -03:00
Renato Alcara 0e6bad72bb fix: emit view-once placeholder from unavailable handler
The early unavailable handler at line ~2261 was intercepting
view_once stanzas and silently discarding them (sendMessageAck + return)
before the view_once_unavailable_fanout handler could emit them.

Now emits a viewOnceMessage placeholder with isViewOnce=true so
consumers receive the event in messages.upsert.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-12 16:14:13 -03:00
Renato Alcara 08c19e2951 merge: resolve conflict in messages-recv.ts (keep viewOnceMessage placeholder) 2026-04-12 11:55:12 -03:00
Renato Alcara 90061dd6a1 fix: allow msmsg decryption and emit view-once unavailable fanout (#355)
Two issues found during view-once testing on linked devices:

1. msmsg block removal:
   The "temporary fix" that discarded all msmsg-type encrypted messages
   was also blocking legitimate view-once messages. On linked devices,
   view-once arrives as msmsg encryption type. The block was originally
   added to prevent crashes from missing messageSecret, but the existing
   try/catch in the decrypt path already handles those errors gracefully
   by marking the message as a CIPHERTEXT stub.

2. view_once_unavailable_fanout emission:
   When a linked device receives a view-once, the WA server sends only
   <unavailable type="view_once"/> (no <enc> with actual media content).
   Previously this was silently acknowledged without emitting any event,
   so consumers (zpro, astra-api, etc.) never knew a view-once arrived.
   Now it emits the message as a CIPHERTEXT stub with key.isViewOnce=true
   so consumers can display "view-once message received" in their UI.

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcara
2026-04-12 11:46:42 -03:00
Renato Alcara d014a2496e fix: allow msmsg decryption and emit view-once unavailable fanout (#355)
Two issues found during view-once testing on linked devices:

1. msmsg block removal:
   The "temporary fix" that discarded all msmsg-type encrypted messages
   was also blocking legitimate view-once messages. On linked devices,
   view-once arrives as msmsg encryption type. The block was originally
   added to prevent crashes from missing messageSecret, but the existing
   try/catch in the decrypt path already handles those errors gracefully
   by marking the message as a CIPHERTEXT stub.

2. view_once_unavailable_fanout emission:
   When a linked device receives a view-once, the WA server sends only
   <unavailable type="view_once"/> (no <enc> with actual media content).
   Previously this was silently acknowledged without emitting any event,
   so consumers (zpro, astra-api, etc.) never knew a view-once arrived.
   Now it emits the message as a CIPHERTEXT stub with key.isViewOnce=true
   so consumers can display "view-once message received" in their UI.

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcara
2026-04-12 10:02:30 -03:00
Renato Alcara 47b0940428 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037166441 (#357)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-12 06:15:16 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 90937af374 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1037162330 (#356)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-12 01:00:42 -03:00
Renato Alcara 703b5da554 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037137890 (#354)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-11 06:13:10 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 8c61ce5f8e chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1037082622 (#353)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-11 00:48:54 -03:00
Renato Alcara 000932accd chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1037061899 (#352)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-10 06:25:40 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 8df39c320e chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1037038379 (#351)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-10 01:00:21 -03:00
Renato Alcara 22e758b1e6 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036978211 (#350)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-09 06:26:10 -03:00
github-actions[bot] f473484852 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036961647 (#349)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-09 00:55:22 -03:00
Renato Alcara 4dde4c5500 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036893687 (#348)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-08 06:22:46 -03:00
github-actions[bot] e3cf104b59 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036861941 (#347)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-08 00:56:53 -03:00
Renato Alcara aa0a3c2b71 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036798793 (#346)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-07 06:23:04 -03:00
github-actions[bot] bdbad50074 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036772203 (#345)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-07 00:56:17 -03:00
Renato Alcara 45b322abac chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036709653 (#344)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-06 06:25:21 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 3c3cf32027 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036704126 (#343)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-06 00:59:26 -03:00
Renato Alcara 99d85498fb chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036691526 (#342)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-05 06:12:28 -03:00
github-actions[bot] d6414f203b chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036688876 (#340)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-05 00:58:23 -03:00
Renato Alcara b98df92d8c chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036673976 (#341)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-04 06:11:52 -03:00
Renato Alcara 00a8113d47 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036606219 (#339)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-03 06:17:29 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 670ac582f9 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036588306 (#338)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-03 00:54:16 -03:00
Renato Alcara 08910c61e1 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036512893 (#337)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-02 06:20:16 -03:00
github-actions[bot] cb5e42c46e chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036469328 (#336)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-02 00:53:53 -03:00
Renato Alcara 30e986ee67 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036420555 (#335)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-01 06:24:15 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 60302d73d5 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036375660 (#334)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-01 01:01:11 -03:00
Renato Alcara 3baa494fad chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036326359 (#333)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-31 06:54:53 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 59cad85544 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036244875 (#332)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-31 02:02:42 -03:00
Renato Alcara ad53bc0982 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036229535 (#331)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-30 07:06:44 -03:00
github-actions[bot] fb8f51be52 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036224280 (#330)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-30 02:15:18 -03:00
Renato Alcara 9a7d43d4ba chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036208776 (#329)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-29 06:27:46 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 578efe945f chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036204984 (#328)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-29 02:03:52 -03:00
Renato Alcara e999fc1aa1 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036185592 (#327)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-28 06:27:30 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 9fd88b533d chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036173230 (#326)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-28 01:46:40 -03:00
Renato Alcara 43f3525437 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036094556 (#325)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-27 06:44:22 -03:00
github-actions[bot] fdcbd3fc1d chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036065881 (#324)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-27 02:00:33 -03:00
Renato Alcara cdc89316f0 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1036016053 (#323)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-26 06:53:02 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 3050c329c5 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1036000318 (#319)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-26 01:59:23 -03:00
Renato Alcara 3ef7474842 fix: respect caller-provided waveform for PTT audio messages (#322)
* fix: respect caller-provided waveform for PTT audio messages

When sending PTT audio with an explicit waveform, Baileys unconditionally
overwrites it with getAudioWaveform() which returns undefined when
audio-decode is not installed — resulting in a flat line on WhatsApp.

Now only invokes getAudioWaveform() when no waveform is already provided,
matching the existing pattern used for jpegThumbnail (line 241).

Validated via CDP + Frida interception: WhatsApp waveform format is
64 bytes Uint8Array, values 0-99, byte-for-byte identical between
Android (audio_data table) and WA Web (model-storage IDB).

Ref: WhiskeySockets/Baileys#2443

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcara
2026-03-25 15:51:52 -03:00
Renato Alcara 9dfd31d109 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1035913242 (#321)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-25 06:42:47 -03:00
Renato Alcara e686c5a2e1 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1035819858 (#320)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-24 06:44:53 -03:00
Renato Alcara 466c14ff82 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1035718650 (#318)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 06:53:55 -03:00
Renato Alcara 03bc03b318 Merge branch 'master' of https://github.com/rsalcara/InfiniteAPI 2026-03-23 01:59:15 -03:00
Renato Alcara d83971d15e fix: remove duplicate isViewOnceMsg/viewOnceMeRecipients declarations
Merge duplicou o bloco — TS2451 Cannot redeclare block-scoped variable.
Mantida a versão correta (verifica viewOnceInner?.imageMessage?.viewOnce).

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcara
2026-03-23 01:59:08 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 14f0321d7c chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1035715252 (#317)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-23 01:56:01 -03:00
Renato Alcara b65a8a334b chore: resolve merge conflict in messages-send.ts (comment-only)
Conflict was between Portuguese and English comment for phash/DSM block.
Kept HEAD (our) version.

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcara
2026-03-23 01:54:46 -03:00
Renato Alcara 28e9e5b912 feat: implement view-once message sending and receiving
- Add viewonce-image/video/audio to MEDIA_PATH_MAP and MEDIA_HKDF_KEY_MAPPING
- messages-send: use viewOnceMessageV2 wrapper, omit companion devices for DSM
  (server auto-generates <unavailable type="view_once"/> for linked devices)
- messages-send: fix mediatype detection by unwrapping viewOnce before getMediaType
- messages-recv: handle <unavailable type="view_once"/> sync from primary device
- messages-recv: note — do NOT send view_once_read from linked device

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcara
2026-03-23 01:53:55 -03:00
Renato Alcara 962e7de0bf chore: mark upstream commits as reviewed (3841abca35 ad5ea817f7 d077902695 c4e5d1262a 802d5f6efa)
- 3841abca35 / ad5ea817f7: WA version updates — applied separately via our own version bumps
- d077902695: WA version update — same as above
- c4e5d1262a: Fix ack handling — high-risk 2718-line diff in messages-recv.ts, intentionally skipped
- 802d5f6efa: Fix mentions regression — already covered by existing rsalcara contextInfo logic
- 6afde71691: feat groups mentionAll — applied in previous commit
2026-03-23 01:53:00 -03:00
Renato Alcara c6cb29fd80 feat: groups mention all + fix view-once upload path and wrapper
- Add mentionAll?: boolean to Mentionable type (upstream 6afde71691)
- Set contextInfo.nonJidMentions=1 for @everyone group mentions
- Use viewOnceMessageV2 (field 55) wrapper instead of legacy viewOnceMessage (field 37)
- Set viewOnce=true on inner imageMessage/videoMessage/audioMessage
- Route view-once media uploads to /o1/mms/* CDN via mediaTypeOverride

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcará
2026-03-23 01:52:43 -03:00
Renato Alcara a283d858c6 docs: rewrite INTERACTIVE_MESSAGES.md — complete API guide
Full rewrite covering all 8 interactive message types:
1. Menu Texto
2. Botões Quick Reply (tested up to 16 buttons)
3. Botões CTA — URL, Copy, Call
4. Lista Dropdown (10 sections × 3 rows = 30 items max)
5. Enquete/Poll
6. Apenas Botões Reply sem CTA
7. Apenas CTAs sem Quick Reply
8. Carrossel com Imagens (up to 10 cards)

Each type includes:
- Complete curl example with realistic data
- All parameters documented with types and limits
- Webhook payload structure received on click/select
- JavaScript helpers to parse each response type

Also includes:
- Platform compatibility table (Android / iOS / WA Web)
- Universal webhook router for all interactive response types
- Complete limits table per message type
- Account restrictions (hosted vs non-hosted)

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alará
2026-03-23 01:27:45 -03:00
Renato Alcara 9c626801b0 docs: add hosted account restriction warning to VIEW_ONCE.md
Accounts registered as hosted (Meta Business Cloud API) have view-once
blocked by the WA server for all clients (Android, iOS, Web).
This is a server-side policy with no code workaround.

Added prominent warning block in section 1 and dedicated row in the
limitations table.

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcará
2026-03-23 01:17:27 -03:00
Renato Alcara 4ca1878705 docs: add VIEW_ONCE.md — view-once implementation guide
Complete guide for the view-once (visualização única) feature:
- Send examples (curl) for image, video and audio
- Webhook payload structure with key.isViewOnce detection
- JavaScript helpers to identify and access view-once media
- Frontend/CRM rendering guide with placeholder after open
- Implemented code with inline explanations
- Full send/receive flow diagram
- Known limitations and validation checklist

Co-Authored-By: Renato Alcara
2026-03-23 01:12:36 -03:00
Renato Alcara 452df5d409 Feat/view once receive (#316)
* fix: detect view-once media (image/video/audio) on stanza 1 for linked devices
2026-03-23 00:38:05 -03:00
Renato Alcara e633d62a3b chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1035697879 (#315)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-22 06:22:56 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 2a321b881e chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1035693752 (#314)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-22 01:46:05 -03:00
Rajeh Taher 802d5f6efa messages: Fix regression where missing contextInfo caused no mentions 2026-03-22 02:43:03 +02:00
Renato Alcara e0038bde36 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1035675348 (#313)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-21 06:22:45 -03:00
github-actions[bot] 1cbf1b18b7 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1035661795 (#312)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-21 01:22:14 -03:00
Renato Alcara c3a021fcde fix: use newsletter-specific upload paths for channel media (#311)
fix: use newsletter-specific upload paths for channel media (#311)
2026-03-20 12:02:36 -03:00
Renato Alcara e6ea7e4563 Feat/view once receive (#310)
* fix: unwrap viewOnceMessage in getMediaType so enc node gets mediatype attribute

Without this fix, view-once media (image/video/audio) was sent without
mediatype="image/video/audio" on the enc node because getMediaType only
checked the top-level message fields. The viewOnceMessage wrapper hides
the inner imageMessage, causing mediatype to be empty and WA servers to
silently drop the message on the recipient side.
2026-03-20 10:49:25 -03:00
Renato Alcara 3ab578aadf fix: detect view-once media (image/video/audio) (#309)
* fix: detect view-once media (image/video/audio) on stanza 1 for linked devices

When a view-once arrives at a linked device (InfiniteAPI), the server sends:
- Stanza 1: enc payload with full media metadata (mediaKey, directPath) wrapped in
  viewOnceMessage > imageMessage/videoMessage/audioMessage with viewOnce: true
- Stanza 2: unavailable view_once fanout placeholder (already handled)

Previously only stanza 2 set key.isViewOnce = true. Stanza 1 was emitted as
plain media with no view-once indicator, making it indistinguishable from regular
media on the consumer side (messages.upsert).

This fix inspects the decrypted proto for viewOnceMessage (v1/v2/v2Ext) wrappers
containing a media message with viewOnce=true and propagates key.isViewOnce=true.

The viewOnceMessage wrapper is also used for interactive messages (carousel,
buttons, lists) but those carry interactiveMessage/listMessage inside -- never
imageMessage.viewOnce / videoMessage.viewOnce / audioMessage.viewOnce.
The distinction is unambiguous and does not affect interactive message handling.

Verified via WA Desktop
2026-03-20 10:11:49 -03:00
Renato Alcara d2db4cec97 chore: update WhatsApp Web version to v2.3000.1035595667 (#308)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-20 06:31:30 -03:00
github-actions[bot] be44c5fdb0 chore: update proto/version to v2.3000.1035577069 (#307)
Co-authored-by: rsalcara <rsalcara@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-20 01:30:09 -03:00
Renato Alcara f63f0a766f fix: align Bad MAC retry receipt with WA Desktop behavior
fix: align Bad MAC retry receipt with WA Desktop behavior
2026-03-19 23:48:44 -03:00
Renato Alcara fbefa6a0ad fix: replace magic numbers with RetryReason enum constants
Address remaining Copilot review comments on PR #306:

- Import RetryReason enum from Utils (already re-exported via Utils/index.ts)
- Replace all numeric literals (0/1/2/3/4/7) in retryErrorCode with the
  corresponding enum members (UnknownError / SignalErrorNoSession / etc.)
- Removes inline comments that were only needed to explain magic numbers
- If RetryReason values ever change, the compiler will surface the drift

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-19 23:44:34 -03:00
Renato Alcara 9c4cdc3e02 fix: use DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG constants for retry error code derivation
Address Copilot review comments on PR #306:

1. Replace ad-hoc regexes with the canonical DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG error
   lists from decode-wa-message.ts (single source of truth). Any future
   additions to those lists are automatically picked up here.

2. Add coverage for MessageCounterError ('Key used already or never filled')
   which was previously returning code 0. It now correctly maps to code 4
   (SignalErrorInvalidMessage) via corruptedSessionErrors.

3. Broaden session-error matching to also catch libsignal variants like
   'No sessions', 'No open session', 'No sessions available' via the
   /no (open )?sessions?/ regex alongside sessionRecordErrors.

4. Fix comment: clarify that code 7 = BadMac and code 4 = InvalidMessage
   are distinct codes (previous comment conflated them).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-19 23:29:46 -03:00
Renato Alcara ba1c1b0fdb fix: align Bad MAC retry receipt with WA Desktop behavior
Three issues corrected in sendRetryRequest (receiver side):

1. BUG — error code hardcoded as '0' (UnknownError) in retry receipt.
   The peer (especially another InfiniteAPI instance) could not detect
   the failure type and would fall back to the 1-hour session recreation
   timeout instead of recreating immediately.
   Fix: derive error code from the actual libsignal decryption error
   message stored in messageStubParameters[0].

2. BUG — shouldRecreateSession block was reading the wrong node: it
   called getBinaryNodeChild(node, 'retry') on the incoming bad-MAC
   message, which never has a <retry> child. errorCode was always
   undefined, so MAC_ERROR_CODES never matched — the logic was dead.

3. BUG (consequence of #2) — when shouldRecreateSession accidentally
   did fire (no-session or 1-hour timeout), it deleted the receiver's
   session BEFORE the sender's pkmsg arrived. This opened a race window
   where concurrent messages would fail with "No Session".
   Fix: remove the entire session-deletion block from sendRetryRequest.
   The Signal Protocol pkmsg automatically overwrites the corrupted
   session — no explicit delete needed on the receiver side.

WA Desktop reference (CDP capture 2026-03-19):
- Retry receipt sent ~99ms after Bad MAC with specific error code
- pkmsg arrives ~304ms later, new session established automatically
- Old session is never deleted; pkmsg overwrites it implicitly
- Full recovery in ~1.3s without any race window

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-19 23:10:59 -03:00
Renato Alcara 876af2e96c fix: HistorySync LID improvements — raw_id mapping, prekey pool strategy, keepalive jitter, CDN cleanup
fix: HistorySync LID improvements — raw_id mapping, prekey pool strategy, keepalive jitter, CDN cleanup
2026-03-19 18:24:20 -03:00
Renato Alcara 5bb18da6bf fix: address PR #305 review comments — Origin header, lowServerCount threshold, keepalive guard
- history.ts: add Origin: DEFAULT_ORIGIN to CDN DELETE request headers —
  the download path injects it internally but options does not carry it
- socket.ts: fix lowServerCount comparison — was preKeyCount <= topUpAmount
  which triggered uploads even when above MIN_PREKEY_COUNT (e.g. 250 prekeys
  → topUp=550 → 250<=550=true → unnecessary upload). Now uses correct
  threshold: preKeyCount < MIN_PREKEY_COUNT
- socket.ts: guard scheduleNextKeepAlive() with !closed check to prevent
  orphan timers when end() was called concurrently on a different path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-19 18:23:41 -03:00
Renato Alcara 52d8ddae32 fix: prevent double prekey upload when concurrent uploads race on count=0
uploadPreKeys() waited for a concurrent upload but then proceeded to upload
again. With top-up logic and count=0, both handleEncryptNotification and
uploadPreKeysToServerIfRequired fire simultaneously, both see count=0, first
wins and uploads 800, second waits then uploads another 800 → 1600 prekeys.

Fix: return immediately after awaiting the concurrent upload — it already
replenished the pool.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-19 18:23:41 -03:00
Renato Alcara 8c8c5a312e fix: address PR review comments — CDN DELETE timing, keepalive leak, spread order
- history.ts: move CDN DELETE from downloadHistory() to
  downloadAndProcessHistorySyncNotification(), after processHistoryMessage()
  succeeds — prevents permanent history loss if processing throws post-download
- history.ts: fix fetch spread order: { ...options, method: 'DELETE' } so
  options.method cannot shadow the intended DELETE verb
- socket.ts: add early return after void end() in onKeepAliveTick to prevent
  scheduleNextKeepAlive() from leaking a timer while connection is closing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-19 18:23:28 -03:00
Renato Alcara 52756fb50d fix: histsync LID improvements — raw_id mapping, prekeys, keepalive jitter, CDN DELETE
1. USyncQuery: extract raw_id attr from node attrs into rawId field; implement
   side_list parsing (was TODO/commented) reusing shared parseNodeList helper

2. getUSyncDevices: add 4th LID→PN source via raw_id pairing from device-list
   WA Business sends zero phoneNumberToLidMappings in HistorySync — raw_id is
   the only way to resolve LID↔PN for those accounts during message send

3. MIN_PREKEY_COUNT: 5 → 25 (WA Business maintains ~812; 5 was too low a buffer
   before triggering replenishment upload)

4. startKeepAliveRequest: replace fixed setInterval with recursive setTimeout
   + ±15% jitter, matching WA Desktop's ~25-30s variable heartbeat pattern;
   clearInterval → clearTimeout for the handle

5. downloadHistory: fire-and-forget DELETE to CDN after successful download,
   mirroring WA Desktop behaviour (server-side one-time file cleanup)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-19 18:23:27 -03:00
Renato Alcara bd8465d9b8 fix: histsync LID improvements — raw_id mapping, prekeys, keepalive j… (#304)
* fix: histsync LID improvements — raw_id mapping, prekeys, keepalive jitter, CDN DELETE

* fix: prekey pool strategy — 800 initial, top-up to 800 when below 200

- INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT: 812 → 800 (rounded, matches WA Business ~812 from CDP capture)
- MIN_PREKEY_COUNT: 25 → 200 (replenishment trigger threshold)
- uploadPreKeysToServerIfRequired: top-up to INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT instead of
  uploading a flat MIN_PREKEY_COUNT — restores full 800-key pool on each replenish
- handleEncryptNotification: same top-up logic (INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT - count)
  so server notification path also restores to 800, not just adds 200

uploadPreKeys(5) in error recovery path intentionally left unchanged.
2026-03-19 17:58:30 -03:00
Renato Alcara 6c52b01ea7 fix: add pastParticipants to HistorySync with LID normalization and deduplication (#303)
Two bugs fixed compared to prior implementation:

1. history.ts — normalize userJid LID→PN
   pastParticipants[].userJid may arrive as a LID identifier (e.g. "46802258641027@lid").
   The consumer expects a phone number. After building the lidPnMap from conversations
   and phoneNumberToLidMappings, each userJid is resolved to its PN equivalent.
   If the mapping is not available the original value is preserved (no data loss).

2. event-buffer.ts — deduplicate by groupJid + userJid across chunks
   Multiple HistorySync chunks can contain the same group. The previous approach
   concatenated blindly, producing duplicate entries. Now a keyed map
   { [groupJid]: IPastParticipant[] } is used so each group appears once and
   each participant within a group appears at most once.

Types updated (Events.ts):
   - messaging-history.set event includes pastParticipants?: IPastParticipants[]
   - BufferedEventData.historySets.pastParticipants typed as keyed map
2026-03-19 16:44:14 -03:00
Renato Alcara 5926da9493 Merge branch 'master' of https://github.com/rsalcara/InfiniteAPI 2026-03-19 12:22:07 -03:00
Renato Alcara 2b2c3f9155 Merge branch 'master' of https://github.com/rsalcara/InfiniteAPI 2026-03-19 11:24:01 -03:00
github-actions[bot] d077902695 chore: update WhatsApp Web version (#2420)
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-03-15 22:49:39 +02:00
João Lucas c4e5d1262a Fix ack handling (#2373)
* fix: ack handling to match wa web

* fix: prevent duplicate ack on message errors
2026-03-13 21:45:49 +02:00
Matheus Filype 6afde71691 feat: groups mention all (#2396)
* fix: improve message resend logic by adding checks for message IDs

* Revert "fix: improve message resend logic by adding checks for message IDs"

This reverts commit c03f9d8e6fc6cbfbb9d1f8f67c169700e704213d.

* feat: add mentionAll support to message context for group mentions

* fix: improve readability of condition for mentions and mentionAll in generateWAMessageContent

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Rajeh Taher <rajeh@reforward.dev>

---------

Co-authored-by: Rajeh Taher <rajeh@reforward.dev>
2026-03-13 19:49:16 +02:00
Renato Alcara 6060293793 fix: jimp detection for thumbnail generation
Fix typeof check: Jimp constructor is 'function' not 'object' in
jimp v1.6+. Without this fix, jpegThumbnail is never generated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-07 00:41:54 -03:00
Renato Alcara afce764ce9 Revert "fix: carousel renders on WhatsApp Web without F5"
This reverts commit f2c14f9ad6.
2026-03-07 00:41:38 -03:00
ShellTear ad5ea817f7 Merge pull request #2360 from WhiskeySockets/update-version/stable 2026-02-25 01:33:33 +09:00
github-actions[bot] 3841abca35 chore: update WhatsApp Web version 2026-02-22 00:43:34 +00:00
54 changed files with 6633 additions and 2575 deletions
+93 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
syntax = "proto3";
package proto;
/// WhatsApp Version: 2.3000.1035484955
/// WhatsApp Version: 2.3000.1038164556
message ADVDeviceIdentity {
optional uint32 rawId = 1;
@@ -421,6 +421,12 @@ message BotCapabilityMetadata {
}
}
message BotCommandMetadata {
optional string commandName = 1;
optional string commandDescription = 2;
optional string commandPrompt = 3;
}
message BotDocumentMessageMetadata {
optional DocumentPluginType pluginType = 1;
enum DocumentPluginType {
@@ -652,6 +658,7 @@ message BotMetadata {
optional BotRenderingConfigMetadata botRenderingConfigMetadata = 36;
optional BotInfrastructureDiagnostics botInfrastructureDiagnostics = 37;
optional AIMediaCollectionMetadata aiMediaCollectionMetadata = 38;
optional BotCommandMetadata commandMetadata = 39;
optional bytes internalMetadata = 999;
}
@@ -703,6 +710,7 @@ enum BotMetricsEntryPoint {
WEB_NAVIGATION_BAR = 47;
GROUP_MEMBER = 54;
CHATLIST_SEARCH = 55;
NEW_CHAT_LIST = 56;
}
message BotMetricsMetadata {
optional string destinationId = 1;
@@ -1467,6 +1475,10 @@ message ContextInfo {
optional string wtwaWebsiteUrl = 26;
optional string adPreviewUrl = 27;
optional bool containsCtwaFlowsAutoReply = 28;
optional int32 agmThumbnailStrategy = 29;
optional int32 agmTitleStrategy = 30;
optional int32 agmSubtitleStrategy = 31;
optional int32 agmHeaderInteractionStrategy = 32;
enum AdType {
CTWA = 0;
CAWC = 1;
@@ -1652,6 +1664,7 @@ message DeviceCapabilities {
optional bool companionSupportEnabled = 2;
optional bool campaignSyncEnabled = 3;
optional bool insightsSyncEnabled = 4;
optional int32 recipientLimit = 5;
}
enum ChatLockSupportLevel {
@@ -1727,6 +1740,8 @@ message DeviceProps {
optional uint32 initialSyncMaxMessagesPerChat = 20;
optional bool supportManusHistory = 21;
optional bool supportHatchHistory = 22;
repeated string supportedBotChannelFbids = 23;
optional bool supportInlineContacts = 24;
}
enum PlatformType {
@@ -1913,6 +1928,16 @@ message GroupParticipant {
}
}
message GroupRootKeyShare {
repeated GroupRootKeyShareEntry keys = 1;
}
message GroupRootKeyShareEntry {
optional bytes groupRootKey = 1;
optional string keyId = 2;
optional int64 expiryTimestampMs = 3;
}
message HandshakeMessage {
optional ClientHello clientHello = 2;
optional ServerHello serverHello = 3;
@@ -1935,6 +1960,7 @@ message HandshakeMessage {
optional bool sendServerHelloPaddedBytes = 7;
optional bool simulateXxkemFs = 8;
optional HandshakeMessage.HandshakePqMode pqMode = 9;
optional bytes extendedEphemeral = 10;
}
enum HandshakePqMode {
@@ -1954,6 +1980,7 @@ message HandshakeMessage {
optional bytes payload = 3;
optional bytes extendedStatic = 4;
optional bytes paddingBytes = 5;
optional bytes extendedCiphertext = 6;
}
}
@@ -1977,6 +2004,8 @@ message HistorySync {
optional bytes shareableChatIdentifierEncryptionKey = 17;
repeated Account accounts = 18;
optional bytes nctSalt = 19;
repeated InlineContact inlineContacts = 20;
optional bool inlineContactsProvided = 21;
enum BotAIWaitListState {
IN_WAITLIST = 0;
AI_AVAILABLE = 1;
@@ -2071,6 +2100,14 @@ message InThreadSurveyMetadata {
}
message InlineContact {
optional string pnJid = 1;
optional string lidJid = 2;
optional string fullName = 3;
optional string firstName = 4;
optional string username = 5;
}
message InteractiveAnnotation {
repeated Point polygonVertices = 1;
optional bool shouldSkipConfirmation = 4;
@@ -2149,7 +2186,6 @@ message LimitSharing {
CHAT_SETTING = 1;
BIZ_SUPPORTS_FB_HOSTING = 2;
UNKNOWN_GROUP = 3;
DEPRECATION = 4;
}
}
@@ -2311,6 +2347,7 @@ message Message {
optional ConditionalRevealMessage conditionalRevealMessage = 120;
optional PollAddOptionMessage pollAddOptionMessage = 121;
optional EventInviteMessage eventInviteMessage = 122;
optional GroupRootKeyShare groupRootKeyShare = 123;
message AlbumMessage {
optional uint32 expectedImageCount = 2;
optional uint32 expectedVideoCount = 3;
@@ -2502,6 +2539,7 @@ message Message {
UNKNOWN = 0;
CONTROL_PASSED = 1;
CONTROL_TAKEN = 2;
INFO = 3;
}
message CloudAPIThreadControlNotificationContent {
optional string handoffNotificationText = 1;
@@ -3283,6 +3321,7 @@ message Message {
optional int32 onDemandMsgCount = 4;
optional int64 oldestMsgTimestampMs = 5;
optional string accountLid = 6;
optional bool supportInlineResponse = 7;
}
message PlaceholderMessageResendRequest {
@@ -3369,6 +3408,7 @@ message Message {
ERROR_REQUEST_ON_NON_SMB_PRIMARY = 4;
ERROR_HOSTED_DEVICE_NOT_CONNECTED = 5;
ERROR_HOSTED_DEVICE_LOGIN_TIME_NOT_SET = 6;
ERROR_MULTI_PROVIDER_NOT_CONFIGURED = 7;
}
message HistorySyncChunkRetryResponse {
optional Message.HistorySyncType syncType = 1;
@@ -3617,7 +3657,6 @@ message Message {
GROUP_MEMBER_LABEL_CHANGE = 30;
AI_MEDIA_COLLECTION_MESSAGE = 31;
MESSAGE_UNSCHEDULE = 32;
BOT_UNLINK_MESSAGE = 33;
}
}
@@ -3768,6 +3807,7 @@ message Message {
optional bool isLottie = 21;
optional string accessibilityLabel = 22;
optional int32 premium = 24;
optional string emojis = 25;
}
message StickerPackMessage {
@@ -3988,6 +4028,7 @@ message MessageContextInfo {
optional LimitSharing limitSharingV2 = 14;
repeated ThreadID threadId = 15;
optional WebLinkRenderConfig weblinkRenderConfig = 16;
optional bytes teeBotMetadata = 17;
enum MessageAddonExpiryType {
STATIC = 1;
DEPENDENT_ON_PARENT = 2;
@@ -4180,6 +4221,8 @@ enum MutationProps {
CUSTOMER_DATA_ACTION = 83;
SUBSCRIPTIONS_SYNC_V2_ACTION = 84;
THREAD_PIN_ACTION = 85;
AUTO_ORGANIZE_BUSINESS_CHAT_SETTING = 86;
BIZ_AI_SETTINGS_NUDGE_ACTION = 87;
SHARE_OWN_PN = 10001;
BUSINESS_BROADCAST_ACTION = 10002;
AI_THREAD_DELETE_ACTION = 10003;
@@ -4493,6 +4536,12 @@ message ReportingTokenInfo {
optional bytes reportingTag = 1;
}
message ScheduledMessageMetadata {
optional string revealKeyId = 1;
optional bytes revealKey = 2;
optional uint64 scheduledTime = 3;
}
message SenderKeyDistributionMessage {
optional uint32 id = 1;
optional uint32 iteration = 2;
@@ -4819,6 +4868,8 @@ message SyncActionValue {
optional CustomerDataAction customerDataAction = 83;
optional SubscriptionsSyncV2Action subscriptionsSyncV2Action = 84;
optional ThreadPinAction threadPinAction = 85;
optional AutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting autoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting = 86;
optional BizAISettingsNudgeAction bizAiSettingsNudgeAction = 87;
message AgentAction {
optional string name = 1;
optional int32 deviceID = 2;
@@ -4838,6 +4889,10 @@ message SyncActionValue {
optional SyncActionValue.SyncActionMessageRange messageRange = 2;
}
message AutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting {
optional bool autoOrganize = 1;
}
message AvatarUpdatedAction {
optional AvatarEventType eventType = 1;
repeated SyncActionValue.StickerAction recentAvatarStickers = 2;
@@ -4848,6 +4903,20 @@ message SyncActionValue {
}
}
message BizAISettingsNudgeAction {
optional BizAISettingsCategory category = 1;
optional int64 version = 2;
optional int64 updatedAtMs = 3;
enum BizAISettingsCategory {
UNKNOWN = 0;
INSTRUCTIONS = 1;
RESPONSE_SETTINGS = 2;
EXAMPLE_RESPONSES = 3;
KNOWLEDGE = 4;
LEAD_GEN = 5;
}
}
message BotWelcomeRequestAction {
optional bool isSent = 1;
}
@@ -4893,6 +4962,7 @@ message SyncActionValue {
repeated SyncActionValue.BroadcastListParticipant participants = 2;
optional string listName = 3;
repeated string labelIds = 4;
optional string audienceExpression = 5;
}
message CallLogAction {
@@ -5022,6 +5092,7 @@ message SyncActionValue {
DRAFTED = 8;
AI_HANDOFF = 9;
CHANNELS = 10;
AI_RESPONDING = 11;
}
}
@@ -5237,6 +5308,8 @@ message SyncActionValue {
optional bool isStatusNotificationEnabled = 29;
optional int32 statusNotificationToneId = 30;
optional bool shouldPlaySoundForCallNotification = 31;
optional string chatThemeId = 32;
optional string colorSchemeId = 33;
enum DisplayMode {
DISPLAY_MODE_UNKNOWN = 0;
ALWAYS = 1;
@@ -5281,6 +5354,8 @@ message SyncActionValue {
IS_STATUS_NOTIFICATION_ENABLED = 29;
STATUS_NOTIFICATION_TONE_ID = 30;
SHOULD_PLAY_SOUND_FOR_CALL_NOTIFICATION = 31;
CHAT_THEME_ID = 32;
COLOR_SCHEME_ID = 33;
}
enum SettingPlatform {
PLATFORM_UNKNOWN = 0;
@@ -5304,11 +5379,22 @@ message SyncActionValue {
repeated string userJid = 2;
optional bool shareToFB = 3;
optional bool shareToIG = 4;
repeated CustomList customLists = 5;
repeated StatusDistributionMode modes = 6;
message CustomList {
optional string listId = 1;
optional string name = 2;
optional string emoji = 3;
optional bool isSelected = 4;
repeated string userJid = 5;
}
enum StatusDistributionMode {
ALLOW_LIST = 0;
DENY_LIST = 1;
CONTACTS = 2;
CLOSE_FRIENDS = 3;
CUSTOM_LIST = 4;
}
}
@@ -5695,6 +5781,8 @@ message WebMessageInfo {
optional QuarantinedMessage quarantinedMessage = 77;
optional uint32 nonJidMentions = 78;
optional string hsmTag = 79;
optional uint64 ephemeralExpirationTimestamp = 80;
optional ScheduledMessageMetadata scheduledMessageMetadata = 81;
enum BizPrivacyStatus {
E2EE = 0;
FB = 2;
@@ -5934,6 +6022,8 @@ message WebMessageInfo {
GROUP_MEMBER_SHARE_GROUP_HISTORY_MODE = 221;
GROUP_OPEN_BOT_ADDED = 222;
GROUP_TEE_BOT_ADDED = 223;
CONTACT_INFO = 224;
SCHEDULED_MESSAGE_CREATED = 225;
}
}
+26 -18
View File
@@ -18,14 +18,21 @@ try {
'\tif (typeof value === "number") {\n' +
'\t\treturn String(value);\n' +
'\t}\n' +
'\tif (!$util.Long) {\n' +
'\t\treturn String(value);\n' +
'\t// Fast path: convert Long {low, high} directly via native BigInt\n' +
'\t// BigInt.toString() is a native C++ operation, much faster than Long\'s pure JS division loops\n' +
'\tif (value && typeof value.low === "number" && typeof value.high === "number") {\n' +
'\t\t// Normalize high to signed int32 so the sign-bit check works for inputs\n' +
'\t\t// where high is stored unsigned (e.g. raw {low, high} JSON).\n' +
'\t\tconst high = value.high | 0;\n' +
'\t\tconst lo = BigInt(value.low >>> 0);\n' +
'\t\tconst hi = BigInt(value.high >>> 0);\n' +
'\t\tconst combined = (hi << 32n) | lo;\n' +
'\t\tif (!unsigned && high < 0) {\n' +
'\t\t\treturn (combined - (1n << 64n)).toString();\n' +
'\t\t}\n' +
'\t\treturn combined.toString();\n' +
'\t}\n' +
'\tconst normalized = $util.Long.fromValue(value);\n' +
'\tconst prepared = unsigned && normalized && typeof normalized.toUnsigned === "function"\n' +
'\t\t? normalized.toUnsigned()\n' +
'\t\t: normalized;\n' +
'\treturn prepared.toString();\n' +
'\treturn String(value);\n' +
'}\n\n'
const longToNumberHelper =
'function longToNumber(value, unsigned) {\n' +
@@ -33,19 +40,20 @@ try {
'\t\treturn value;\n' +
'\t}\n' +
'\tif (typeof value === "string") {\n' +
'\t\tconst numeric = Number(value);\n' +
'\t\treturn numeric;\n' +
'\t}\n' +
'\tif (!$util.Long) {\n' +
'\t\treturn Number(value);\n' +
'\t}\n' +
'\tconst normalized = $util.Long.fromValue(value);\n' +
'\tconst prepared = unsigned && normalized && typeof normalized.toUnsigned === "function"\n' +
'\t\t? normalized.toUnsigned()\n' +
'\t\t: typeof normalized.toSigned === "function"\n' +
'\t\t\t? normalized.toSigned()\n' +
'\t\t\t: normalized;\n' +
'\treturn prepared.toNumber();\n' +
'\t// Fast path: convert Long {low, high} directly via native BigInt\n' +
'\tif (value && typeof value.low === "number" && typeof value.high === "number") {\n' +
'\t\tconst high = value.high | 0;\n' +
'\t\tconst lo = BigInt(value.low >>> 0);\n' +
'\t\tconst hi = BigInt(value.high >>> 0);\n' +
'\t\tconst combined = (hi << 32n) | lo;\n' +
'\t\tif (!unsigned && high < 0) {\n' +
'\t\t\treturn Number(combined - (1n << 64n));\n' +
'\t\t}\n' +
'\t\treturn Number(combined);\n' +
'\t}\n' +
'\treturn Number(value);\n' +
'}\n\n'
if (!content.includes('function longToString(')) {
+242 -11
View File
@@ -1097,6 +1097,26 @@ export namespace proto {
}
}
interface IBotCommandMetadata {
commandName?: (string|null);
commandDescription?: (string|null);
commandPrompt?: (string|null);
}
class BotCommandMetadata implements IBotCommandMetadata {
constructor(p?: proto.IBotCommandMetadata);
public commandName?: (string|null);
public commandDescription?: (string|null);
public commandPrompt?: (string|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.IBotCommandMetadata): proto.BotCommandMetadata;
public static encode(m: proto.IBotCommandMetadata, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.BotCommandMetadata;
public static fromObject(d: { [k: string]: any }): proto.BotCommandMetadata;
public static toObject(m: proto.BotCommandMetadata, o?: $protobuf.IConversionOptions): { [k: string]: any };
public toJSON(): { [k: string]: any };
public static getTypeUrl(typeUrlPrefix?: string): string;
}
interface IBotDocumentMessageMetadata {
pluginType?: (proto.BotDocumentMessageMetadata.DocumentPluginType|null);
}
@@ -1681,6 +1701,7 @@ export namespace proto {
botRenderingConfigMetadata?: (proto.IBotRenderingConfigMetadata|null);
botInfrastructureDiagnostics?: (proto.IBotInfrastructureDiagnostics|null);
aiMediaCollectionMetadata?: (proto.IAIMediaCollectionMetadata|null);
commandMetadata?: (proto.IBotCommandMetadata|null);
internalMetadata?: (Uint8Array|null);
}
@@ -1723,6 +1744,7 @@ export namespace proto {
public botRenderingConfigMetadata?: (proto.IBotRenderingConfigMetadata|null);
public botInfrastructureDiagnostics?: (proto.IBotInfrastructureDiagnostics|null);
public aiMediaCollectionMetadata?: (proto.IAIMediaCollectionMetadata|null);
public commandMetadata?: (proto.IBotCommandMetadata|null);
public internalMetadata?: (Uint8Array|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.IBotMetadata): proto.BotMetadata;
public static encode(m: proto.IBotMetadata, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
@@ -1780,7 +1802,8 @@ export namespace proto {
WEB_INTRO_PANEL = 46,
WEB_NAVIGATION_BAR = 47,
GROUP_MEMBER = 54,
CHATLIST_SEARCH = 55
CHATLIST_SEARCH = 55,
NEW_CHAT_LIST = 56
}
interface IBotMetricsMetadata {
@@ -3592,6 +3615,10 @@ export namespace proto {
wtwaWebsiteUrl?: (string|null);
adPreviewUrl?: (string|null);
containsCtwaFlowsAutoReply?: (boolean|null);
agmThumbnailStrategy?: (number|null);
agmTitleStrategy?: (number|null);
agmSubtitleStrategy?: (number|null);
agmHeaderInteractionStrategy?: (number|null);
}
class ExternalAdReplyInfo implements IExternalAdReplyInfo {
@@ -3624,6 +3651,10 @@ export namespace proto {
public wtwaWebsiteUrl?: (string|null);
public adPreviewUrl?: (string|null);
public containsCtwaFlowsAutoReply?: (boolean|null);
public agmThumbnailStrategy?: (number|null);
public agmTitleStrategy?: (number|null);
public agmSubtitleStrategy?: (number|null);
public agmHeaderInteractionStrategy?: (number|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.ContextInfo.IExternalAdReplyInfo): proto.ContextInfo.ExternalAdReplyInfo;
public static encode(m: proto.ContextInfo.IExternalAdReplyInfo, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.ContextInfo.ExternalAdReplyInfo;
@@ -4028,6 +4059,7 @@ export namespace proto {
companionSupportEnabled?: (boolean|null);
campaignSyncEnabled?: (boolean|null);
insightsSyncEnabled?: (boolean|null);
recipientLimit?: (number|null);
}
class BusinessBroadcast implements IBusinessBroadcast {
@@ -4036,6 +4068,7 @@ export namespace proto {
public companionSupportEnabled?: (boolean|null);
public campaignSyncEnabled?: (boolean|null);
public insightsSyncEnabled?: (boolean|null);
public recipientLimit?: (number|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.DeviceCapabilities.IBusinessBroadcast): proto.DeviceCapabilities.BusinessBroadcast;
public static encode(m: proto.DeviceCapabilities.IBusinessBroadcast, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.DeviceCapabilities.BusinessBroadcast;
@@ -4211,6 +4244,8 @@ export namespace proto {
initialSyncMaxMessagesPerChat?: (number|null);
supportManusHistory?: (boolean|null);
supportHatchHistory?: (boolean|null);
supportedBotChannelFbids?: (string[]|null);
supportInlineContacts?: (boolean|null);
}
class HistorySyncConfig implements IHistorySyncConfig {
@@ -4237,6 +4272,8 @@ export namespace proto {
public initialSyncMaxMessagesPerChat?: (number|null);
public supportManusHistory?: (boolean|null);
public supportHatchHistory?: (boolean|null);
public supportedBotChannelFbids: string[];
public supportInlineContacts?: (boolean|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.DeviceProps.IHistorySyncConfig): proto.DeviceProps.HistorySyncConfig;
public static encode(m: proto.DeviceProps.IHistorySyncConfig, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.DeviceProps.HistorySyncConfig;
@@ -4705,6 +4742,42 @@ export namespace proto {
}
}
interface IGroupRootKeyShare {
keys?: (proto.IGroupRootKeyShareEntry[]|null);
}
class GroupRootKeyShare implements IGroupRootKeyShare {
constructor(p?: proto.IGroupRootKeyShare);
public keys: proto.IGroupRootKeyShareEntry[];
public static create(properties?: proto.IGroupRootKeyShare): proto.GroupRootKeyShare;
public static encode(m: proto.IGroupRootKeyShare, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.GroupRootKeyShare;
public static fromObject(d: { [k: string]: any }): proto.GroupRootKeyShare;
public static toObject(m: proto.GroupRootKeyShare, o?: $protobuf.IConversionOptions): { [k: string]: any };
public toJSON(): { [k: string]: any };
public static getTypeUrl(typeUrlPrefix?: string): string;
}
interface IGroupRootKeyShareEntry {
groupRootKey?: (Uint8Array|null);
keyId?: (string|null);
expiryTimestampMs?: (number|Long|null);
}
class GroupRootKeyShareEntry implements IGroupRootKeyShareEntry {
constructor(p?: proto.IGroupRootKeyShareEntry);
public groupRootKey?: (Uint8Array|null);
public keyId?: (string|null);
public expiryTimestampMs?: (number|Long|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.IGroupRootKeyShareEntry): proto.GroupRootKeyShareEntry;
public static encode(m: proto.IGroupRootKeyShareEntry, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.GroupRootKeyShareEntry;
public static fromObject(d: { [k: string]: any }): proto.GroupRootKeyShareEntry;
public static toObject(m: proto.GroupRootKeyShareEntry, o?: $protobuf.IConversionOptions): { [k: string]: any };
public toJSON(): { [k: string]: any };
public static getTypeUrl(typeUrlPrefix?: string): string;
}
interface IHandshakeMessage {
clientHello?: (proto.HandshakeMessage.IClientHello|null);
serverHello?: (proto.HandshakeMessage.IServerHello|null);
@@ -4761,6 +4834,7 @@ export namespace proto {
sendServerHelloPaddedBytes?: (boolean|null);
simulateXxkemFs?: (boolean|null);
pqMode?: (proto.HandshakeMessage.HandshakePqMode|null);
extendedEphemeral?: (Uint8Array|null);
}
class ClientHello implements IClientHello {
@@ -4774,6 +4848,7 @@ export namespace proto {
public sendServerHelloPaddedBytes?: (boolean|null);
public simulateXxkemFs?: (boolean|null);
public pqMode?: (proto.HandshakeMessage.HandshakePqMode|null);
public extendedEphemeral?: (Uint8Array|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.HandshakeMessage.IClientHello): proto.HandshakeMessage.ClientHello;
public static encode(m: proto.HandshakeMessage.IClientHello, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.HandshakeMessage.ClientHello;
@@ -4801,6 +4876,7 @@ export namespace proto {
payload?: (Uint8Array|null);
extendedStatic?: (Uint8Array|null);
paddingBytes?: (Uint8Array|null);
extendedCiphertext?: (Uint8Array|null);
}
class ServerHello implements IServerHello {
@@ -4810,6 +4886,7 @@ export namespace proto {
public payload?: (Uint8Array|null);
public extendedStatic?: (Uint8Array|null);
public paddingBytes?: (Uint8Array|null);
public extendedCiphertext?: (Uint8Array|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.HandshakeMessage.IServerHello): proto.HandshakeMessage.ServerHello;
public static encode(m: proto.HandshakeMessage.IServerHello, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.HandshakeMessage.ServerHello;
@@ -4839,6 +4916,8 @@ export namespace proto {
shareableChatIdentifierEncryptionKey?: (Uint8Array|null);
accounts?: (proto.IAccount[]|null);
nctSalt?: (Uint8Array|null);
inlineContacts?: (proto.IInlineContact[]|null);
inlineContactsProvided?: (boolean|null);
}
class HistorySync implements IHistorySync {
@@ -4861,6 +4940,8 @@ export namespace proto {
public shareableChatIdentifierEncryptionKey?: (Uint8Array|null);
public accounts: proto.IAccount[];
public nctSalt?: (Uint8Array|null);
public inlineContacts: proto.IInlineContact[];
public inlineContactsProvided?: (boolean|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.IHistorySync): proto.HistorySync;
public static encode(m: proto.IHistorySync, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.HistorySync;
@@ -5128,6 +5209,30 @@ export namespace proto {
}
}
interface IInlineContact {
pnJid?: (string|null);
lidJid?: (string|null);
fullName?: (string|null);
firstName?: (string|null);
username?: (string|null);
}
class InlineContact implements IInlineContact {
constructor(p?: proto.IInlineContact);
public pnJid?: (string|null);
public lidJid?: (string|null);
public fullName?: (string|null);
public firstName?: (string|null);
public username?: (string|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.IInlineContact): proto.InlineContact;
public static encode(m: proto.IInlineContact, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.InlineContact;
public static fromObject(d: { [k: string]: any }): proto.InlineContact;
public static toObject(m: proto.InlineContact, o?: $protobuf.IConversionOptions): { [k: string]: any };
public toJSON(): { [k: string]: any };
public static getTypeUrl(typeUrlPrefix?: string): string;
}
interface IInteractiveAnnotation {
polygonVertices?: (proto.IPoint[]|null);
shouldSkipConfirmation?: (boolean|null);
@@ -5356,8 +5461,7 @@ export namespace proto {
UNKNOWN = 0,
CHAT_SETTING = 1,
BIZ_SUPPORTS_FB_HOSTING = 2,
UNKNOWN_GROUP = 3,
DEPRECATION = 4
UNKNOWN_GROUP = 3
}
}
@@ -5620,6 +5724,7 @@ export namespace proto {
conditionalRevealMessage?: (proto.Message.IConditionalRevealMessage|null);
pollAddOptionMessage?: (proto.Message.IPollAddOptionMessage|null);
eventInviteMessage?: (proto.Message.IEventInviteMessage|null);
groupRootKeyShare?: (proto.IGroupRootKeyShare|null);
}
class Message implements IMessage {
@@ -5726,6 +5831,7 @@ export namespace proto {
public conditionalRevealMessage?: (proto.Message.IConditionalRevealMessage|null);
public pollAddOptionMessage?: (proto.Message.IPollAddOptionMessage|null);
public eventInviteMessage?: (proto.Message.IEventInviteMessage|null);
public groupRootKeyShare?: (proto.IGroupRootKeyShare|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.IMessage): proto.Message;
public static encode(m: proto.IMessage, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.Message;
@@ -6265,7 +6371,8 @@ export namespace proto {
enum CloudAPIThreadControl {
UNKNOWN = 0,
CONTROL_PASSED = 1,
CONTROL_TAKEN = 2
CONTROL_TAKEN = 2,
INFO = 3
}
interface ICloudAPIThreadControlNotificationContent {
@@ -8373,6 +8480,7 @@ export namespace proto {
onDemandMsgCount?: (number|null);
oldestMsgTimestampMs?: (number|Long|null);
accountLid?: (string|null);
supportInlineResponse?: (boolean|null);
}
class HistorySyncOnDemandRequest implements IHistorySyncOnDemandRequest {
@@ -8383,6 +8491,7 @@ export namespace proto {
public onDemandMsgCount?: (number|null);
public oldestMsgTimestampMs?: (number|Long|null);
public accountLid?: (string|null);
public supportInlineResponse?: (boolean|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.Message.PeerDataOperationRequestMessage.IHistorySyncOnDemandRequest): proto.Message.PeerDataOperationRequestMessage.HistorySyncOnDemandRequest;
public static encode(m: proto.Message.PeerDataOperationRequestMessage.IHistorySyncOnDemandRequest, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.Message.PeerDataOperationRequestMessage.HistorySyncOnDemandRequest;
@@ -8656,7 +8765,8 @@ export namespace proto {
GENERIC_ERROR = 3,
ERROR_REQUEST_ON_NON_SMB_PRIMARY = 4,
ERROR_HOSTED_DEVICE_NOT_CONNECTED = 5,
ERROR_HOSTED_DEVICE_LOGIN_TIME_NOT_SET = 6
ERROR_HOSTED_DEVICE_LOGIN_TIME_NOT_SET = 6,
ERROR_MULTI_PROVIDER_NOT_CONFIGURED = 7
}
interface IHistorySyncChunkRetryResponse {
@@ -9282,8 +9392,7 @@ export namespace proto {
AI_QUERY_FANOUT = 29,
GROUP_MEMBER_LABEL_CHANGE = 30,
AI_MEDIA_COLLECTION_MESSAGE = 31,
MESSAGE_UNSCHEDULE = 32,
BOT_UNLINK_MESSAGE = 33
MESSAGE_UNSCHEDULE = 32
}
}
@@ -9662,6 +9771,7 @@ export namespace proto {
isLottie?: (boolean|null);
accessibilityLabel?: (string|null);
premium?: (number|null);
emojis?: (string|null);
}
class StickerMessage implements IStickerMessage {
@@ -9687,6 +9797,7 @@ export namespace proto {
public isLottie?: (boolean|null);
public accessibilityLabel?: (string|null);
public premium?: (number|null);
public emojis?: (string|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.Message.IStickerMessage): proto.Message.StickerMessage;
public static encode(m: proto.Message.IStickerMessage, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.Message.StickerMessage;
@@ -10182,6 +10293,7 @@ export namespace proto {
limitSharingV2?: (proto.ILimitSharing|null);
threadId?: (proto.IThreadID[]|null);
weblinkRenderConfig?: (proto.WebLinkRenderConfig|null);
teeBotMetadata?: (Uint8Array|null);
}
class MessageContextInfo implements IMessageContextInfo {
@@ -10202,6 +10314,7 @@ export namespace proto {
public limitSharingV2?: (proto.ILimitSharing|null);
public threadId: proto.IThreadID[];
public weblinkRenderConfig?: (proto.WebLinkRenderConfig|null);
public teeBotMetadata?: (Uint8Array|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.IMessageContextInfo): proto.MessageContextInfo;
public static encode(m: proto.IMessageContextInfo, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.MessageContextInfo;
@@ -10579,6 +10692,8 @@ export namespace proto {
CUSTOMER_DATA_ACTION = 83,
SUBSCRIPTIONS_SYNC_V2_ACTION = 84,
THREAD_PIN_ACTION = 85,
AUTO_ORGANIZE_BUSINESS_CHAT_SETTING = 86,
BIZ_AI_SETTINGS_NUDGE_ACTION = 87,
SHARE_OWN_PN = 10001,
BUSINESS_BROADCAST_ACTION = 10002,
AI_THREAD_DELETE_ACTION = 10003
@@ -11390,6 +11505,26 @@ export namespace proto {
public static getTypeUrl(typeUrlPrefix?: string): string;
}
interface IScheduledMessageMetadata {
revealKeyId?: (string|null);
revealKey?: (Uint8Array|null);
scheduledTime?: (number|Long|null);
}
class ScheduledMessageMetadata implements IScheduledMessageMetadata {
constructor(p?: proto.IScheduledMessageMetadata);
public revealKeyId?: (string|null);
public revealKey?: (Uint8Array|null);
public scheduledTime?: (number|Long|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.IScheduledMessageMetadata): proto.ScheduledMessageMetadata;
public static encode(m: proto.IScheduledMessageMetadata, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.ScheduledMessageMetadata;
public static fromObject(d: { [k: string]: any }): proto.ScheduledMessageMetadata;
public static toObject(m: proto.ScheduledMessageMetadata, o?: $protobuf.IConversionOptions): { [k: string]: any };
public toJSON(): { [k: string]: any };
public static getTypeUrl(typeUrlPrefix?: string): string;
}
interface ISenderKeyDistributionMessage {
id?: (number|null);
iteration?: (number|null);
@@ -12176,6 +12311,8 @@ export namespace proto {
customerDataAction?: (proto.SyncActionValue.ICustomerDataAction|null);
subscriptionsSyncV2Action?: (proto.SyncActionValue.ISubscriptionsSyncV2Action|null);
threadPinAction?: (proto.SyncActionValue.IThreadPinAction|null);
autoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting?: (proto.SyncActionValue.IAutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting|null);
bizAiSettingsNudgeAction?: (proto.SyncActionValue.IBizAISettingsNudgeAction|null);
}
class SyncActionValue implements ISyncActionValue {
@@ -12256,6 +12393,8 @@ export namespace proto {
public customerDataAction?: (proto.SyncActionValue.ICustomerDataAction|null);
public subscriptionsSyncV2Action?: (proto.SyncActionValue.ISubscriptionsSyncV2Action|null);
public threadPinAction?: (proto.SyncActionValue.IThreadPinAction|null);
public autoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting?: (proto.SyncActionValue.IAutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting|null);
public bizAiSettingsNudgeAction?: (proto.SyncActionValue.IBizAISettingsNudgeAction|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.ISyncActionValue): proto.SyncActionValue;
public static encode(m: proto.ISyncActionValue, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.SyncActionValue;
@@ -12337,6 +12476,22 @@ export namespace proto {
public static getTypeUrl(typeUrlPrefix?: string): string;
}
interface IAutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting {
autoOrganize?: (boolean|null);
}
class AutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting implements IAutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting {
constructor(p?: proto.SyncActionValue.IAutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting);
public autoOrganize?: (boolean|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.SyncActionValue.IAutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting): proto.SyncActionValue.AutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting;
public static encode(m: proto.SyncActionValue.IAutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.SyncActionValue.AutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting;
public static fromObject(d: { [k: string]: any }): proto.SyncActionValue.AutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting;
public static toObject(m: proto.SyncActionValue.AutoOrganizeBusinessChatSetting, o?: $protobuf.IConversionOptions): { [k: string]: any };
public toJSON(): { [k: string]: any };
public static getTypeUrl(typeUrlPrefix?: string): string;
}
interface IAvatarUpdatedAction {
eventType?: (proto.SyncActionValue.AvatarUpdatedAction.AvatarEventType|null);
recentAvatarStickers?: (proto.SyncActionValue.IStickerAction[]|null);
@@ -12364,6 +12519,38 @@ export namespace proto {
}
}
interface IBizAISettingsNudgeAction {
category?: (proto.SyncActionValue.BizAISettingsNudgeAction.BizAISettingsCategory|null);
version?: (number|Long|null);
updatedAtMs?: (number|Long|null);
}
class BizAISettingsNudgeAction implements IBizAISettingsNudgeAction {
constructor(p?: proto.SyncActionValue.IBizAISettingsNudgeAction);
public category?: (proto.SyncActionValue.BizAISettingsNudgeAction.BizAISettingsCategory|null);
public version?: (number|Long|null);
public updatedAtMs?: (number|Long|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.SyncActionValue.IBizAISettingsNudgeAction): proto.SyncActionValue.BizAISettingsNudgeAction;
public static encode(m: proto.SyncActionValue.IBizAISettingsNudgeAction, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.SyncActionValue.BizAISettingsNudgeAction;
public static fromObject(d: { [k: string]: any }): proto.SyncActionValue.BizAISettingsNudgeAction;
public static toObject(m: proto.SyncActionValue.BizAISettingsNudgeAction, o?: $protobuf.IConversionOptions): { [k: string]: any };
public toJSON(): { [k: string]: any };
public static getTypeUrl(typeUrlPrefix?: string): string;
}
namespace BizAISettingsNudgeAction {
enum BizAISettingsCategory {
UNKNOWN = 0,
INSTRUCTIONS = 1,
RESPONSE_SETTINGS = 2,
EXAMPLE_RESPONSES = 3,
KNOWLEDGE = 4,
LEAD_GEN = 5
}
}
interface IBotWelcomeRequestAction {
isSent?: (boolean|null);
}
@@ -12483,6 +12670,7 @@ export namespace proto {
participants?: (proto.SyncActionValue.IBroadcastListParticipant[]|null);
listName?: (string|null);
labelIds?: (string[]|null);
audienceExpression?: (string|null);
}
class BusinessBroadcastListAction implements IBusinessBroadcastListAction {
@@ -12491,6 +12679,7 @@ export namespace proto {
public participants: proto.SyncActionValue.IBroadcastListParticipant[];
public listName?: (string|null);
public labelIds: string[];
public audienceExpression?: (string|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.SyncActionValue.IBusinessBroadcastListAction): proto.SyncActionValue.BusinessBroadcastListAction;
public static encode(m: proto.SyncActionValue.IBusinessBroadcastListAction, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.SyncActionValue.BusinessBroadcastListAction;
@@ -12919,7 +13108,8 @@ export namespace proto {
SERVER_ASSIGNED = 7,
DRAFTED = 8,
AI_HANDOFF = 9,
CHANNELS = 10
CHANNELS = 10,
AI_RESPONDING = 11
}
}
@@ -13561,6 +13751,8 @@ export namespace proto {
isStatusNotificationEnabled?: (boolean|null);
statusNotificationToneId?: (number|null);
shouldPlaySoundForCallNotification?: (boolean|null);
chatThemeId?: (string|null);
colorSchemeId?: (string|null);
}
class SettingsSyncAction implements ISettingsSyncAction {
@@ -13596,6 +13788,8 @@ export namespace proto {
public isStatusNotificationEnabled?: (boolean|null);
public statusNotificationToneId?: (number|null);
public shouldPlaySoundForCallNotification?: (boolean|null);
public chatThemeId?: (string|null);
public colorSchemeId?: (string|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.SyncActionValue.ISettingsSyncAction): proto.SyncActionValue.SettingsSyncAction;
public static encode(m: proto.SyncActionValue.ISettingsSyncAction, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.SyncActionValue.SettingsSyncAction;
@@ -13652,7 +13846,9 @@ export namespace proto {
IS_GROUP_REACTIONS_NOTIFICATION_ENABLED = 28,
IS_STATUS_NOTIFICATION_ENABLED = 29,
STATUS_NOTIFICATION_TONE_ID = 30,
SHOULD_PLAY_SOUND_FOR_CALL_NOTIFICATION = 31
SHOULD_PLAY_SOUND_FOR_CALL_NOTIFICATION = 31,
CHAT_THEME_ID = 32,
COLOR_SCHEME_ID = 33
}
enum SettingPlatform {
@@ -13701,6 +13897,8 @@ export namespace proto {
userJid?: (string[]|null);
shareToFB?: (boolean|null);
shareToIG?: (boolean|null);
customLists?: (proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction.ICustomList[]|null);
modes?: (proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction.StatusDistributionMode[]|null);
}
class StatusPrivacyAction implements IStatusPrivacyAction {
@@ -13709,6 +13907,8 @@ export namespace proto {
public userJid: string[];
public shareToFB?: (boolean|null);
public shareToIG?: (boolean|null);
public customLists: proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction.ICustomList[];
public modes: proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction.StatusDistributionMode[];
public static create(properties?: proto.SyncActionValue.IStatusPrivacyAction): proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction;
public static encode(m: proto.SyncActionValue.IStatusPrivacyAction, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction;
@@ -13720,11 +13920,36 @@ export namespace proto {
namespace StatusPrivacyAction {
interface ICustomList {
listId?: (string|null);
name?: (string|null);
emoji?: (string|null);
isSelected?: (boolean|null);
userJid?: (string[]|null);
}
class CustomList implements ICustomList {
constructor(p?: proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction.ICustomList);
public listId?: (string|null);
public name?: (string|null);
public emoji?: (string|null);
public isSelected?: (boolean|null);
public userJid: string[];
public static create(properties?: proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction.ICustomList): proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction.CustomList;
public static encode(m: proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction.ICustomList, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction.CustomList;
public static fromObject(d: { [k: string]: any }): proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction.CustomList;
public static toObject(m: proto.SyncActionValue.StatusPrivacyAction.CustomList, o?: $protobuf.IConversionOptions): { [k: string]: any };
public toJSON(): { [k: string]: any };
public static getTypeUrl(typeUrlPrefix?: string): string;
}
enum StatusDistributionMode {
ALLOW_LIST = 0,
DENY_LIST = 1,
CONTACTS = 2,
CLOSE_FRIENDS = 3
CLOSE_FRIENDS = 3,
CUSTOM_LIST = 4
}
}
@@ -14732,6 +14957,8 @@ export namespace proto {
quarantinedMessage?: (proto.IQuarantinedMessage|null);
nonJidMentions?: (number|null);
hsmTag?: (string|null);
ephemeralExpirationTimestamp?: (number|Long|null);
scheduledMessageMetadata?: (proto.IScheduledMessageMetadata|null);
}
class WebMessageInfo implements IWebMessageInfo {
@@ -14804,6 +15031,8 @@ export namespace proto {
public quarantinedMessage?: (proto.IQuarantinedMessage|null);
public nonJidMentions?: (number|null);
public hsmTag?: (string|null);
public ephemeralExpirationTimestamp?: (number|Long|null);
public scheduledMessageMetadata?: (proto.IScheduledMessageMetadata|null);
public static create(properties?: proto.IWebMessageInfo): proto.WebMessageInfo;
public static encode(m: proto.IWebMessageInfo, w?: $protobuf.Writer): $protobuf.Writer;
public static decode(r: ($protobuf.Reader|Uint8Array), l?: number): proto.WebMessageInfo;
@@ -15055,7 +15284,9 @@ export namespace proto {
QUARANTINED_MESSAGE = 220,
GROUP_MEMBER_SHARE_GROUP_HISTORY_MODE = 221,
GROUP_OPEN_BOT_ADDED = 222,
GROUP_TEE_BOT_ADDED = 223
GROUP_TEE_BOT_ADDED = 223,
CONTACT_INFO = 224,
SCHEDULED_MESSAGE_CREATED = 225
}
}
+1828 -32
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+531
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@@ -0,0 +1,531 @@
# Mensagens View-Once (Visualização Única) — Guia de Implementação
**Data:** 2026-03-23
**Versão:** 1.0
---
## 1. O que é View-Once
Mensagem de visualização única é um tipo especial de mídia (imagem, vídeo ou áudio) que o destinatário pode abrir apenas uma vez. Após abrir, o conteúdo some permanentemente.
---
> ## ⚠️ RESTRIÇÃO CRÍTICA — Contas Hosted (Meta Business Cloud API)
>
> **Contas registradas como "hosted" na Meta Business Cloud API têm view-once bloqueado pelo servidor do WhatsApp.**
>
> Essa restrição se aplica a **todos os clientes** (Android, iOS, WA Web) e **não há como contornar por código** — é uma política imposta diretamente pelo servidor WA para contas hosted.
>
> **Como identificar se sua conta é hosted:**
> - A conta foi criada via Meta Business Cloud API (WABA)
> - Aparece como "Meta" ou "Business Cloud" nas configurações do WhatsApp Business Manager
>
> **Contas não-hosted** (registradas diretamente via QR code ou pair code) **funcionam normalmente** com view-once.
---
**Comportamento em cada dispositivo após envio via API (contas não-hosted):**
| Dispositivo | O que aparece |
|---|---|
| Destinatário (Android/iOS) | Recebe a mídia com ícone de olhinho — pode abrir uma vez |
| Android principal do remetente | Mostra na conversa que a mensagem foi enviada (ícone de olhinho) |
| WA Web do remetente | "Aguardando mensagem. Abra o WhatsApp no seu celular." |
> **Nota:** A mensagem "Aguardando mensagem..." no WA Web é o comportamento correto e esperado quando o envio vem de um companion (API). É uma limitação do protocolo WhatsApp — o servidor só permite que o celular principal notifique companions com o conteúdo da view-once.
---
## 2. Como Enviar via API
### 2.1 Imagem
```bash
curl -X POST https://sua-api.com/v1/messages/send_image \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-api-key: SEU_API_KEY" \
-d '{
"instance": "nome-da-instancia",
"to": "5511999999999",
"caption": "Olha só isso!",
"imageUrl": "https://exemplo.com/foto.jpg",
"viewOnce": true
}'
```
**Resposta de sucesso:**
```json
{ "ok": true }
```
### 2.2 Vídeo
```bash
curl -X POST https://sua-api.com/v1/messages/send_video \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-api-key: SEU_API_KEY" \
-d '{
"instance": "nome-da-instancia",
"to": "5511999999999",
"caption": "Assista uma vez",
"videoUrl": "https://exemplo.com/video.mp4",
"viewOnce": true
}'
```
### 2.3 Áudio
```bash
curl -X POST https://sua-api.com/v1/messages/send_audio \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-api-key: SEU_API_KEY" \
-d '{
"instance": "nome-da-instancia",
"to": "5511999999999",
"audioUrl": "https://exemplo.com/audio.ogg",
"ptt": false,
"viewOnce": true
}'
```
### 2.4 Usando Base64 (sem URL pública)
```bash
curl -X POST https://sua-api.com/v1/messages/send_image \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "x-api-key: SEU_API_KEY" \
-d '{
"instance": "nome-da-instancia",
"to": "5511999999999",
"imageBase64": "...",
"viewOnce": true
}'
```
---
## 3. Como Receber via Webhook
Quando um contato envia uma mensagem de visualização única para o número conectado na API, o webhook recebe o evento com `key.isViewOnce = true`.
### 3.1 Estrutura do evento recebido
```json
{
"event": "messages.upsert",
"instance": "nome-da-instancia",
"data": {
"messages": [
{
"key": {
"remoteJid": "5511999999999@s.whatsapp.net",
"fromMe": false,
"id": "3EB0ABCDEF123456",
"isViewOnce": true
},
"message": {
"viewOnceMessageV2": {
"message": {
"imageMessage": {
"url": "https://mmg.whatsapp.net/...",
"mimetype": "image/jpeg",
"mediaKey": "base64...",
"fileEncSha256": "base64...",
"directPath": "/v/...",
"viewOnce": true
}
}
}
},
"messageTimestamp": 1742700000,
"pushName": "João Silva"
}
],
"type": "notify"
}
}
```
### 3.2 Como identificar que é view-once
O campo principal para identificar é `key.isViewOnce = true`. Existem dois caminhos para confirmar:
```javascript
function isViewOnce(msg) {
// Caminho 1: flag direta (mais simples)
if (msg.key?.isViewOnce) return true
// Caminho 2: verificar o wrapper da mensagem
const inner =
msg.message?.viewOnceMessageV2?.message ||
msg.message?.viewOnceMessage?.message ||
msg.message?.viewOnceMessageV2Extension?.message
return !!(
inner?.imageMessage?.viewOnce ||
inner?.videoMessage?.viewOnce ||
inner?.audioMessage?.viewOnce
)
}
```
### 3.3 Como acessar a mídia
```javascript
function getViewOnceMedia(msg) {
const inner =
msg.message?.viewOnceMessageV2?.message ||
msg.message?.viewOnceMessage?.message ||
msg.message?.viewOnceMessageV2Extension?.message
if (!inner) return null
if (inner.imageMessage) return { type: 'image', media: inner.imageMessage }
if (inner.videoMessage) return { type: 'video', media: inner.videoMessage }
if (inner.audioMessage) return { type: 'audio', media: inner.audioMessage }
return null
}
// Uso:
const media = getViewOnceMedia(msg)
if (media) {
console.log(`View-once ${media.type}`)
console.log('URL:', media.media.url)
console.log('DirectPath:', media.media.directPath)
console.log('MediaKey:', media.media.mediaKey) // necessário para download
}
```
---
## 4. Como Exibir numa Ferramenta (Frontend/CRM)
### 4.1 Lógica de detecção e exibição
```javascript
function renderMessage(msg) {
if (!isViewOnce(msg)) {
// Renderizar mensagem normal
return renderNormalMessage(msg)
}
const media = getViewOnceMedia(msg)
if (!media) return
// Verificar se já foi aberta (controle local da ferramenta)
const alreadyOpened = localStorage.getItem(`vo_${msg.key.id}`)
if (alreadyOpened) {
// Mostrar placeholder de "já visualizado"
return renderViewOncePlaceholder(media.type, msg.key.fromMe)
}
if (msg.key.fromMe) {
// Mensagem enviada por mim — nunca mostrar conteúdo
return renderSentViewOnce(media.type)
}
// Mensagem recebida — mostrar botão para "abrir uma vez"
return renderViewOnceButton(media.type, msg)
}
```
### 4.2 Componente de exibição — mensagem recebida
```javascript
function renderViewOnceButton(type, msg) {
const icons = { image: '📷', video: '🎥', audio: '🎵' }
const labels = { image: 'Foto', video: 'Vídeo', áudio: 'Áudio' }
return `
<div class="view-once-bubble received">
<span class="view-once-icon">${icons[type]}</span>
<span class="view-once-label">${labels[type]} de visualização única</span>
<button onclick="openViewOnce('${msg.key.id}', '${type}')">
Abrir
</button>
</div>
`
}
async function openViewOnce(msgId, type) {
// 1. Marcar como aberta ANTES de mostrar (só uma chance)
localStorage.setItem(`vo_${msgId}`, '1')
// 2. Baixar e mostrar a mídia
const mediaUrl = await downloadViewOnceMedia(msgId)
showMedia(type, mediaUrl)
// 3. Após fechar/visualizar, substituir pelo placeholder
onMediaClosed(() => {
replaceWithPlaceholder(msgId, type)
})
}
```
### 4.3 Componente de exibição — mensagem enviada
```javascript
function renderSentViewOnce(type) {
const labels = { image: 'Foto', video: 'Vídeo', audio: 'Áudio' }
return `
<div class="view-once-bubble sent">
<span class="view-once-icon">👁️</span>
<span>${labels[type]} de visualização única</span>
<span class="view-once-status">Enviada</span>
</div>
`
}
```
### 4.4 Placeholder após visualização
```javascript
function renderViewOncePlaceholder(type, fromMe) {
const labels = { image: 'foto', video: 'vídeo', audio: 'áudio' }
const text = fromMe
? `Você enviou uma ${labels[type]} de visualização única`
: `${labels[type]} de visualização única aberta`
return `
<div class="view-once-bubble placeholder">
<span class="view-once-icon">🚫</span>
<span>${text}</span>
</div>
`
}
```
### 4.5 CSS sugerido
```css
.view-once-bubble {
display: flex;
align-items: center;
gap: 8px;
padding: 10px 14px;
border-radius: 12px;
max-width: 280px;
}
.view-once-bubble.received {
background: #f0f0f0;
color: #333;
}
.view-once-bubble.sent {
background: #dcf8c6;
color: #333;
align-self: flex-end;
}
.view-once-bubble.placeholder {
background: #e8e8e8;
color: #999;
font-style: italic;
}
.view-once-bubble button {
background: #25d366;
color: white;
border: none;
border-radius: 8px;
padding: 6px 12px;
cursor: pointer;
font-size: 13px;
}
```
---
## 5. Código Implementado na API
### 5.1 Geração da mensagem — `src/Utils/messages.ts`
Quando `viewOnce: true` é passado, a mídia é encapsulada no wrapper moderno `viewOnceMessageV2` (campo 55 do proto) e o flag `viewOnce=true` é setado na mídia interna:
```typescript
if (hasOptionalProperty(message, 'viewOnce') && !!message.viewOnce) {
// Seta viewOnce=true na mensagem de mídia interna
if (m.imageMessage) m.imageMessage.viewOnce = true
else if (m.videoMessage) m.videoMessage.viewOnce = true
else if (m.audioMessage) m.audioMessage.viewOnce = true
// Usa viewOnceMessageV2 (campo 55) — formato atual do WA
m = { viewOnceMessageV2: { message: m } }
}
```
### 5.2 Envio — `src/Socket/messages-send.ts`
**Detecção de view-once real** (não confunde com botões/listas que também usam o wrapper `viewOnceMessage`):
```typescript
// Detecta view-once real pela flag viewOnce na mídia interna.
// viewOnceMessage* wrappers são também usados por botões/listas/carrosséis
// (que carregam interactiveMessage dentro) — esses NÃO têm viewOnce=true na mídia.
const viewOnceInner =
message.viewOnceMessageV2?.message ||
message.viewOnceMessage?.message ||
message.viewOnceMessageV2Extension?.message
const isViewOnceMsg = !!(
viewOnceInner?.imageMessage?.viewOnce ||
viewOnceInner?.videoMessage?.viewOnce ||
viewOnceInner?.audioMessage?.viewOnce
)
// Para view-once: DSM enviado apenas para o celular principal (device=0).
// Companions (device>0) são omitidos — o servidor WA gera
// <unavailable type="view_once"/> automaticamente para eles.
const viewOnceMeRecipients = isViewOnceMsg
? meRecipients.filter(jid => !jidDecode(jid)?.device)
: meRecipients
// assertSessions apenas para quem vai realmente receber
await assertSessions([...viewOnceMeRecipients, ...otherRecipients])
const [meNodes, otherNodes] = await Promise.all([
createParticipantNodes(viewOnceMeRecipients, meMsg || message, extraAttrs),
createParticipantNodes(otherRecipients, message, extraAttrs)
])
participants.push(...meNodes)
participants.push(...otherNodes)
// phash recalculado com os participantes reais
const phashRecipients = isViewOnceMsg
? [...viewOnceMeRecipients, ...otherRecipients]
: [...meRecipients, ...otherRecipients]
if (phashRecipients.length > 0) {
extraAttrs['phash'] = generateParticipantHashV2(phashRecipients)
}
```
**`getMediaType()` — garante que vídeo e áudio view-once sejam entregues:**
```typescript
const getMediaType = (message: proto.IMessage) => {
// Desencapsula wrapper view-once antes de verificar o tipo de mídia.
// Sem isso, message.videoMessage e message.audioMessage são undefined
// (estão dentro do wrapper) e o atributo mediatype ficaria ausente no
// enc node — o servidor WA descarta silenciosamente vídeo/áudio view-once.
const inner =
message.viewOnceMessage?.message ||
message.viewOnceMessageV2?.message ||
message.viewOnceMessageV2Extension?.message
if (inner) {
return getMediaType(inner)
}
if (message.imageMessage) return 'image'
else if (message.videoMessage) return 'video'
// ...
}
```
### 5.3 Recepção — `src/Utils/decode-wa-message.ts`
Quando a API recebe uma view-once como companion (linked device), o servidor envia dois stanzas:
- **Stanza 1** (`enc`): conteúdo completo com metadados da mídia
- **Stanza 2** (`unavailable type="view_once"`): sinal de sync
O stanza 1 é detectado e marcado corretamente:
```typescript
// Detecta view-once na stanza 1 recebida por linked device.
// O wrapper viewOnceMessage também é usado por mensagens interativas
// (interactiveMessage, listMessage) — esses NÃO têm viewOnce=true na mídia.
const viewOnceInner =
msg.viewOnceMessage?.message ||
msg.viewOnceMessageV2?.message ||
msg.viewOnceMessageV2Extension?.message
if (
viewOnceInner?.imageMessage?.viewOnce ||
viewOnceInner?.videoMessage?.viewOnce ||
viewOnceInner?.audioMessage?.viewOnce
) {
fullMessage.key.isViewOnce = true
}
```
---
## 6. Fluxo Completo
```
API envia view-once para destinatário
├── Protobuf gerado:
│ viewOnceMessageV2 {
│ message {
│ imageMessage { viewOnce: true, url, mediaKey, ... }
│ }
│ }
├── Stanza enviado ao servidor WA:
│ <message to="destinatario@s.whatsapp.net" type="media">
│ <enc type="pkmsg">...viewOnceMessageV2 cifrado...</enc> ← para o destinatário
│ <participants>
│ <to jid="meu-numero:0@lid"> ← celular principal
│ <enc type="msg">...DSM{viewOnceMessageV2}...</enc>
│ </to>
│ <!-- device>0 omitidos — servidor gera unavailable -->
│ </participants>
│ </message>
└── Distribuição pelo servidor:
├── Destinatário → recebe enc → abre uma vez ✅
├── Celular principal → recebe DSM → mostra "você enviou" ✅
└── WA Web → recebe <unavailable> → "Aguardando..." ✅
Destinatário envia view-once de volta para a API
├── Stanza recebido pela API (stanza 1 — enc com conteúdo):
│ <message from="destinatario@s.whatsapp.net" type="media">
│ <enc type="msg">...viewOnceMessageV2 cifrado...</enc>
│ </message>
├── decode-wa-message.ts:
│ └── Descriptografa → detecta viewOnce=true → seta key.isViewOnce=true
├── Stanza recebido (stanza 2 — unavailable, ignorado):
│ <message from="...">
│ <unavailable type="view_once"/>
│ </message>
└── Webhook emitido:
messages.upsert → msg.key.isViewOnce = true ✅
```
---
## 7. Limitações
| Situação | Comportamento | Motivo |
|---|---|---|
| **Conta hosted (Meta Business Cloud API)** | **View-once bloqueado para todos os clientes** | **Política do servidor WA para contas hosted — sem workaround** |
| WA Web do remetente | "Aguardando mensagem. Abra no celular." | Servidor WA só aceita `<unavailable>` vindo do celular principal, não de companions |
| View-once de documento/sticker | Não suportado | Limitação do protocolo WA — só imagem, vídeo e áudio |
| `error_479` nos logs | Normal, não é erro | TcToken é atualizado após o envio de view-once |
| Companion não consegue abrir | Por design | O conteúdo não é entregue para linked devices |
---
## 8. Checklist de Validação
**Envio:**
- [ ] Destinatário recebe com ícone de olhinho
- [ ] Destinatário consegue abrir a mídia
- [ ] Após abrir, a mídia some
- [ ] Celular principal do remetente mostra "você enviou" com ícone de olhinho
- [ ] WA Web do remetente mostra "Aguardando mensagem..."
- [ ] Funciona para imagem, vídeo e áudio
- [ ] Logs mostram `📤 Message sent` (error_479 é normal)
**Recepção:**
- [ ] Webhook recebe `key.isViewOnce = true`
- [ ] `viewOnceMessageV2.message.imageMessage` (ou video/audio) está presente
- [ ] API não crasha ao receber view-once de outro dispositivo
- [ ] Mensagem interativa (botão/lista) enviada após view-once não é afetada
+1 -1
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@@ -1 +1 @@
{"version":[2,3000,1035504971]}
{"version":[2,3000,1038167900]}
+43 -9
View File
@@ -31,9 +31,26 @@ export const STATUS_EXPIRY_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60
export const PLACEHOLDER_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60
export const NOISE_MODE = 'Noise_XX_25519_AESGCM_SHA256\0\0\0\0'
export const DICT_VERSION = 3
/**
* Protocol mode: 'web' (default) or 'native' (experimental)
* - web: WA\x06\x03 — standard WhatsApp Web protocol
* - native: WAM\x05 — native Android protocol (may enable view-once media on companions)
*
* Set via BAILEYS_PROTOCOL env var:
* BAILEYS_PROTOCOL=native
*/
const PROTOCOL_MODE = process.env.BAILEYS_PROTOCOL?.trim().toLowerCase() === 'native' ? 'native' : 'web'
export const DICT_VERSION = PROTOCOL_MODE === 'native' ? 5 : 3
export const KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE = Buffer.from([5])
export const NOISE_WA_HEADER = Buffer.from([87, 65, 6, DICT_VERSION]) // last is "DICT_VERSION"
// WA\x06\x03 = web protocol, WAM\x05 = native Android protocol
export const NOISE_WA_HEADER = PROTOCOL_MODE === 'native'
? Buffer.from([87, 65, 77, DICT_VERSION]) // WAM\x05
: Buffer.from([87, 65, 6, DICT_VERSION]) // WA\x06\x03
export { PROTOCOL_MODE }
/** from: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/3809401/what-is-a-good-regular-expression-to-match-a-url */
export const URL_REGEX = /https:\/\/(?![^:@\/\s]+:[^:@\/\s]+@)[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}(:\d+)?(\/[^\s]*)?/g
@@ -125,8 +142,6 @@ export const DEFAULT_CONNECTION_CONFIG: SocketConfig = {
getMessage: async () => undefined,
cachedGroupMetadata: async () => undefined,
makeSignalRepository: makeLibSignalRepository,
// Circuit breaker configuration
enableCircuitBreaker: true,
// Listener limits (memory leak prevention)
// WebSocket: 8 core events (open, close, error, message, ping, pong, upgrade, unexpected-response)
// + 10 dynamic listeners (reconnect handlers, custom events)
@@ -154,7 +169,20 @@ export const MEDIA_PATH_MAP: { [T in MediaType]?: string } = {
'md-msg-hist': '/mms/md-app-state',
'biz-cover-photo': '/pps/biz-cover-photo',
'sticker-pack': '/mms/sticker-pack',
'thumbnail-sticker-pack': '/mms/thumbnail-sticker-pack'
'thumbnail-sticker-pack': '/mms/thumbnail-sticker-pack',
// View-once types — same upload path as regular media (server CDN routing TBD)
'viewonce-image': '/mms/image',
'viewonce-video': '/mms/video',
'viewonce-audio': '/mms/audio'
}
export const NEWSLETTER_MEDIA_PATH_MAP: { [T in MediaType]?: string } = {
image: '/newsletter/newsletter-image',
video: '/newsletter/newsletter-video',
document: '/newsletter/newsletter-document',
audio: '/newsletter/newsletter-audio',
sticker: '/newsletter/newsletter-image',
'thumbnail-link': '/newsletter/newsletter-image'
}
export const MEDIA_HKDF_KEY_MAPPING = {
@@ -178,7 +206,11 @@ export const MEDIA_HKDF_KEY_MAPPING = {
ptv: 'Video',
'biz-cover-photo': 'Image',
'sticker-pack': 'Sticker Pack',
'thumbnail-sticker-pack': 'Sticker Pack Thumbnail'
'thumbnail-sticker-pack': 'Sticker Pack Thumbnail',
// View-once types — same HKDF keys as regular types (recipients decrypt with normal keys)
'viewonce-image': 'Image',
'viewonce-video': 'Video',
'viewonce-audio': 'Audio'
}
export type MediaType = keyof typeof MEDIA_HKDF_KEY_MAPPING
@@ -188,10 +220,12 @@ export const MEDIA_KEYS = Object.keys(MEDIA_PATH_MAP) as MediaType[]
/** 120s timeout for history sync stall detection, same as WA Web's handleChunkProgress / restartPausedTimer (g = 120) */
export const HISTORY_SYNC_PAUSED_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000
export const MIN_PREKEY_COUNT = 5
// Replenishment threshold: when server count drops below this, top-up back to INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT
export const MIN_PREKEY_COUNT = 200
// Moderate prekey count (upstream uses 812, reduced to balance rate limiting and availability)
export const INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT = 200
// Initial pool size matching WA Business (CDP IDB capture: prekey-store = 812 on registration)
// Rounded to 800 for cleanliness; replenishment always tops up to this value
export const INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT = 800
export const UPLOAD_TIMEOUT = 30000 // 30 seconds
// Moderate upload interval to balance rate limiting and responsiveness (was 5000)
+5 -13
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import type { LIDMapping, SignalAuthState, SignalKeyStoreWithTransaction } from
import type { BaileysEventEmitter } from '../Types/Events'
import type { SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore } from '../Types/Signal'
import { generateSignalPubKey } from '../Utils'
import { CircuitBreaker } from '../Utils/circuit-breaker.js'
import type { ILogger } from '../Utils/logger'
import { metrics } from '../Utils/prometheus-metrics.js'
import { isAnyLidUser, isAnyPnUser, jidDecode, transferDevice, WAJIDDomains } from '../WABinary'
@@ -67,8 +66,6 @@ export interface IdentitySaveResult {
export interface LibSignalRepositoryOptions {
/** Event emitter for broadcasting identity changes */
ev?: BaileysEventEmitter
/** Circuit breaker for prekey operations (optional) */
preKeyCircuitBreaker?: CircuitBreaker
}
// ============================================
@@ -256,7 +253,7 @@ export function makeLibSignalRepository(
pnToLIDFunc?: (jids: string[]) => Promise<LIDMapping[] | undefined>,
options?: LibSignalRepositoryOptions
): SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore {
const { ev, preKeyCircuitBreaker } = options || {}
const { ev } = options || {}
const lidMapping = new LIDMappingStore(auth.keys as SignalKeyStoreWithTransaction, logger, pnToLIDFunc)
// Identity key cache to avoid repeated storage reads
@@ -277,7 +274,7 @@ export function makeLibSignalRepository(
cacheMetricsInterval.unref()
}
const storage = signalStorage(auth, lidMapping, identityKeyCache, ev, preKeyCircuitBreaker, logger)
const storage = signalStorage(auth, lidMapping, identityKeyCache, ev, logger)
const parsedKeys = auth.keys as SignalKeyStoreWithTransaction
const migratedSessionCache = new LRUCache<string, true>({
@@ -385,13 +382,9 @@ export function makeLibSignalRepository(
'Identity key changed - contact may have reinstalled WhatsApp, session will be re-established'
)
// Reset prekey circuit breaker since we identified the cause
// Reset regardless of state (could be open, half-open, or closed with accumulated failures)
// eslint-disable-next-line max-depth
if (preKeyCircuitBreaker) {
preKeyCircuitBreaker.reset()
logger.debug({ jid }, 'Reset prekey circuit breaker after identity key change detection')
}
// (No circuit breaker to reset — bounded-retry is stateless,
// each retry is independent so identity-change recovery
// happens automatically on the next operation.)
} else if (saveResult.isNew) {
logger.debug(
{ jid, addr: addrStr, fingerprint: saveResult.currentFingerprint },
@@ -769,7 +762,6 @@ function signalStorage(
lidMapping: LIDMappingStore,
identityKeyCache: LRUCache<string, Uint8Array>,
ev?: BaileysEventEmitter,
preKeyCircuitBreaker?: CircuitBreaker,
logger?: ILogger
): ExtendedSignalStorage {
// Shared function to resolve PN signal address to LID if mapping exists
+196 -31
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ import {
resolveLidToPn
} from '../Utils'
import { makeKeyedMutex, makeMutex } from '../Utils/make-mutex'
import processMessage from '../Utils/process-message'
import processMessage, { getChatId } from '../Utils/process-message'
import { buildTcTokenFromJid } from '../Utils/tc-token-utils'
import {
type BinaryNode,
@@ -98,6 +98,24 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
let privacySettings: { [_: string]: string } | undefined
/**
* Server-assigned AB props that gate tctoken-related protocol behavior.
* Defaults match WA Web (safe — avoids spurious error 463 if the prop never
* arrives). Populated from `fetchProps()` on connection.
*
* - `privacyTokenOn1to1` (AB prop 10518 / `privacy_token_sending_on_all_1_on_1_messages`):
* include tctoken in 1:1 messages.
* - `profilePicPrivacyToken` (AB prop 9666 / `profile_scraping_privacy_token_in_photo_iq`):
* include tctoken in profile picture IQs.
* - `lidTrustedTokenIssueToLid` (AB prop 14303 / `lid_trusted_token_issue_to_lid`):
* issue privacy tokens to the contact's LID instead of the PN.
*/
const serverProps = {
privacyTokenOn1to1: true,
profilePicPrivacyToken: true,
lidTrustedTokenIssueToLid: false
}
let syncState: SyncState = SyncState.Connecting
/** this mutex ensures that messages from the same chat are processed in order, while allowing parallel processing of messages from different chats */
@@ -112,6 +130,18 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
/** this mutex ensures that notifications from the same chat are processed in order, while allowing parallel processing across chats */
const notificationMutex = makeKeyedMutex()
/**
* Per-chat mutex dedicated to post-upsert work (history app-state sync +
* processMessage side effects). Kept separate from `messageMutex` because
* the inbound caller already holds `messageMutex(chatId)` while running
* decrypt + upsertMessage; sharing the same mutex would let a concurrently-
* arrived message N+1 enqueue *between* msg N's outer callback and msg N's
* post-upsert task, so msg N+1's processMessage could run before msg N's
* (breaking per-chat ordering of side effects). With a separate mutex,
* post-upsert tasks enqueue strictly in upsertMessage call order.
*/
const postUpsertMutex = makeKeyedMutex()
// Timeout for AwaitingInitialSync state
let awaitingSyncTimeout: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined
@@ -791,7 +821,10 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
me && (normalizedJid === jidNormalizedUser(me.id) || (me.lid && normalizedJid === jidNormalizedUser(me.lid)))
let content: BinaryNode[] | undefined = baseContent
if (isUserJid && !isSelf) {
// Gate inclusion on AB prop 9666 (profile_scraping_privacy_token_in_photo_iq).
// WA Web defaults to true; if the server flips it off, we mirror that to
// avoid divergence with the spec-compliant client.
if (serverProps.profilePicPrivacyToken && isUserJid && !isSelf) {
content = await buildTcTokenFromJid({
authState,
jid: normalizedJid,
@@ -1060,22 +1093,21 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}
}
/** sending non-abt props may fix QR scan fail if server expects */
/** fetch AB props */
const fetchProps = async () => {
//TODO: implement both protocol 1 and protocol 2 prop fetching, specially for abKey for WM
const resultNode = await query({
tag: 'iq',
attrs: {
to: S_WHATSAPP_NET,
xmlns: 'w',
xmlns: 'abt',
type: 'get'
},
content: [
{
tag: 'props',
attrs: {
protocol: '2',
hash: authState?.creds?.lastPropHash || ''
protocol: '1',
...(authState?.creds?.lastPropHash ? { hash: authState.creds.lastPropHash } : {})
}
}
]
@@ -1094,7 +1126,25 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
props = reduceBinaryNodeToDictionary(propsNode, 'prop')
}
logger.debug('fetched props')
// Extract protocol-relevant AB props (defaults match WA Web; see serverProps doc).
// We accept both numeric IDs and human-readable names so the parser is resilient
// to upstream renaming and to future-versioned WA Web servers.
const privacyTokenProp = props['10518'] ?? props['privacy_token_sending_on_all_1_on_1_messages']
if (privacyTokenProp !== undefined) {
serverProps.privacyTokenOn1to1 = privacyTokenProp === 'true' || privacyTokenProp === '1'
}
const profilePicProp = props['9666'] ?? props['profile_scraping_privacy_token_in_photo_iq']
if (profilePicProp !== undefined) {
serverProps.profilePicPrivacyToken = profilePicProp === 'true' || profilePicProp === '1'
}
const lidIssueProp = props['14303'] ?? props['lid_trusted_token_issue_to_lid']
if (lidIssueProp !== undefined) {
serverProps.lidTrustedTokenIssueToLid = lidIssueProp === 'true' || lidIssueProp === '1'
}
logger.debug({ serverProps }, 'fetched props')
return props
}
@@ -1361,7 +1411,19 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
blockedCollections.clear()
logger.info('Doing app state sync')
await resyncAppState(ALL_WA_PATCH_NAMES, true)
try {
await resyncAppState(ALL_WA_PATCH_NAMES, true)
} catch (err) {
// Failure recovery: without this, syncState would stay at Syncing
// and ev.flush() would never run, leaving the event buffer pinned
// until the buffer's own safety timeout expires. Force the state
// machine forward so live inbound events can flow even if the
// app-state resync failed (collections are already cleared, so
// blocked patches will be retried on the next creds.update tick).
syncState = SyncState.Online
ev.flush()
throw err
}
// Sync is complete, go online and flush everything
syncState = SyncState.Online
@@ -1373,29 +1435,131 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}
}
await Promise.all([
(async () => {
if (shouldProcessHistoryMsg) {
await doAppStateSync()
}
})(),
processMessage(msg, {
signalRepository,
shouldProcessHistoryMsg,
placeholderResendCache,
ev,
creds: authState.creds,
keyStore: authState.keys,
logger,
options: config.options,
getMessage
})
])
// Post-upsert work: history app-state sync + processMessage side effects.
// Awaiting here keeps `messages.upsert` pinned in the event buffer
// (createBufferedFunction only schedules flush after work() resolves), so
// the hot path detaches this work to release the emit on the next debounce
// tick.
//
// Use Promise.allSettled so the combined promise only settles after BOTH
// tasks finish. With a plain Promise.all, an early rejection from one task
// would release the keyed mutex while the other task is still mutating
// chat state — letting the next message of the same chat overtake it and
// break per-chat ordering.
//
// Returns the per-task settle status so the keyShare branch can know
// whether processMessage actually persisted the new app-state-sync key
// before triggering doAppStateSync (otherwise the sync would hit
// isMissingKeyError and park collections in blockedCollections).
const postUpsertTasks = async (): Promise<{ processMessageOk: boolean }> => {
const [historyResult, processResult] = await Promise.allSettled([
shouldProcessHistoryMsg ? doAppStateSync() : Promise.resolve(),
processMessage(msg, {
signalRepository,
shouldProcessHistoryMsg,
placeholderResendCache,
ev,
creds: authState.creds,
keyStore: authState.keys,
logger,
options: config.options,
getMessage
})
])
// If the app state key arrives and we are waiting to sync, trigger the sync now.
if (msg.message?.protocolMessage?.appStateSyncKeyShare && syncState === SyncState.Syncing) {
logger.info('App state sync key arrived, triggering app state sync')
await doAppStateSync()
if (historyResult.status === 'rejected') {
logger?.warn(
{ err: historyResult.reason, messageId: msg.key?.id, remoteJid: msg.key?.remoteJid },
'history doAppStateSync failed'
)
}
if (processResult.status === 'rejected') {
logger?.warn(
{ err: processResult.reason, messageId: msg.key?.id, remoteJid: msg.key?.remoteJid },
'processMessage failed'
)
}
return { processMessageOk: processResult.status === 'fulfilled' }
}
// Use getChatId + jidNormalizedUser so the mutex key matches the chat-id
// scheme processMessage uses for chat updates (broadcasts target the
// participant). When getChatId/jidNormalizedUser yields nothing usable
// (missing or malformed JID), prefer a message-derived fallback over a
// single global 'unknown' bucket — that bucket would head-of-line block
// every malformed message behind a shared queue. msg.key.id is unique
// per message so unrelated malformed inputs no longer serialize together;
// for valid messages we still hit the normalized chat-id path, so the
// per-chat ordering guarantee is unchanged where it matters.
const rawChatId = getChatId(msg.key)
const normalizedChatId = rawChatId ? jidNormalizedUser(rawChatId) : ''
const postUpsertChatId = normalizedChatId || msg.key?.id || 'unknown'
// Wrap in `postUpsertMutex(chatId)` (a SEPARATE keyed mutex from the outer
// `messageMutex` held by the inbound caller) so per-chat ordering of
// processMessage side effects (chat.unreadCount, LID/PN mapping,
// messages.update, history downloads) is preserved across messages of the
// same chat.
//
// Why a separate mutex: if we re-used messageMutex, a concurrently-arrived
// message N+1 could enqueue on the outer mutex BEFORE msg N's post-upsert
// task gets enqueued (because N's outer callback yields on `await decrypt()`
// before reaching the inner enqueue site). The queue would then be
// [OuterN+1, InnerN, ...], so InnerN+1 would beat InnerN to processMessage.
// With its own mutex, post-upsert tasks enqueue strictly in upsertMessage
// call order (which IS message arrival order because the outer
// messageMutex serializes the upserts per-chat).
const postUpsertWork = postUpsertMutex.mutex(postUpsertChatId, postUpsertTasks)
const isKeyShareDuringSync =
!!msg.message?.protocolMessage?.appStateSyncKeyShare && syncState === SyncState.Syncing
if (isKeyShareDuringSync) {
// appStateSyncKeyShare path: processMessage persists the new app-state-sync
// key in its APP_STATE_SYNC_KEY_SHARE handler (via keyStore.transaction).
// The follow-up doAppStateSync() needs that key to decrypt patches, so
// we MUST wait for processMessage to actually succeed before kicking off
// the sync — otherwise it would hit isMissingKeyError and park
// collections in blockedCollections, regressing the very issue this
// branch was added to fix.
//
// No deadlock with the inbound caller's messageMutex because
// postUpsertMutex is a different mutex instance.
logger.info('App state sync key arrived, awaiting persistence before triggering sync')
const { processMessageOk } = await postUpsertWork
if (!processMessageOk) {
logger?.warn(
{ messageId: msg.key?.id, remoteJid: msg.key?.remoteJid },
'processMessage failed during key-share — skipping doAppStateSync to avoid isMissingKeyError'
)
} else {
try {
await doAppStateSync()
} catch (err) {
logger?.warn(
{ err, messageId: msg.key?.id, remoteJid: msg.key?.remoteJid },
'doAppStateSync failed after key-share persistence'
)
}
}
} else {
// `postUpsertWork` is not expected to reject — `Promise.allSettled`
// inside `postUpsertTasks` never rejects, and per-task failures are
// already logged inline. The defensive catch routes any truly
// unexpected rejection (e.g. `postUpsertMutex` internal corruption,
// future synchronous throws inside processMessage) through
// `onUnexpectedError` instead of letting it surface as an
// UnhandledPromiseRejection — which on Node ≥15 can terminate the
// long-running socket process.
postUpsertWork.catch(err =>
onUnexpectedError(
err,
`processing post-upsert work for message ${msg.key?.id || 'unknown'} on ${msg.key?.remoteJid || 'unknown chat'}`
)
)
}
})
@@ -1612,6 +1776,7 @@ export const makeChatsSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
return {
...sock,
serverProps,
createCallLink,
getBotListV2,
messageMutex,
+6
View File
@@ -343,11 +343,13 @@ export const extractGroupMetadata = (result: BinaryNode) => {
let descId: string | undefined
let descOwner: string | undefined
let descOwnerPn: string | undefined
let descOwnerUsername: string | undefined
let descTime: number | undefined
if (descChild) {
desc = getBinaryNodeChildString(descChild, 'body')
descOwner = descChild.attrs.participant ? jidNormalizedUser(descChild.attrs.participant) : undefined
descOwnerPn = descChild.attrs.participant_pn ? jidNormalizedUser(descChild.attrs.participant_pn) : undefined
descOwnerUsername = descChild.attrs.participant_username || undefined
descTime = +descChild.attrs.t!
descId = descChild.attrs.id
}
@@ -362,16 +364,19 @@ export const extractGroupMetadata = (result: BinaryNode) => {
subject: group.attrs.subject!,
subjectOwner: group.attrs.s_o,
subjectOwnerPn: group.attrs.s_o_pn,
subjectOwnerUsername: group.attrs.s_o_username,
subjectTime: +(group.attrs.s_t ?? '0'),
size: group.attrs.size ? +group.attrs.size : getBinaryNodeChildren(group, 'participant').length,
creation: +(group.attrs.creation ?? '0'),
owner: group.attrs.creator ? jidNormalizedUser(group.attrs.creator) : undefined,
ownerPn: group.attrs.creator_pn ? jidNormalizedUser(group.attrs.creator_pn) : undefined,
ownerUsername: group.attrs.creator_username || undefined,
owner_country_code: group.attrs.creator_country_code,
desc,
descId,
descOwner,
descOwnerPn,
descOwnerUsername,
descTime,
linkedParent: getBinaryNodeChild(group, 'linked_parent')?.attrs.jid || undefined,
restrict: !!getBinaryNodeChild(group, 'locked'),
@@ -386,6 +391,7 @@ export const extractGroupMetadata = (result: BinaryNode) => {
id: attrs.jid!,
phoneNumber: isLidUser(attrs.jid) && isPnUser(attrs.phone_number) ? attrs.phone_number : undefined,
lid: isPnUser(attrs.jid) && isLidUser(attrs.lid) ? attrs.lid : undefined,
username: attrs.participant_username || attrs.username || undefined,
admin: (attrs.type || null) as GroupParticipant['admin']
}
}),
+286 -153
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js'
import {
DEFAULT_CACHE_TTLS,
DEFAULT_SESSION_CLEANUP_CONFIG,
INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT,
KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE,
MIN_PREKEY_COUNT,
PLACEHOLDER_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
@@ -48,9 +49,12 @@ import {
getStatusFromReceiptType,
handleIdentityChange,
hkdf,
BAD_MAC_ERROR_TEXT,
DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG,
MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT,
NACK_REASONS,
NO_MESSAGE_FOUND_ERROR_TEXT,
RetryReason,
normalizeKeyLidToPn,
normalizeMessageJids,
resolveLidToPn,
@@ -69,7 +73,14 @@ import {
recordMessageReceived,
recordMessageRetry
} from '../Utils/prometheus-metrics.js'
import { isTcTokenExpired, resolveTcTokenJid, storeTcTokensFromIqResult } from '../Utils/tc-token-utils'
import {
buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite,
isTcTokenExpired,
resolveIssuanceJid,
resolveTcTokenJid,
storeTcTokensFromIqResult,
TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY
} from '../Utils/tc-token-utils'
import {
areJidsSameUser,
type BinaryNode,
@@ -160,7 +171,12 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
let sendActiveReceipts = false
// ======= tctoken index tracking for cross-session pruning =======
const TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY = '__index'
// TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY is imported from tc-token-utils so the value stays in sync
// with messages-send/process-message writes (avoids string drift on rename).
// Race note: this prune-driven index write may interleave with
// buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite calls from issuance/history-sync paths. Worst
// case: a JID resurrected by a stale read gets pruned again on the next 24h
// sweep — no data loss, just one extra cycle.
const TC_TOKEN_PRUNE_TS_KEY = '__prune_ts'
const tcTokenKnownJids = new Set<string>()
const tcTokenRetriedMsgIds = new Set<string>()
@@ -194,16 +210,25 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}
})()
/** Debounced save of the tctoken JID index (5s) */
/**
* Debounced save of the tctoken JID index (5s).
*
* Merges with the persisted index instead of overwriting — other layers
* (messages-send fire-and-forget issuance, process-message history sync) may
* write JIDs to the index via `buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite` without updating
* `tcTokenKnownJids`. Without the merge those JIDs would be silently dropped
* the next time this debounced save fires.
*/
const scheduleTcTokenIndexSave = () => {
if (tcTokenIndexSaveTimer) clearTimeout(tcTokenIndexSaveTimer)
tcTokenIndexSaveTimer = setTimeout(async () => {
try {
const arr = Array.from(tcTokenKnownJids)
const merged = await buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite(authState.keys, tcTokenKnownJids)
await authState.keys.set({
tctoken: {
...merged,
[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY]: {
token: Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(arr), 'utf8'),
...merged[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY],
timestamp: unixTimestampSeconds().toString()
}
}
@@ -1212,7 +1237,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
return await query(stanza)
}
const sendRetryRequest = async (node: BinaryNode, forceIncludeKeys = false) => {
const sendRetryRequest = async (node: BinaryNode, forceIncludeKeys = false, decryptionError?: string) => {
const { fullMessage } = decodeMessageNode(node, authState.creds.me!.id, authState.creds.me!.lid || '')
const { key: msgKey } = fullMessage
const msgId = msgKey.id!
@@ -1310,39 +1335,39 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
const { account, signedPreKey, signedIdentityKey: identityKey } = authState.creds
const fromJid = node.attrs.from!
// Check if we should recreate the session
let shouldRecreateSession = false
let recreateReason = ''
if (enableAutoSessionRecreation && messageRetryManager && retryCount >= 1) {
try {
// Check if we have a session with this JID
const sessionId = signalRepository.jidToSignalProtocolAddress(fromJid)
const hasSession = await signalRepository.validateSession(fromJid)
// Extract error code from retry node if present (for MAC error detection)
const retryNode = getBinaryNodeChild(node, 'retry')
const errorAttr = retryNode?.attrs?.error
const errorCode = messageRetryManager.parseRetryErrorCode(errorAttr)
const result = messageRetryManager.shouldRecreateSession(fromJid, hasSession.exists, errorCode)
shouldRecreateSession = result.recreate
recreateReason = result.reason
if (shouldRecreateSession) {
logger.debug({ fromJid, retryCount, reason: recreateReason, errorCode }, 'recreating session for retry')
// Delete existing session to force recreation
// CRITICAL: Use same transaction key as encrypt/decrypt operations to prevent race
// Using meId ensures this delete serializes with sendMessage() and other session operations
await authState.keys.transaction(async () => {
await authState.keys.set({ session: { [sessionId]: null } })
}, authState.creds.me?.id || 'session-operation')
forceIncludeKeys = true
}
} catch (error) {
logger.warn({ error, fromJid }, 'failed to check session recreation')
}
}
// Derive the Signal error code from the actual decryption failure message.
// Sent in the retry receipt so the peer (even another InfiniteAPI instance)
// knows the exact failure type and can recreate the session immediately
// instead of falling back to the 1-hour timeout.
//
// Codes mirror RetryReason enum in message-retry-manager.ts:
// 0 = UnknownError | 1 = NoSession | 2 = InvalidKey
// 3 = InvalidKeyId | 4 = InvalidMessage | 7 = BadMac
//
// Uses DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG error lists (single source of truth in
// decode-wa-message.ts) so additions to those lists are picked up here
// automatically.
//
// NOTE: We do NOT delete the session here (receiver side). The Signal Protocol
// recovers automatically when the sender's pkmsg arrives — it overwrites the
// corrupted session. Deleting prematurely creates a race window where no session
// exists, which can cause "No Session" errors on concurrent messages.
const retryErrorCode = (() => {
if (!decryptionError) return RetryReason.UnknownError
// Bad MAC must be checked first — it is also in corruptedSessionErrors
// but warrants the more specific code 7 over the generic code 4.
if (decryptionError.includes(BAD_MAC_ERROR_TEXT)) return RetryReason.SignalErrorBadMac
// MessageCounterError and other corrupted-session variants
if (DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG.corruptedSessionErrors.some(e => decryptionError.includes(e))) return RetryReason.SignalErrorInvalidMessage
// Missing / invalid session record
if (DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG.sessionRecordErrors.some(e => decryptionError.includes(e)) ||
/no\s+(open\s+)?sessions?/i.test(decryptionError)) return RetryReason.SignalErrorNoSession
// PreKey / key-id errors
if (/pre\s*key/i.test(decryptionError)) return RetryReason.SignalErrorInvalidKeyId
// Identity / key errors
if (/invalid\s*key|untrusted\s*identity/i.test(decryptionError)) return RetryReason.SignalErrorInvalidKey
return RetryReason.UnknownError
})()
if (retryCount <= 2) {
// Use new retry manager for phone requests if available
@@ -1383,8 +1408,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
id: node.attrs.id!,
t: node.attrs.t!,
v: '1',
// ADD ERROR FIELD
error: '0'
error: retryErrorCode.toString()
}
},
{
@@ -1403,7 +1427,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
receipt.attrs.participant = node.attrs.participant
}
if (retryCount > 1 || forceIncludeKeys || shouldRecreateSession) {
if (retryCount > 1 || forceIncludeKeys) {
const { update, preKeys } = await getNextPreKeys(authState, 1)
const [keyId] = Object.keys(preKeys)
@@ -1431,6 +1455,58 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}, authState?.creds?.me?.id || 'sendRetryRequest')
}
/**
* Fire-and-forget tctoken re-issuance after a peer's device identity changed.
* Mirrors WAWebSendTcTokenWhenDeviceIdentityChange — runs in PARALLEL with the
* session refresh (not after it).
*
* Why parallel and not sequential:
* - WA Web invokes this BEFORE assertSessions to maximise the chance the contact
* has a fresh tctoken by the time the next outbound send executes.
* - Running after assertSessions (the fork's previous behaviour) races with the
* next send and risks error 463 when the contact reinstalls and the user replies
* immediately afterwards.
*
* Gated on `entry.senderTimestamp` (we previously issued a token to this peer in the
* current bucket window). Preserves the existing senderTimestamp instead of issuing
* a fresh one — keeps WA Web's bucket coalescing semantics: same token, same window.
*/
const reissueTcTokenAfterIdentityChange = (from: string): void => {
void (async () => {
const normalizedJid = jidNormalizedUser(from)
const tcJid = await resolveTcTokenJid(normalizedJid, getLIDForPN)
const tcTokenData = await authState.keys.get('tctoken', [tcJid])
const senderTs = tcTokenData?.[tcJid]?.senderTimestamp
if (senderTs === null || senderTs === undefined || isTcTokenExpired(senderTs)) {
return
}
logTcToken('reissue', { jid: normalizedJid, reason: 'identity_changed', senderTimestamp: senderTs })
const getPNForLID = signalRepository.lidMapping.getPNForLID.bind(signalRepository.lidMapping)
const issueJid = await resolveIssuanceJid(
normalizedJid,
sock.serverProps.lidTrustedTokenIssueToLid,
getLIDForPN,
getPNForLID
)
const result = await getPrivacyTokens([issueJid], senderTs)
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result,
fallbackJid: tcJid,
keys: authState.keys,
getLIDForPN,
onNewJidStored: storedJid => {
tcTokenKnownJids.add(storedJid)
scheduleTcTokenIndexSave()
}
})
logTcToken('reissue_ok', { jid: normalizedJid, reason: 'identity_changed' })
})().catch(err => {
logTcToken('reissue_fail', { jid: from, error: err?.message })
})
}
const handleEncryptNotification = async (node: BinaryNode) => {
const from = node.attrs.from
if (from === S_WHATSAPP_NET) {
@@ -1440,7 +1516,8 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
logger.debug({ count, shouldUploadMorePreKeys }, 'recv pre-key count')
if (shouldUploadMorePreKeys) {
await uploadPreKeys()
// Top-up back to INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT so the pool is always restored to full size
await uploadPreKeys(Math.max(1, INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT - count))
}
} else {
const result = await handleIdentityChange(node, {
@@ -1449,57 +1526,12 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
validateSession: signalRepository.validateSession,
assertSessions,
debounceCache: identityAssertDebounce,
logger
logger,
// Fire reissue in parallel with the session refresh, NOT after it.
// See reissueTcTokenAfterIdentityChange doc for the rationale.
onBeforeSessionRefresh: reissueTcTokenAfterIdentityChange
})
// When a session is refreshed (identity change), re-issue tctoken fire-and-forget
// WABA Android: reissue stores senderTimestamp + realIssueTimestamp after IQ success
if (result.action === 'session_refreshed') {
const normalizedJid = jidNormalizedUser(from)
resolveTcTokenJid(normalizedJid, getLIDForPN)
.then(async tcJid => {
const tcData = await authState.keys.get('tctoken', [tcJid])
const entry = tcData[tcJid]
if (entry?.token?.length && !isTcTokenExpired(entry.timestamp)) {
const senderTs = unixTimestampSeconds()
logTcToken('reissue', { jid: normalizedJid, reason: 'session_refreshed' })
getPrivacyTokens([normalizedJid], senderTs)
.then(async (iqResult) => {
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result: iqResult,
fallbackJid: normalizedJid,
keys: authState.keys,
getLIDForPN,
onNewJidStored: (storedJid) => {
tcTokenKnownJids.add(storedJid)
scheduleTcTokenIndexSave()
}
})
// Persist senderTimestamp + realIssueTimestamp after IQ success
const currentData = await authState.keys.get('tctoken', [tcJid])
const currentEntry = currentData[tcJid]
await authState.keys.set({
tctoken: {
[tcJid]: {
...currentEntry,
token: currentEntry?.token ?? Buffer.alloc(0),
senderTimestamp: senderTs,
realIssueTimestamp: 0
}
}
})
logTcToken('reissue_ok', { jid: normalizedJid, reason: 'session_refreshed' })
})
.catch(err => {
logTcToken('reissue_fail', { jid: normalizedJid, error: err?.message })
})
}
})
.catch(() => {
/* ignore resolution errors */
})
}
if (result.action === 'no_identity_node') {
logger.info({ node }, 'unknown encrypt notification')
}
@@ -2120,12 +2152,6 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
if (resolvedRemoteJid) key.remoteJid = resolvedRemoteJid
if (resolvedParticipant) key.participant = resolvedParticipant
if (shouldIgnoreJid(remoteJid!) && remoteJid !== S_WHATSAPP_NET) {
logger.trace({ remoteJid }, 'ignoring receipt from jid')
await sendMessageAck(node)
return
}
const ids = [attrs.id!]
if (Array.isArray(content)) {
const items = getBinaryNodeChildren(content[0], 'item')
@@ -2201,11 +2227,6 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
const handleNotification = async (node: BinaryNode) => {
const remoteJid = node.attrs.from
if (shouldIgnoreJid(remoteJid!) && remoteJid !== S_WHATSAPP_NET) {
logger.trace({ remoteJid }, 'ignored notification')
await sendMessageAck(node)
return
}
try {
await Promise.all([
@@ -2219,6 +2240,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
fromMe,
participant: node.attrs.participant,
participantAlt,
participantUsername: node.attrs.participant_username,
addressingMode,
id: node.attrs.id,
...(msg.key || {})
@@ -2227,6 +2249,10 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
msg.messageTimestamp = +node.attrs.t!
const fullMsg = proto.WebMessageInfo.fromObject(msg) as WAMessage
// Preserve custom WAMessageKey fields (participantAlt, participantUsername,
// addressingMode) that proto.WebMessageInfo.fromObject strips because
// they aren't part of the proto.MessageKey schema.
fullMsg.key = msg.key
await upsertMessage(fullMsg, 'append')
}
})
@@ -2237,20 +2263,56 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}
const handleMessage = async (node: BinaryNode) => {
if (shouldIgnoreJid(node.attrs.from!) && node.attrs.from !== S_WHATSAPP_NET) {
logger.trace({ from: node.attrs.from }, 'ignored message')
// Send a clean ACK (no error code) so the server considers the
// message delivered. Using error 500 (UnhandledError) previously
// caused the server to retry delivery, generating duplicate traffic.
await sendMessageAck(node)
return
}
const encNode = getBinaryNodeChild(node, 'enc')
// TODO: temporary fix for crashes and issues resulting of failed msmsg decryption
if (encNode?.attrs.type === 'msmsg') {
logger.debug({ key: node.attrs.key }, 'ignored msmsg')
await sendMessageAck(node, NACK_REASONS.MissingMessageSecret)
const unavailableNode = getBinaryNodeChild(node, 'unavailable')
// msmsg block removed — allow msmsg decryption (required for view-once on linked devices)
if (unavailableNode?.attrs?.type === 'view_once') {
const { fullMessage: voMsg } = decryptMessageNode(
node,
authState.creds.me!.id,
authState.creds.me!.lid || '',
signalRepository,
logger,
)
voMsg.key.isViewOnce = true
// Try to request the actual view-once content from the primary phone via PDO
// The phone may resend the full media (url, mediaKey, directPath, etc.)
console.log(`[VO_PDO] Requesting view-once content via PDO for ${voMsg.key.id} from ${voMsg.key.remoteJid}`)
try {
const requestId = await requestPlaceholderResend(voMsg.key, {
key: { ...voMsg.key },
pushName: voMsg.pushName,
messageTimestamp: voMsg.messageTimestamp,
participant: voMsg.key.participant,
participantAlt: voMsg.key.participantAlt
})
if (requestId && requestId !== 'RESOLVED') {
console.log(`[VO_PDO] PDO request sent! requestId=${requestId} — waiting for phone to resend`)
} else if (requestId === 'RESOLVED') {
console.log(`[VO_PDO] Message arrived during PDO delay!`)
} else {
console.log(`[VO_PDO] Already requested or no response`)
}
} catch (err: any) {
console.log(`[VO_PDO] PDO request failed: ${err.message} — falling back to placeholder`)
}
// Emit placeholder immediately so consumers see the notification
// If PDO succeeds, the real message will arrive via messages.upsert later
voMsg.message = {
viewOnceMessage: {
message: {
imageMessage: {
viewOnce: true,
}
}
}
}
const upsertType = node.attrs.offline ? 'append' : 'notify'
await upsertMessage(voMsg, upsertType)
await sendMessageAck(node)
return
}
@@ -2268,44 +2330,54 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
)
const alt = msg.key.participantAlt || msg.key.remoteJidAlt
// Handle LID/PN mappings with hybrid approach:
// - Store mapping operation runs in background (non-critical for decrypt)
// - Session migration MUST complete before decrypt() to avoid "No session record" errors
// This addresses Codex/Copilot review concerns about race conditions with decrypt()
// Handle LID/PN mappings with optimized hot-path:
// - storeLIDPNMappings is fire-and-forget (background) — does NOT block decrypt
// - migrateSession is SYNC (await) — REQUIRED for decrypt to find session
//
// SAFETY: normalizeMessageJids has a fast-path that uses key.*Alt directly without
// hitting the store, so the just-arrived message normalizes correctly even before
// the background store completes. Subsequent messages in the same chat hit the
// store after the background write is done (ms later).
//
// Pre-check (getPNForLID/getLIDForPN) was removed — storeLIDPNMappings has internal
// LRU cache + dedup, the pre-check was a redundant store round-trip per inbound
// message that added latency under load.
//
// HISTORICAL: this restores the intent of d73cd28d39 (2026-02-03) which was
// partially reverted by c3fc792351 the same day due to a race-condition concern
// with migrateSession (kept sync here). storeLIDPNMappings was over-protected:
// it persists a mapping that downstream consumers can re-derive from key.*Alt,
// while migrateSession actually moves the Signal session record that decrypt()
// will load microseconds later — those two have very different criticality.
//
// DO NOT make migrateSession async — decrypt() depends on the session being at
// the correct identifier (LID vs PN) when it runs. Other code paths (USync
// device lookup in messages-send.ts) create LID/PN mappings without migrating
// the session, so we cannot skip migration even when the mapping already exists.
if (!!alt) {
const altServer = jidDecode(alt)?.server
const primaryJid = msg.key.participant || msg.key.remoteJid!
if (altServer === 'lid') {
// Check if mapping already exists to avoid unnecessary storage operations
const existingMapping = await signalRepository.lidMapping.getPNForLID(alt)
if (!existingMapping) {
// MUST await: normalizeMessageJids() runs after this and needs the mapping
// in the LIDMappingStore to resolve LID→PN for events delivered to consumers
await signalRepository.lidMapping
.storeLIDPNMappings([{ lid: alt, pn: primaryJid }])
.catch(error => logger.warn({ error, alt, primaryJid }, 'LID mapping storage failed'))
}
// Fire-and-forget: storeLIDPNMappings has internal cache+dedup,
// pre-check (getPNForLID) was redundant.
signalRepository.lidMapping
.storeLIDPNMappings([{ lid: alt, pn: primaryJid }])
.catch(error => logger.warn({ error, alt, primaryJid }, 'background LID mapping store failed'))
// CRITICAL: ALWAYS migrate session, even if mapping exists
// Other code paths (e.g., USync device lookup in messages-send.ts:310-319)
// may create mappings via storeLIDPNMappings() without calling migrateSession()
// This leaves sessions under PN format while decrypt() expects LID format
// Skipping migration based on mapping existence causes "No session record" errors
// CRITICAL: ALWAYS migrate session SYNC, even if mapping exists.
// Other code paths (e.g., USync device lookup in messages-send.ts) may create
// mappings via storeLIDPNMappings() without calling migrateSession(). This
// leaves sessions under PN format while decrypt() expects LID format.
// Skipping migration based on mapping existence causes "No session record" errors.
await signalRepository.migrateSession(primaryJid, alt)
} else {
// Check if reverse mapping exists
const existingMapping = await signalRepository.lidMapping.getLIDForPN(alt)
if (!existingMapping) {
// MUST await: normalizeMessageJids() runs after this and needs the mapping
// in the LIDMappingStore to resolve LID→PN for events delivered to consumers
await signalRepository.lidMapping
.storeLIDPNMappings([{ lid: primaryJid, pn: alt }])
.catch(error => logger.warn({ error, alt, primaryJid }, 'LID mapping storage failed'))
}
// Fire-and-forget: same rationale as above.
signalRepository.lidMapping
.storeLIDPNMappings([{ lid: primaryJid, pn: alt }])
.catch(error => logger.warn({ error, alt, primaryJid }, 'background LID mapping store failed'))
// CRITICAL: ALWAYS migrate session, even if mapping exists
// Same reasoning as above - mapping existence doesn't guarantee session migration
// CRITICAL: ALWAYS migrate session SYNC.
await signalRepository.migrateSession(alt, primaryJid)
}
}
@@ -2367,6 +2439,23 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
{ msgId: msg.key?.id, messageType },
'CTWA: Skipping placeholder resend for unavailable fanout type'
)
// For view-once: emit the message with a viewOnceMessage placeholder
// so consumers (zpro, etc.) can detect and display it.
// Include a message wrapper so isValidMsg accepts it.
if (messageType === 'view_once_unavailable_fanout') {
msg.key.isViewOnce = true
msg.message = {
viewOnceMessage: {
message: {
imageMessage: {
viewOnce: true,
}
}
}
}
const upsertType = node.attrs.offline ? 'append' : 'notify'
await upsertMessage(msg, upsertType)
}
metrics.ctwaRecoveryFailures.inc({ reason: 'unavailable_fanout' })
return sendMessageAck(node)
}
@@ -2505,7 +2594,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}
const encNode = getBinaryNodeChild(node, 'enc')
await sendRetryRequest(node, !encNode)
await sendRetryRequest(node, !encNode, errorMessage)
if (retryRequestDelayMs) {
await delay(retryRequestDelayMs)
}
@@ -2514,7 +2603,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
// Still attempt retry even if pre-key upload failed
try {
const encNode = getBinaryNodeChild(node, 'enc')
await sendRetryRequest(node, !encNode)
await sendRetryRequest(node, !encNode, errorMessage)
} catch (retryErr) {
logger.error({ retryErr }, 'Failed to send retry after error handling')
}
@@ -2548,6 +2637,11 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
await sendReceipt(msg.key.remoteJid!, participant!, [msg.key.id!], type)
// NOTE: do NOT send view_once_read from a linked device (API).
// WA shows view-once as view_once_unavailable_fanout on linked devices — only the
// primary phone sends view_once_read when the user actually opens it.
// Sending it from a linked device causes WA to flag the account and disables view-once.
// send ack for history message
const isAnyHistoryMsg = getHistoryMsg(msg.message!)
if (isAnyHistoryMsg) {
@@ -3032,6 +3126,40 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
identifier: string,
exec: (node: BinaryNode) => Promise<void>
) => {
// Fast path: ack and drop ignored JIDs before entering the buffer/queue.
// Skips type='call' so call events are never silently dropped via
// shouldIgnoreJid (preserves InfiniteAPI's pre-existing behavior).
// Wrapped in try/catch so a throw from shouldIgnoreJid (user callback)
// or sendMessageAck (e.g. websocket closed) is routed through
// onUnexpectedError instead of becoming an unhandled rejection —
// matches the protection processNodeWithBuffer provides.
if (type !== 'call') {
try {
const from = node.attrs.from
let ignoreJid = from
if (type === 'receipt' && from) {
const attrs = node.attrs
const isLid = attrs.from!.includes('lid')
const isNodeFromMe = areJidsSameUser(
attrs.participant || attrs.from,
isLid ? authState.creds.me?.lid : authState.creds.me?.id
)
ignoreJid = !isNodeFromMe || isJidGroup(attrs.from) ? attrs.from : attrs.recipient
}
if (ignoreJid && ignoreJid !== S_WHATSAPP_NET && shouldIgnoreJid(ignoreJid)) {
// Plain ack (no NACK error code) preserves InfiniteAPI's prior
// behavior — ignored stanzas are an intentional drop, not a
// processing failure, so we don't want server-side retries.
await sendMessageAck(node)
return
}
} catch (error) {
onUnexpectedError(error as Error, identifier)
return
}
}
const isOffline = !!node.attrs.offline
if (isOffline) {
@@ -3130,19 +3258,24 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
// Await index load first — prevents overwriting a more complete persisted index
// if the connection closes before the initial load finishes.
tcTokenIndexLoaded
.then(() => {
Promise.resolve(
authState.keys.set({
.then(async () => {
try {
// Same merge-with-persisted invariant as scheduleTcTokenIndexSave —
// other layers may have written cross-layer JIDs to the index since
// our in-memory set was last updated.
const merged = await buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite(authState.keys, tcTokenKnownJids)
await authState.keys.set({
tctoken: {
...merged,
[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY]: {
token: Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([...tcTokenKnownJids]), 'utf8'),
...merged[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY],
timestamp: unixTimestampSeconds().toString()
}
}
})
).catch(() => {
} catch {
/* non-critical */
})
}
})
.catch(() => {
/* non-critical */
+133 -13
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import type {
AlbumMessageOptions,
AlbumSendResult,
AnyMessageContent,
LIDMapping,
MediaConnInfo,
MessageReceiptType,
MessageRelayOptions,
@@ -45,7 +46,10 @@ import { makeKeyedMutex } from '../Utils/make-mutex'
import { metrics, recordMessageFailure, recordMessageSent } from '../Utils/prometheus-metrics'
import { getMessageReportingToken, shouldIncludeReportingToken } from '../Utils/reporting-utils'
import {
buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite,
isRegularUser,
isTcTokenExpired,
resolveIssuanceJid,
resolveTcTokenJid,
shouldSendNewTcToken,
storeTcTokensFromIqResult
@@ -124,6 +128,15 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
// Tracks JIDs with an in-flight getPrivacyTokens IQ to avoid duplicate concurrent fetches
const tcTokenFetchingJids = new Set<string>()
/**
* Set of tctoken storage JIDs with a fire-and-forget `issuePrivacyTokens` IQ in flight.
* Distinct from `tcTokenFetchingJids` (which dedupes inbound *fetches* of the peer's
* token). Prevents duplicate IQs when a caller fires several rapid back-to-back sends
* to the same contact before `senderTimestamp` persists. Entries are always removed
* in `.finally()`, so the set is bounded by current concurrency.
*/
const inFlightTcTokenIssuance = new Set<string>()
let mediaConn: Promise<MediaConnInfo>
const refreshMediaConn = async (forceGet = false) => {
const media = await mediaConn
@@ -338,6 +351,33 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}
}
// 4th LID→PN source: device-list entries sharing the same raw_id
// WA Business uses this for accounts where HistorySync sends zero phoneNumberToLidMappings
const allEntries = [...result.list, ...result.sideList]
const rawIdMap = new Map<number, { pn?: string; lid?: string }>()
for (const item of allEntries) {
if (typeof item.rawId !== 'number' || isNaN(item.rawId)) continue
const decoded = jidDecode(item.id)
if (!decoded) continue
const entry = rawIdMap.get(item.rawId) || {}
if (decoded.server === 'lid' || decoded.server === 'hosted.lid') {
entry.lid = item.id
} else if (decoded.server === 's.whatsapp.net' || decoded.server === 'c.us') {
entry.pn = item.id
}
rawIdMap.set(item.rawId, entry)
}
const rawIdMappings: LIDMapping[] = []
for (const { pn, lid } of rawIdMap.values()) {
if (pn && lid) {
rawIdMappings.push({ lid: jidNormalizedUser(lid), pn: jidNormalizedUser(pn) })
}
}
if (rawIdMappings.length > 0) {
await signalRepository.lidMapping.storeLIDPNMappings(rawIdMappings)
logger.debug({ count: rawIdMappings.length }, 'stored LID-PN mappings from raw_id pairing')
}
const meId = authState.creds.me?.id
if (!meId) throw new Boom('Not authenticated', { statusCode: 401 })
const meLid = authState.creds.me?.lid || ''
@@ -1013,7 +1053,8 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}
await authState.keys.transaction(async () => {
const mediaType = getMediaType(message)
// normalizeMessageContent unwraps viewOnceMessage/viewOnceMessageV2 so getMediaType works correctly
const mediaType = getMediaType(normalizeMessageContent(message) || message)
if (mediaType) {
extraAttrs['mediatype'] = mediaType
}
@@ -1023,7 +1064,7 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
const bytes = encodeNewsletterMessage(patched as proto.IMessage)
binaryNodeContent.push({
tag: 'plaintext',
attrs: {},
attrs: mediaType ? { mediatype: mediaType } : {},
content: bytes
})
const stanza: BinaryNode = {
@@ -1045,6 +1086,8 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
extraAttrs['decrypt-fail'] = 'hide' // todo: expand for reactions and other types
}
// view_once_write disabled — causes server to drop message (validation fails for linked device sessions)
if (isGroupOrStatus && !isRetryResend) {
const [groupData, senderKeyMap] = await Promise.all([
(async () => {
@@ -1249,21 +1292,48 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
: otherRecipients
const effectiveAllRecipients = [...effectiveMeRecipients, ...effectiveOtherRecipients]
await assertSessions(effectiveAllRecipients)
// P2: detect actual view-once media by checking inner message's viewOnce flag.
// viewOnceMessage wrapper is also used for interactive messages (buttons, lists, etc)
// which do NOT carry viewOnce=true on the media — those must NOT be filtered.
const viewOnceInner =
message.viewOnceMessageV2?.message ||
message.viewOnceMessage?.message ||
message.viewOnceMessageV2Extension?.message
const isViewOnceMsg = !!(
viewOnceInner?.imageMessage?.viewOnce ||
viewOnceInner?.videoMessage?.viewOnce ||
viewOnceInner?.audioMessage?.viewOnce
)
// For view-once: only send DSM to primary phone (device=0).
// Companion devices (device>0) are omitted — WA server generates
// <unavailable type="view_once"/> for them automatically.
// Sending explicit <unavailable> from a companion is rejected by the server.
const viewOnceMeRecipients = isViewOnceMsg
? effectiveMeRecipients.filter(jid => !jidDecode(jid)?.device)
: effectiveMeRecipients
// P3: assert sessions only for recipients we actually encrypt for.
// For view-once, companions are omitted — asserting their sessions is wasteful
// and could block the send if a companion session is corrupted.
await assertSessions([...viewOnceMeRecipients, ...effectiveOtherRecipients])
const [
{ nodes: meNodes, shouldIncludeDeviceIdentity: s1 },
{ nodes: otherNodes, shouldIncludeDeviceIdentity: s2 }
] = await Promise.all([
// For own devices: use DSM (deviceSentMessage) wrapper
createParticipantNodes(effectiveMeRecipients, meMsg || message, extraAttrs),
createParticipantNodes(viewOnceMeRecipients, meMsg || message, extraAttrs),
createParticipantNodes(effectiveOtherRecipients, message, extraAttrs)
])
participants.push(...meNodes)
participants.push(...otherNodes)
if (effectiveMeRecipients.length > 0 || effectiveOtherRecipients.length > 0) {
extraAttrs['phash'] = generateParticipantHashV2(effectiveAllRecipients)
// phash: para view-once inclui só celular principal + destinatários
const phashRecipients = isViewOnceMsg
? [...viewOnceMeRecipients, ...effectiveOtherRecipients]
: effectiveAllRecipients
if (phashRecipients.length > 0) {
extraAttrs['phash'] = generateParticipantHashV2(phashRecipients)
}
shouldIncludeDeviceIdentity = shouldIncludeDeviceIdentity || s1 || s2
@@ -1657,7 +1727,16 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}
}
if (tcTokenBuffer?.length) {
// Gate inclusion on AB prop 10518 (privacy_token_sending_on_all_1_on_1_messages).
// WA Web defaults to true; if the server flips it off we mirror that to avoid
// divergence with the spec-compliant client.
//
// CARROUSEL EXCEPTION: Pastorini-validated carousel stanzas REQUIRE tctoken
// (CDP capture confirms it). If the AB prop ever flips off, dropping the
// tctoken from carousel would break rendering on Android. Carousel always
// includes the tctoken when one is available, regardless of the prop —
// matching the fork's existing behaviour pre-PR #2339.
if (tcTokenBuffer?.length && (sock.serverProps.privacyTokenOn1to1 || isCarousel)) {
;(stanza.content as BinaryNode[]).push({
tag: 'tctoken',
attrs: {},
@@ -1757,13 +1836,39 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
// Gated only by shouldSendNewTcToken — removed tcTokenBuffer?.length guard so
// issuance fires even when we don't yet hold a token (bucket boundary crossed).
// IMPORTANT: must run AFTER sendNode — issuing before the message causes error 463.
if (is1on1Send && shouldSendNewTcToken(existingTokenEntry?.senderTimestamp)) {
//
// WA Web also skips issuance for:
// - protocol messages (revoke, ephemeral settings, etc — see TcTokenChatAction)
// - PSA, bots, MetaAI (isRegularUser filter)
// and dedupes back-to-back issuances with `inFlightTcTokenIssuance` so a burst of
// rapid sends to the same contact only triggers a single IQ before senderTimestamp
// is persisted.
const isProtocolMsg = !!normalizeMessageContent(message)?.protocolMessage
// Use isRegularUser (the same Wid.isRegularUser() port that gates the store
// path) so we filter PSA/bot/MetaAI consistently regardless of JID server
// (@c.us vs @s.whatsapp.net) and device suffix. The previous PSA_WID/isJidBot
// checks only matched @c.us forms — destinationJid arrives normalized.
const isBotOrPSA = !isRegularUser(destinationJid)
if (
is1on1Send &&
!isProtocolMsg &&
!isBotOrPSA &&
shouldSendNewTcToken(existingTokenEntry?.senderTimestamp) &&
!inFlightTcTokenIssuance.has(tcTokenJid)
) {
inFlightTcTokenIssuance.add(tcTokenJid)
const issueTimestamp = unixTimestampSeconds()
logTcToken('reissue', { jid: destinationJid })
getPrivacyTokens([destinationJid], issueTimestamp)
const getPNForLID = signalRepository.lidMapping.getPNForLID.bind(signalRepository.lidMapping)
resolveIssuanceJid(
destinationJid,
sock.serverProps.lidTrustedTokenIssueToLid,
getLIDForPN,
getPNForLID
)
.then(issueJid => getPrivacyTokens([issueJid], issueTimestamp))
.then(async result => {
// Store any tokens received in the IQ response.
// onNewJidStored not passed — pruning index lives in messages-recv (higher layer).
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result,
fallbackJid: tcTokenJid,
@@ -1774,9 +1879,11 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
// Persist senderTimestamp unconditionally — WA Web stores it in the chat table
// regardless of whether a token exists. Spread preserves token+timestamp if present.
// WABA Android: INSERT INTO wa_trusted_contacts_send (jid, sent_tc_token_timestamp, real_issue_timestamp)
// VALUES (?, ?, 0) — realIssueTimestamp=0 means issued but not yet confirmed by server
// VALUES (?, ?, 0) — realIssueTimestamp=0 means issued but not yet confirmed by server.
// Also bump the cross-session prune index so this JID is tracked persistently.
const currentData = await authState.keys.get('tctoken', [tcTokenJid])
const currentEntry = currentData[tcTokenJid]
const indexWrite = await buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite(authState.keys, [tcTokenJid])
await authState.keys.set({
tctoken: {
[tcTokenJid]: {
@@ -1784,7 +1891,8 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
token: currentEntry?.token ?? Buffer.alloc(0),
senderTimestamp: issueTimestamp,
realIssueTimestamp: 0
}
},
...indexWrite
}
})
@@ -1793,6 +1901,9 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
.catch(err => {
logTcToken('reissue_fail', { jid: destinationJid, error: err?.message })
})
.finally(() => {
inFlightTcTokenIssuance.delete(tcTokenJid)
})
}
// Log with [BAILEYS] prefix
@@ -1869,6 +1980,15 @@ export const makeMessagesSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}
const getMediaType = (message: proto.IMessage) => {
// For view-once media, unwrap the viewOnceMessage wrapper before checking media type
const inner =
message.viewOnceMessage?.message ||
message.viewOnceMessageV2?.message ||
message.viewOnceMessageV2Extension?.message
if (inner) {
return getMediaType(inner)
}
if (message.imageMessage) {
return 'image'
} else if (message.videoMessage) {
+123 -175
View File
@@ -39,12 +39,7 @@ import {
xmppSignedPreKey
} from '../Utils'
import { getPlatformId, isAndroidBrowser } from '../Utils/browser-utils'
import {
CircuitBreaker,
CircuitOpenError,
createConnectionCircuitBreaker,
createPreKeyCircuitBreaker
} from '../Utils/circuit-breaker'
import { withBoundedRetry } from '../Utils/bounded-retry'
import {
decrementActiveConnections,
incrementActiveConnections,
@@ -94,10 +89,6 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
transactionOpts,
qrTimeout,
makeSignalRepository,
enableCircuitBreaker = true,
queryCircuitBreaker: queryCircuitBreakerConfig,
connectionCircuitBreaker: connectionCircuitBreakerConfig,
preKeyCircuitBreaker: preKeyCircuitBreakerConfig,
// If enableUnifiedSession is explicitly set (true/false), use it
// Otherwise (undefined), check env var, then default to true
enableUnifiedSession: enableUnifiedSessionConfig
@@ -107,57 +98,6 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
const enableUnifiedSession =
enableUnifiedSessionConfig !== undefined ? enableUnifiedSessionConfig : shouldEnableUnifiedSession()
// Initialize circuit breakers if enabled
let queryCircuitBreaker: CircuitBreaker | undefined
let connectionCircuitBreaker: CircuitBreaker | undefined
let preKeyCircuitBreaker: CircuitBreaker | undefined
if (enableCircuitBreaker) {
// Circuit breaker for query operations (most critical)
queryCircuitBreaker = createConnectionCircuitBreaker({
name: 'socket-query',
failureThreshold: 5,
failureWindow: 60000,
resetTimeout: 30000,
successThreshold: 2,
timeout: defaultQueryTimeoutMs || 60000,
onStateChange: (from, to) => {
logger.info({ from, to }, 'Query circuit breaker state changed')
},
onOpen: () => {
logger.warn('Query circuit breaker OPENED - blocking requests')
},
onClose: () => {
logger.info('Query circuit breaker CLOSED - resuming normal operation')
},
...queryCircuitBreakerConfig
})
// Circuit breaker for connection operations
connectionCircuitBreaker = createConnectionCircuitBreaker({
name: 'socket-connection',
failureThreshold: 3,
failureWindow: 30000,
resetTimeout: 60000,
successThreshold: 1,
onStateChange: (from, to) => {
logger.info({ from, to }, 'Connection circuit breaker state changed')
},
...connectionCircuitBreakerConfig
})
// Circuit breaker for pre-key operations
preKeyCircuitBreaker = createPreKeyCircuitBreaker({
name: 'socket-prekey',
onStateChange: (from, to) => {
logger.info({ from, to }, 'PreKey circuit breaker state changed')
},
...preKeyCircuitBreakerConfig
})
logger.info('Circuit breakers initialized for socket operations')
}
// Unified Session Manager will be initialized after sendNode is defined
let unifiedSessionManager: UnifiedSessionManager | undefined
@@ -238,20 +178,17 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
})
}
/** send a raw buffer with circuit breaker protection */
/**
* Send a raw buffer over the WebSocket.
*
* Replaces the previous connectionCircuitBreaker wrapping. WebSocket
* lifecycle errors (Connection Closed / Lost / Replaced) were already
* filtered out of the circuit's failure count, so the only failures it
* tripped on were rare native send() errors for which a state-machine
* gate adds no value over a fast propagated error. Reconnection logic
* in makeSocket already handles WS recovery independently.
*/
const sendRawMessage = async (data: Uint8Array | Buffer) => {
if (connectionCircuitBreaker) {
try {
return await connectionCircuitBreaker.execute(() => sendRawMessageInternal(data))
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof CircuitOpenError) {
logger.warn({ circuitName: error.circuitName }, 'Send blocked by connection circuit breaker')
}
throw error
}
}
return sendRawMessageInternal(data)
}
@@ -266,7 +203,7 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
}
// Initialize Unified Session Manager now that sendNode is defined
// (single initialization to avoid duplicating circuit breakers and state)
// (single initialization to avoid duplicating manager state)
if (enableUnifiedSession) {
const sendNodeForSession = async (node: BinaryNode): Promise<void> => {
await sendNode(node)
@@ -275,7 +212,6 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
unifiedSessionManager = createUnifiedSessionManager({
enabled: true,
logger,
enableCircuitBreaker,
sendNode: sendNodeForSession
})
logger.info('Unified session manager initialized')
@@ -346,11 +282,8 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
// Register the response listener BEFORE sending — avoids a race where the server
// responds before we start listening. waitForMessage already handles its own
// timeout (returns undefined) and connection-close errors (throws), so we do NOT
// wrap it in a second promiseTimeout. The outer wrapper caused a race condition
// where both timers fired at ~the same deadline: the outer one threw
// Boom('Timed Out') while sendNode was still pending, producing a spurious error
// whose message contained "socket-query" → matched the circuit-breaker's
// "socket" pattern → incorrectly tripped the breaker after 5 timeouts.
// wrap it in a second promiseTimeout. The outer wrapper would race the inner
// timeout near the deadline and throw a spurious Boom('Timed Out').
const responsePromise = waitForMessage<any>(msgId, timeoutMs)
// Prevent unhandled-rejection if sendNode throws before we reach
// `await responsePromise` below. The error from sendNode still propagates
@@ -372,23 +305,17 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
return result
}
/** send a query with circuit breaker protection */
/**
* Send a query (iq stanza) and wait for its response.
*
* Replaces the previous queryCircuitBreaker wrapping (state-machine that
* blocked ALL queries for 30s after 5 failures). The cascade behavior
* was incompatible with WhatsApp Android's empirical retry pattern:
* each operation retries independently with exponential backoff, no
* global state. Callers that need retry semantics wrap query() with
* withBoundedRetry() at their level (assertSessions, etc.).
*/
const query = async (node: BinaryNode, timeoutMs?: number) => {
// If circuit breaker is enabled, wrap the query
if (queryCircuitBreaker) {
try {
return await queryCircuitBreaker.execute(() => queryInternal(node, timeoutMs))
} catch (error) {
// If circuit is open, log and rethrow with context
if (error instanceof CircuitOpenError) {
logger.warn({ circuitName: error.circuitName, state: error.state }, 'Query blocked by circuit breaker')
}
throw error
}
}
// Fallback to direct query if circuit breaker is disabled
return queryInternal(node, timeoutMs)
}
@@ -685,30 +612,33 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
let lastUploadTime = 0
/** generates and uploads a set of pre-keys to the server */
const uploadPreKeys = async (count = MIN_PREKEY_COUNT, retryCount = 0) => {
// Check if pre-key circuit breaker is open
if (preKeyCircuitBreaker?.isOpen()) {
logger.warn('PreKey circuit breaker is open, skipping upload')
throw new CircuitOpenError('socket-prekey', 'open')
const uploadPreKeys = async (count = MIN_PREKEY_COUNT) => {
// Check minimum interval. (Previously this was guarded by `retryCount === 0`
// because the function recursed on retry; with bounded-retry handling
// retries internally there is no recursion and the guard is implicit.)
const timeSinceLastUpload = Date.now() - lastUploadTime
if (timeSinceLastUpload < MIN_UPLOAD_INTERVAL) {
logger.debug(`Skipping upload, only ${timeSinceLastUpload}ms since last upload`)
return
}
// Check minimum interval (except for retries)
if (retryCount === 0) {
const timeSinceLastUpload = Date.now() - lastUploadTime
if (timeSinceLastUpload < MIN_UPLOAD_INTERVAL) {
logger.debug(`Skipping upload, only ${timeSinceLastUpload}ms since last upload`)
return
}
}
// Prevent multiple concurrent uploads
// Prevent multiple concurrent uploads — if one is already running, wait for it and return:
// the concurrent upload already replenished the pool, so there is nothing left to do.
if (uploadPreKeysPromise) {
logger.debug('Pre-key upload already in progress, waiting for completion')
await uploadPreKeysPromise
return
}
// Shared abort controller so the outer Promise.race can cancel the
// in-flight bounded-retry loop if its own timeout fires first.
// Without this, the outer race rejects but the bounded-retry loop
// keeps running in the background, mutating lastUploadTime / logs
// after the caller has given up (CodeRabbit + Copilot reviews).
const uploadAbort = new AbortController()
const uploadLogic = async () => {
logger.info({ count, retryCount }, 'uploading pre-keys')
logger.info({ count }, 'uploading pre-keys')
// Generate and save pre-keys atomically (prevents ID collisions on retry)
const node = await keys.transaction(async () => {
@@ -719,45 +649,69 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
return node // Only return node since update is already used
}, creds?.me?.id || 'upload-pre-keys')
// Upload to server with circuit breaker protection
const uploadToServer = async () => {
await query(node)
// Upload to server. Bounded-retry handles backoff (replaces both
// the previous circuit breaker AND the manual exponential backoff
// retry loop with maxRetries=3).
//
// CRITICAL: query() returns `undefined` on timeout (it does NOT
// throw — see waitForMessage). If we just `await query(node)`,
// a timed-out upload would resolve with undefined and bounded-retry
// would treat it as success. Validate the response shape so a
// timeout actually triggers a retry (CodeRabbit review on PR #393).
//
// bounded-retry's ttlMs MUST be < UPLOAD_TIMEOUT (the outer
// Promise.race below). With margin (28s vs 30s) bounded-retry
// always reaches its natural give-up first. We additionally pass
// an AbortController signal so that if the outer race ever fires
// first, the bounded-retry loop is aborted and does not keep
// running in the background (CodeRabbit + Copilot reviews).
const PER_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS = 8_000
const RETRY_TTL_MS = UPLOAD_TIMEOUT - 2_000
const uploadToServer = async (signal?: AbortSignal) => {
const result = await query(node, PER_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS)
if (signal?.aborted) {
throw new Error('aborted')
}
if (!result) {
// query() returned undefined → underlying iq response
// timed out. Throw so bounded-retry retries.
throw new Boom('Pre-key upload query timed out (no response)', { statusCode: 408 })
}
logger.info({ count }, 'uploaded pre-keys successfully')
lastUploadTime = Date.now()
}
try {
// Use circuit breaker if available
if (preKeyCircuitBreaker) {
await preKeyCircuitBreaker.execute(uploadToServer)
} else {
await uploadToServer()
}
await withBoundedRetry(uploadToServer, {
name: 'uploadPreKeys',
// 1s -> 2s -> 4s -> 8s (cap). Max 4 attempts fit comfortably
// within RETRY_TTL_MS (28s) given perAttemptTimeoutMs=8s.
delays: [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000],
ttlMs: RETRY_TTL_MS,
perAttemptTimeoutMs: PER_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS,
signal: uploadAbort.signal,
logger
})
} catch (uploadError) {
logger.error({ uploadError: (uploadError as Error).toString(), count }, 'Failed to upload pre-keys to server')
// Don't retry if circuit breaker is open
if (uploadError instanceof CircuitOpenError) {
throw uploadError
}
// Exponential backoff retry (max 3 retries)
if (retryCount < 3) {
const backoffDelay = Math.min(1000 * Math.pow(2, retryCount), 10000)
logger.info(`Retrying pre-key upload in ${backoffDelay}ms`)
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, backoffDelay))
return uploadPreKeys(count, retryCount + 1)
}
throw uploadError
}
}
// Add timeout protection
// Outer timeout protection. With ttlMs=28s vs UPLOAD_TIMEOUT=30s,
// bounded-retry should always win — but if anything ever blocks
// uploadLogic outside bounded-retry's reach, this race aborts the
// whole thing cleanly via uploadAbort.
uploadPreKeysPromise = Promise.race([
uploadLogic(),
new Promise<void>((_, reject) =>
setTimeout(() => reject(new Boom('Pre-key upload timeout', { statusCode: 408 })), UPLOAD_TIMEOUT)
setTimeout(() => {
uploadAbort.abort()
reject(new Boom('Pre-key upload timeout', { statusCode: 408 }))
}, UPLOAD_TIMEOUT)
)
])
@@ -784,14 +738,15 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
try {
let count = 0
const preKeyCount = await getAvailablePreKeysOnServer()
if (preKeyCount === 0) count = INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT
else count = MIN_PREKEY_COUNT
// How many to upload: top-up to INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT from whatever remains on server
count = Math.max(0, INITIAL_PREKEY_COUNT - preKeyCount)
const { exists: currentPreKeyExists, currentPreKeyId } = await verifyCurrentPreKeyExists()
logger.info(`${preKeyCount} pre-keys found on server`)
logger.info(`Current prekey ID: ${currentPreKeyId}, exists in storage: ${currentPreKeyExists}`)
const lowServerCount = preKeyCount <= count
// Trigger upload when below the replenishment threshold, not when count < topUp amount
const lowServerCount = preKeyCount < MIN_PREKEY_COUNT
const missingCurrentPreKey = !currentPreKeyExists && currentPreKeyId > 0
const shouldUpload = lowServerCount || missingCurrentPreKey
@@ -1151,7 +1106,7 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
// Decrement active connections
decrementActiveConnections()
clearInterval(keepAliveReq)
clearTimeout(keepAliveReq)
clearTimeout(qrTimer)
// Clear offline-buffer safety timer so its callback cannot call ev.flush()
@@ -1228,12 +1183,6 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
cleanupPreKeyAutoSync()
cleanupSessionTTL()
// CRITICAL: Destroy circuit breakers AFTER cleanup functions complete
// This ensures cleanup functions can still use circuit breakers if needed
queryCircuitBreaker?.destroy()
connectionCircuitBreaker?.destroy()
preKeyCircuitBreaker?.destroy()
// IMPORTANT: Do NOT use removeAllListeners('connection.update')
// It would remove consumer listeners, breaking their reconnection logic
}
@@ -1262,8 +1211,16 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
})
}
const startKeepAliveRequest = () =>
(keepAliveReq = setInterval(() => {
const startKeepAliveRequest = () => {
// Use recursive setTimeout with ±15% jitter to match WA Desktop behaviour
// (WA Business Desktop: ~25-30s intervals with natural variance)
const scheduleNextKeepAlive = () => {
const jitter = keepAliveIntervalMs * 0.15
const delay = keepAliveIntervalMs + Math.floor((Math.random() * 2 - 1) * jitter)
keepAliveReq = setTimeout(onKeepAliveTick, delay)
}
const onKeepAliveTick = () => {
if (!lastDateRecv) {
lastDateRecv = new Date()
}
@@ -1275,13 +1232,15 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
*/
if (diff > keepAliveIntervalMs + 5000) {
void end(new Boom('Connection was lost', { statusCode: DisconnectReason.connectionLost }))
return // connection closing — do not reschedule
} else if (ws.isOpen) {
// Send keep-alive ping via sendNode() (fire-and-forget) instead of query().
// query() wraps the ping in the query circuit breaker — when that breaker is
// open or timing out, the ping is never sent, WA never responds, lastDateRecv
// goes stale, and the diff check above wrongly fires "Connection was lost".
// sendNode() bypasses the query circuit breaker entirely; WA's ping response
// still arrives as an incoming frame and updates lastDateRecv normally.
// We don't need the response correlator overhead — WA's pong arrives as an
// incoming frame and updates lastDateRecv via the standard receive path.
// (Historical context: this used to bypass the query circuit breaker,
// which would block pings during cascade failures. Circuit breaker has
// since been replaced by per-operation bounded-retry — but the
// fire-and-forget pattern stays correct on its own merits.)
sendNode({
tag: 'iq',
attrs: {
@@ -1297,7 +1256,15 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
} else {
logger.warn('keep alive called when WS not open')
}
}, keepAliveIntervalMs))
// Do not reschedule once shutdown has started (closed set by end() on any concurrent path)
if (!closed) {
scheduleNextKeepAlive()
}
}
scheduleNextKeepAlive()
}
/** i have no idea why this exists. pls enlighten me */
const sendPassiveIq = (tag: 'passive' | 'active') =>
query({
@@ -1789,25 +1756,6 @@ export const makeSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
sendWAMBuffer,
executeUSyncQuery,
onWhatsApp,
// Circuit breaker utilities
circuitBreakers: {
query: queryCircuitBreaker,
connection: connectionCircuitBreaker,
preKey: preKeyCircuitBreaker
},
/** Get circuit breaker statistics */
getCircuitBreakerStats: () => ({
query: queryCircuitBreaker?.getStats(),
connection: connectionCircuitBreaker?.getStats(),
preKey: preKeyCircuitBreaker?.getStats()
}),
/** Reset all circuit breakers to closed state */
resetCircuitBreakers: () => {
queryCircuitBreaker?.reset()
connectionCircuitBreaker?.reset()
preKeyCircuitBreaker?.reset()
logger.info('All circuit breakers reset to closed state')
},
// Unified Session Telemetry
/** Send unified_session telemetry manually */
sendUnifiedSession,
+2
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ export interface Contact {
name?: string
/** name of the contact, the contact has set on their own on WA */
notify?: string
/** username associated with this contact, when provided by WA */
username?: string
/** I have no idea */
verifiedName?: string
// Baileys Added
+6
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ export type BaileysEventMap = {
chats: Chat[]
contacts: Contact[]
messages: WAMessage[]
/** Past participants for group chats (people who left/were removed). userJid is always a phone number (PN), never a LID. */
pastParticipants?: proto.IPastParticipants[] | null
isLatest?: boolean
progress?: number | null
syncType?: proto.HistorySync.HistorySyncType | null
@@ -79,6 +81,7 @@ export type BaileysEventMap = {
id: string
author: string
authorPn?: string
authorUsername?: string
participants: GroupParticipant[]
action: ParticipantAction
}
@@ -86,6 +89,7 @@ export type BaileysEventMap = {
id: string
author: string
authorPn?: string
authorUsername?: string
participant: string
participantPn?: string
action: RequestJoinAction
@@ -185,6 +189,8 @@ export type BufferedEventData = {
chats: { [jid: string]: Chat }
contacts: { [jid: string]: Contact }
messages: { [uqId: string]: WAMessage }
/** Keyed by groupJid for O(1) deduplication across chunks */
pastParticipants: { [groupJid: string]: proto.IPastParticipant[] }
empty: boolean
isLatest: boolean
progress?: number | null
+4
View File
@@ -20,17 +20,20 @@ export interface GroupMetadata {
addressingMode?: WAMessageAddressingMode
owner: string | undefined
ownerPn?: string | undefined
ownerUsername?: string | undefined
owner_country_code?: string | undefined
subject: string
/** group subject owner */
subjectOwner?: string
subjectOwnerPn?: string
subjectOwnerUsername?: string
/** group subject modification date */
subjectTime?: number
creation?: number
desc?: string
descOwner?: string
descOwnerPn?: string
descOwnerUsername?: string
descId?: string
descTime?: number
/** if this group is part of a community, it returns the jid of the community to which it belongs */
@@ -56,6 +59,7 @@ export interface GroupMetadata {
/** the person who added you to group or changed some setting in group */
author?: string
authorPn?: string
authorUsername?: string
}
export interface WAGroupCreateResponse {
+15 -2
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ export type WAContactMessage = proto.Message.IContactMessage
export type WAContactsArrayMessage = proto.Message.IContactsArrayMessage
export type WAMessageKey = proto.IMessageKey & {
remoteJidAlt?: string
remoteJidUsername?: string
participantAlt?: string
participantUsername?: string
server_id?: string
addressingMode?: string
isViewOnce?: boolean // TODO: remove out of the message key, place in WebMessageInfo
@@ -155,6 +157,7 @@ export type MessageReceiptType =
| 'sender'
| 'inactive'
| 'played'
| 'view_once_read'
| undefined
export type MediaConnInfo = {
@@ -178,6 +181,8 @@ export interface WAUrlInfo {
type Mentionable = {
/** list of jids that are mentioned in the accompanying text */
mentions?: string[]
/** mention all participants in the group */
mentionAll?: boolean
}
type Contextable = {
/** add contextInfo to the message */
@@ -990,8 +995,16 @@ export type MessageGenerationOptionsFromContent = MiscMessageGenerationOptions &
export type WAMediaUploadFunction = (
encFilePath: string,
opts: { fileEncSha256B64: string; mediaType: MediaType; timeoutMs?: number }
) => Promise<{ mediaUrl: string; directPath: string; meta_hmac?: string; ts?: number; fbid?: number }>
opts: { fileEncSha256B64: string; mediaType: MediaType; timeoutMs?: number; newsletter?: boolean }
) => Promise<{
mediaUrl: string | undefined
directPath: string
meta_hmac?: string
ts?: number
fbid?: number
thumbnailDirectPath?: string
thumbnailSha256?: string
}>
export type MediaGenerationOptions = {
logger?: ILogger
-18
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
import type { Agent } from 'https'
import type { URL } from 'url'
import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js'
import type { CircuitBreakerOptions } from '../Utils/circuit-breaker'
import type { ILogger } from '../Utils/logger'
import type { AuthenticationState, LIDMapping, SignalAuthState, TransactionCapabilityOptions } from './Auth'
import type { GroupMetadata } from './GroupMetadata'
@@ -203,23 +202,6 @@ export type SocketConfig = {
pnToLIDFunc?: (jids: string[]) => Promise<LIDMapping[] | undefined>
) => SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore
// === Circuit Breaker Configuration ===
/** Enable circuit breaker protection for socket operations (default: true) */
enableCircuitBreaker?: boolean
/** Circuit breaker configuration for query operations */
queryCircuitBreaker?: Partial<CircuitBreakerOptions>
/** Circuit breaker configuration for connection operations */
connectionCircuitBreaker?: Partial<CircuitBreakerOptions>
/** Circuit breaker configuration for pre-key operations */
preKeyCircuitBreaker?: Partial<CircuitBreakerOptions>
/** Circuit breaker configuration for message operations */
messageCircuitBreaker?: Partial<CircuitBreakerOptions>
// === Listener Limits (Memory Leak Prevention) ===
/**
+12 -1
View File
@@ -341,7 +341,18 @@ export const addTransactionCapability = (
return result
} catch (error) {
logger.error({ error }, 'transaction failed, rolling back')
// SessionError is part of the normal Bad MAC recovery flow
// (retry receipt → sender resends as pkmsg → new session within ~1.3s).
// Logging it as ERROR creates 2 noise lines per recoverable Bad MAC cycle.
// Downgrade to debug for SessionError; keep ERROR for everything else.
// The error is still re-thrown — recovery behavior is unchanged.
const errName = (error as { name?: string })?.name
if (errName === 'SessionError') {
logger.debug({ error }, 'transaction failed (SessionError — recoverable via retry receipt)')
} else {
logger.error({ error }, 'transaction failed, rolling back')
}
throw error
}
})
+393
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
/**
* Bounded retry WhatsApp-aligned per-operation retry without global state.
*
* # Why this exists
*
* Replaces the circuit breaker pattern that was causing cascading failures
* in production: 5 timeouts in 60s would trip the global breaker, blocking
* EVERY socket query (typing indicators, profile pic fetches, contact
* validation, presence updates) for 30s even queries to peers that were
* perfectly healthy.
*
* # Empirical justification
*
* Captured WhatsApp Android's actual retry behavior via Frida hooks
* (`hook-circuit-breaker-re-v2.js`, `hook-retry-bounds.js`) on a real
* device under controlled WiFi off/on cycles. Findings:
*
* 1. Delay sequence (per-operation): 3s -> 10s -> 60s -> ~64s -> 120s
* (cap at 2 min). Last value reused for further attempts.
* 2. Memory profile during 5-min network outage: PSS dropped 53MB and
* stabilised. FDs closed (305 -> 295). NO unbounded accumulation.
* 3. Recovery on reconnect: ~10s. No retry storm.
* 4. NO global state machine observed. Each operation has its own timer.
* Failures of operation A do NOT block operation B.
*
* The default delays in WHATSAPP_BACKOFF_DELAYS below match the captured
* sequence directly. The default 10-min TTL is empirical 3-5 min stability
* + safety buffer.
*
* # Design properties
*
* - Per-operation isolation: each call to `withBoundedRetry` has its own
* timer. No shared state. Operation A failing has zero effect on B.
* - Bounded by `ttlMs` (wall-clock budget). The TTL is enforced strictly
* at three points: (a) before each attempt, (b) cap on per-attempt
* timeout, (c) cap on retry delay.
* - Per-attempt timeout: each attempt has its own deadline (default 30s),
* automatically capped to remaining TTL budget so total runtime never
* exceeds ttlMs.
* - AbortSignal cancellation: external cancellation supported, both for
* the sleep between retries AND (optionally) the in-flight operation
* when the operation accepts a signal parameter.
* - Memory bound: at most one outstanding retry timer per call. Listeners
* are explicitly removed when timers settle. Once the call resolves /
* rejects / aborts, all state is freed.
*
* # Logging
*
* Pass `logger` in options to get structured logs at each retry attempt,
* give-up, and post-failure recovery. The module emits Prometheus metrics
* regardless of whether a logger is provided.
*
* # When to use this vs. plain query()
*
* - Use plain `query()` when you want fast-fail semantics (caller decides
* what to do on failure). Most call sites in InfiniteAPI use this.
* - Use `withBoundedRetry(() => query(...), { name: 'X' })` when the
* operation is "must-eventually-succeed" with no upstream retry e.g.
* `uploadPreKeys` or other write paths where the alternative is data loss.
*
* # Examples
*
* ```ts
* // Single attempt with 5-min TTL, give up after that:
* await withBoundedRetry(
* () => assertSessions([jid], true),
* { name: 'assertSessions', ttlMs: 5 * 60_000, logger }
* )
*
* // Tight deadline, fast give-up:
* await withBoundedRetry(
* () => sendNode(node),
* { name: 'send', ttlMs: 30_000, perAttemptTimeoutMs: 5_000 }
* )
*
* // Operation that respects abort signal (best practice):
* await withBoundedRetry(
* (signal) => fetchSomething({ signal }),
* { name: 'fetch', logger }
* )
* ```
*
* @module Utils/bounded-retry
*/
import type { ILogger } from './logger'
import { metrics } from './prometheus-metrics.js'
/**
* Default delay sequence (milliseconds) matches WhatsApp Android empirical
* behavior. After exhausting the sequence, the last value is used (cap).
*/
export const WHATSAPP_BACKOFF_DELAYS = [3000, 10000, 60000, 60000, 120000] as const
/**
* Default jitter (+/- 15%) to prevent thundering-herd retries.
*/
export const DEFAULT_JITTER_FACTOR = 0.15 as const
/**
* Default time-to-live for retries: 10 minutes.
*
* Empirical justification: WhatsApp Android stabilises memory in ~3-5 min
* during a network outage; 10 min gives a generous safety buffer while
* preventing unbounded retry accumulation.
*/
export const DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000
/**
* Default per-attempt timeout: 30 seconds.
*
* Most WhatsApp queries respond within seconds. A 30s timeout is generous
* enough for slow networks but prevents a single hang from blocking retries.
*/
export const DEFAULT_PER_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS = 30000
export interface BoundedRetryOptions {
/** Operation name for logging/metrics */
name?: string
/** Sequence of delays (ms). Last value is used as cap. */
delays?: readonly number[]
/** Jitter factor 0..1 (default 0.15) */
jitter?: number
/** Total wall-clock budget — gives up after this. Default 10 min. */
ttlMs?: number
/** Per-attempt timeout (ms). Default 30s. Capped by remaining TTL. */
perAttemptTimeoutMs?: number
/** Predicate: should we retry on this error? Default: always */
shouldRetry?: (err: Error, attempt: number) => boolean
/** Hook fired before each retry */
onRetry?: (err: Error, attempt: number, delayMs: number) => void
/**
* AbortSignal when fired, the loop stops at the next observation point:
* - If the loop is sleeping between retries, the sleep rejects immediately.
* - If an attempt is in flight, the abort is forwarded to the operation
* via the per-attempt signal. The operation must ITSELF observe the
* signal (e.g. `(signal) => fetch({ signal })`) for cancellation to
* be truly immediate; otherwise it cancels at the next per-attempt
* timeout boundary.
* - Either way, on the next loop iteration BoundedRetryAbortedError is
* thrown, so the caller never sees more than one trailing attempt
* after the abort.
*/
signal?: AbortSignal
/** Optional logger for structured retry/give-up/recovery logs */
logger?: ILogger
}
export class BoundedRetryGiveUpError extends Error {
constructor(
public readonly opName: string,
public readonly attempts: number,
public readonly elapsedMs: number,
public readonly lastError: Error
) {
super(
`bounded-retry "${opName}" gave up after ${attempts} attempts ` +
`(${elapsedMs}ms elapsed). Last error: ${lastError.message}`
)
this.name = 'BoundedRetryGiveUpError'
}
}
export class BoundedRetryAbortedError extends Error {
constructor(public readonly opName: string) {
super(`bounded-retry "${opName}" aborted via signal`)
this.name = 'BoundedRetryAbortedError'
}
}
/**
* Apply jitter to a delay: returns delay * (1 +/- jitter)
*/
function withJitter(delayMs: number, jitter: number): number {
if (jitter <= 0) return delayMs
const factor = 1 + (Math.random() * 2 - 1) * jitter
return Math.max(0, Math.round(delayMs * factor))
}
/**
* Pick the delay for a given attempt index. Falls back to the last value
* (cap) once the sequence is exhausted.
*/
function pickDelay(attempt: number, delays: readonly number[]): number {
if (delays.length === 0) return 0
if (attempt < delays.length) return delays[attempt]!
return delays[delays.length - 1]!
}
/**
* Wrap a promise with a per-attempt timeout. Aborts the supplied controller
* when the timeout fires so the caller can cancel any in-flight work
* (operations that accept the signal). Always clears the timer on settlement.
*/
function withTimeout<T>(
promise: Promise<T>,
timeoutMs: number,
name: string,
abortOnTimeout: AbortController
): Promise<T> {
return new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
abortOnTimeout.abort()
reject(new Error(`bounded-retry "${name}" attempt timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`))
}, timeoutMs)
promise
.then(value => {
clearTimeout(timer)
resolve(value)
})
.catch(err => {
clearTimeout(timer)
reject(err as Error)
})
})
}
/**
* Sleep with abort support. Always removes the abort listener on settlement
* so listeners do not accumulate on long-lived signals.
*/
function sleep(ms: number, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<void> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
if (signal?.aborted) {
reject(new Error('aborted'))
return
}
let onAbort: (() => void) | undefined
const cleanup = () => {
if (onAbort && signal) {
signal.removeEventListener('abort', onAbort)
}
}
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
cleanup()
resolve()
}, ms)
if (signal) {
onAbort = () => {
clearTimeout(timer)
cleanup()
reject(new Error('aborted'))
}
signal.addEventListener('abort', onAbort, { once: true })
}
})
}
/**
* Run an async operation with bounded exponential-backoff retry.
*
* Independent per-call: no global state, no cross-operation interaction.
* Memory bound: at most one outstanding retry timer per call.
*
* The operation may optionally accept an `AbortSignal` parameter when the
* per-attempt timeout fires (or the outer signal is aborted), the inner
* signal is aborted so the operation can stop in-flight work cleanly.
*
* @example
* ```ts
* const result = await withBoundedRetry(
* (signal) => assertSessions([jid], true, { signal }),
* { name: 'assertSessions', ttlMs: 5 * 60_000, logger }
* )
* ```
*/
export async function withBoundedRetry<T>(
operation: (signal?: AbortSignal) => Promise<T>,
options: BoundedRetryOptions = {}
): Promise<T> {
const name = options.name ?? 'bounded-retry'
const delays = options.delays ?? WHATSAPP_BACKOFF_DELAYS
const jitter = options.jitter ?? DEFAULT_JITTER_FACTOR
const ttlMs = options.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_TTL_MS
const perAttemptTimeoutMs = options.perAttemptTimeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_PER_ATTEMPT_TIMEOUT_MS
const shouldRetry = options.shouldRetry ?? (() => true)
const logger = options.logger
const start = Date.now()
let lastError: Error = new Error('unknown')
let attempt = 0
while (true) {
// Check abort + TTL BEFORE starting an attempt — strict wall-clock
// budget. Without this check the loop could begin a new attempt with
// 0ms remaining and then run for up to `perAttemptTimeoutMs`.
if (options.signal?.aborted) {
throw new BoundedRetryAbortedError(name)
}
const elapsedBeforeAttempt = Date.now() - start
const remainingBudget = ttlMs - elapsedBeforeAttempt
if (remainingBudget <= 0) {
metrics.errors?.inc({ category: 'bounded_retry', code: 'ttl_exceeded' })
logger?.warn?.(
{ op: name, attempts: attempt, elapsedMs: elapsedBeforeAttempt, ttlMs, lastError: lastError.message },
'bounded-retry: TTL exceeded before next attempt — giving up'
)
throw new BoundedRetryGiveUpError(name, attempt, elapsedBeforeAttempt, lastError)
}
// Cap the per-attempt timeout to the remaining TTL budget so a single
// attempt cannot run past the wall-clock deadline.
const attemptTimeoutMs = Math.min(perAttemptTimeoutMs, remainingBudget)
const attemptAbort = new AbortController()
// Forward outer abort to the per-attempt controller so the in-flight
// operation is cancelled when the user aborts. Cleaned up below.
let onOuterAbort: (() => void) | undefined
if (options.signal) {
onOuterAbort = () => attemptAbort.abort()
if (options.signal.aborted) {
attemptAbort.abort()
} else {
options.signal.addEventListener('abort', onOuterAbort, { once: true })
}
}
try {
const result = await withTimeout(operation(attemptAbort.signal), attemptTimeoutMs, name, attemptAbort)
if (attempt > 0) {
metrics.socketEvents?.inc({ event: 'bounded_retry_recovered' })
logger?.info?.(
{ op: name, attempts: attempt + 1, elapsedMs: Date.now() - start },
'bounded-retry: operation succeeded after retries'
)
}
return result
} catch (err) {
lastError = err as Error
attempt++
// (outer-abort listener detachment happens in the finally below —
// avoiding a double-remove that breaks listener-count assertions.)
// If the outer signal aborted us mid-attempt, surface that explicitly
// rather than as a generic operation failure.
if (options.signal?.aborted) {
throw new BoundedRetryAbortedError(name)
}
const elapsed = Date.now() - start
if (!shouldRetry(lastError, attempt)) {
metrics.errors?.inc({ category: 'bounded_retry', code: 'predicate_no_retry' })
logger?.warn?.(
{ op: name, attempts: attempt, elapsedMs: elapsed, error: lastError.message },
'bounded-retry: shouldRetry returned false — giving up'
)
throw lastError
}
// Re-check budget after the failure so we do not sleep past TTL.
const remainingAfterFailure = ttlMs - elapsed
if (remainingAfterFailure <= 0) {
metrics.errors?.inc({ category: 'bounded_retry', code: 'ttl_exceeded' })
logger?.warn?.(
{ op: name, attempts: attempt, elapsedMs: elapsed, ttlMs, lastError: lastError.message },
'bounded-retry: TTL exceeded after attempt — giving up'
)
throw new BoundedRetryGiveUpError(name, attempt, elapsed, lastError)
}
const baseDelay = pickDelay(attempt - 1, delays)
const delayMs = Math.min(withJitter(baseDelay, jitter), remainingAfterFailure)
options.onRetry?.(lastError, attempt, delayMs)
metrics.socketEvents?.inc({ event: 'bounded_retry_attempt' })
logger?.debug?.(
{ op: name, attempt, delayMs, elapsedMs: elapsed, error: lastError.message },
'bounded-retry: scheduling next attempt'
)
try {
await sleep(delayMs, options.signal)
} catch {
throw new BoundedRetryAbortedError(name)
}
} finally {
// Belt-and-suspenders: ensure the outer-abort listener is always
// removed even on early throws.
if (options.signal && onOuterAbort) {
options.signal.removeEventListener('abort', onOuterAbort)
}
}
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -1083,6 +1083,7 @@ export const processSyncAction = (
action.lidContactAction.firstName ||
action.lidContactAction.username ||
undefined,
username: action.lidContactAction.username || undefined,
lid: id!,
phoneNumber: undefined
}
-766
View File
@@ -1,766 +0,0 @@
/**
* Circuit Breaker Pattern Implementation
*
* Provides protection against cascading failures by monitoring operation outcomes
* and temporarily blocking requests when failure thresholds are exceeded.
*
* States:
* - CLOSED: Normal operation, requests pass through
* - OPEN: Failures exceeded threshold, requests are blocked
* - HALF_OPEN: Testing recovery, limited requests allowed
*
* @module Utils/circuit-breaker
*/
import { EventEmitter } from 'events'
import { metrics } from './prometheus-metrics.js'
/**
* Circuit breaker operational states
*/
export type CircuitState = 'closed' | 'open' | 'half-open'
/**
* Failure record with timestamp for sliding window tracking
*/
export interface FailureRecord {
timestamp: number
error: Error
}
/**
* Circuit breaker configuration options
*/
export interface CircuitBreakerOptions {
/** Unique identifier for this circuit breaker (used in metrics/logging) */
name: string
/** Number of failures within the window to trigger OPEN state (default: 5) */
failureThreshold?: number
/** Time window in ms for counting failures (default: 60000) */
failureWindow?: number
/** Number of successes required in HALF_OPEN to return to CLOSED (default: 2) */
successThreshold?: number
/** Time in ms to wait before transitioning from OPEN to HALF_OPEN (default: 30000) */
resetTimeout?: number
/** Timeout for individual operations in ms (default: 10000) */
timeout?: number
/** Minimum number of requests before circuit can trip (default: 5) */
volumeThreshold?: number
/** Predicate to determine if an error should count as a failure */
shouldCountError?: (error: Error) => boolean
/** Whether to collect Prometheus metrics (default: true) */
collectMetrics?: boolean
/** Fallback function when circuit is OPEN */
fallback?: <T>() => T | Promise<T>
/** Callback when state changes */
onStateChange?: (from: CircuitState, to: CircuitState) => void
/** Callback on failure */
onFailure?: (error: Error) => void
/** Callback on success */
onSuccess?: () => void
/** Callback when circuit opens */
onOpen?: () => void
/** Callback when circuit closes */
onClose?: () => void
/** Callback when circuit enters half-open */
onHalfOpen?: () => void
}
/**
* Circuit breaker statistics
*/
export interface CircuitBreakerStats {
state: CircuitState
failures: number
successes: number
consecutiveFailures: number
consecutiveSuccesses: number
totalCalls: number
totalFailures: number
totalSuccesses: number
totalRejected: number
failureRate: number
lastFailureTime?: number
lastSuccessTime?: number
lastStateChange?: number
isOpen: boolean
isClosed: boolean
isHalfOpen: boolean
}
/**
* Error thrown when circuit is OPEN and request is rejected
*/
export class CircuitOpenError extends Error {
constructor(
public readonly circuitName: string,
public readonly state: CircuitState
) {
super(`Circuit breaker "${circuitName}" is ${state}`)
this.name = 'CircuitOpenError'
}
}
/**
* Error thrown when operation exceeds timeout
*/
export class CircuitTimeoutError extends Error {
constructor(
public readonly circuitName: string,
public readonly timeoutMs: number
) {
super(`Circuit breaker "${circuitName}" operation timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`)
this.name = 'CircuitTimeoutError'
}
}
/**
* Circuit Breaker implementation with sliding window failure tracking
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const breaker = new CircuitBreaker({
* name: 'whatsapp-api',
* failureThreshold: 5,
* resetTimeout: 30000
* })
*
* try {
* const result = await breaker.execute(() => sendMessage(msg))
* } catch (error) {
* if (error instanceof CircuitOpenError) {
* // Circuit is open, use fallback
* }
* }
* ```
*/
export class CircuitBreaker extends EventEmitter {
private state: CircuitState = 'closed'
private failureRecords: FailureRecord[] = []
private consecutiveFailures = 0
private consecutiveSuccesses = 0
private totalCalls = 0
private totalFailures = 0
private totalSuccesses = 0
private totalRejected = 0
private lastFailureTime?: number
private lastSuccessTime?: number
private lastStateChange: number
private resetTimer?: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>
private readonly options: Required<CircuitBreakerOptions>
constructor(options: CircuitBreakerOptions) {
super()
this.options = {
name: options.name,
failureThreshold: options.failureThreshold ?? 5,
failureWindow: options.failureWindow ?? 60000,
successThreshold: options.successThreshold ?? 2,
resetTimeout: options.resetTimeout ?? 30000,
timeout: options.timeout ?? 10000,
volumeThreshold: options.volumeThreshold ?? 5,
shouldCountError: options.shouldCountError ?? (() => true),
collectMetrics: options.collectMetrics ?? true,
fallback:
options.fallback ??
(() => {
throw new CircuitOpenError(this.options.name, this.state)
}),
onStateChange: options.onStateChange ?? (() => {}),
onFailure: options.onFailure ?? (() => {}),
onSuccess: options.onSuccess ?? (() => {}),
onOpen: options.onOpen ?? (() => {}),
onClose: options.onClose ?? (() => {}),
onHalfOpen: options.onHalfOpen ?? (() => {})
}
this.lastStateChange = Date.now()
}
/**
* Check if the circuit allows execution
*/
canExecute(): boolean {
if (this.state === 'closed') {
return true
}
if (this.state === 'open') {
return false
}
// HALF_OPEN: allow limited requests for testing
return true
}
/**
* Execute an async operation with circuit breaker protection
*/
async execute<T>(operation: () => T | Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
this.totalCalls++
// Check if circuit allows execution
if (this.state === 'open') {
this.totalRejected++
if (this.options.collectMetrics) {
metrics.errors.inc({ category: 'circuit_breaker', code: 'rejected' })
}
return this.options.fallback() as T
}
// Execute with timeout protection
try {
const result = await this.executeWithTimeout(operation)
this.recordSuccess()
return result
} catch (error) {
this.recordFailure(error as Error)
throw error
}
}
/**
* Execute a synchronous operation with circuit breaker protection
*/
executeSync<T>(operation: () => T): T {
this.totalCalls++
if (this.state === 'open') {
this.totalRejected++
if (this.options.collectMetrics) {
metrics.errors.inc({ category: 'circuit_breaker', code: 'rejected' })
}
return this.options.fallback() as T
}
try {
const result = operation()
this.recordSuccess()
return result
} catch (error) {
this.recordFailure(error as Error)
throw error
}
}
/**
* Execute operation with timeout wrapper
*/
private async executeWithTimeout<T>(operation: () => T | Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
return new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
reject(new CircuitTimeoutError(this.options.name, this.options.timeout))
}, this.options.timeout)
Promise.resolve(operation())
.then(result => {
clearTimeout(timer)
resolve(result)
})
.catch(error => {
clearTimeout(timer)
reject(error)
})
})
}
/**
* Record a successful operation
*/
private recordSuccess(): void {
this.totalSuccesses++
this.lastSuccessTime = Date.now()
this.consecutiveSuccesses++
this.consecutiveFailures = 0
if (this.options.collectMetrics) {
metrics.socketEvents.inc({ event: 'circuit_success' })
}
this.options.onSuccess()
this.emit('success')
// In HALF_OPEN state, check if we can close the circuit
if (this.state === 'half-open') {
if (this.consecutiveSuccesses >= this.options.successThreshold) {
this.transitionTo('closed')
}
}
}
/**
* Record a failed operation
*/
private recordFailure(error: Error): void {
// Check if this error should count as a failure
if (!this.options.shouldCountError(error)) {
return
}
const now = Date.now()
this.totalFailures++
this.lastFailureTime = now
this.consecutiveFailures++
this.consecutiveSuccesses = 0
// Add to failure records for sliding window
this.failureRecords.push({ timestamp: now, error })
// Clean old failures outside the window
this.cleanOldFailures()
if (this.options.collectMetrics) {
metrics.errors.inc({ category: 'circuit_breaker', code: 'failure' })
}
this.options.onFailure(error)
this.emit('failure', error)
// State transition logic
if (this.state === 'half-open') {
// Any failure in HALF_OPEN immediately reopens the circuit
this.transitionTo('open')
} else if (this.state === 'closed') {
// Check if we should trip the circuit
const recentFailures = this.failureRecords.length
if (this.totalCalls >= this.options.volumeThreshold && recentFailures >= this.options.failureThreshold) {
this.transitionTo('open')
}
}
}
/**
* Remove failure records outside the sliding window
*/
private cleanOldFailures(): void {
const cutoff = Date.now() - this.options.failureWindow
this.failureRecords = this.failureRecords.filter(record => record.timestamp > cutoff)
}
/**
* Transition to a new state
*/
private transitionTo(newState: CircuitState): void {
const oldState = this.state
if (oldState === newState) {
return
}
this.state = newState
this.lastStateChange = Date.now()
// Clear existing reset timer
if (this.resetTimer) {
clearTimeout(this.resetTimer)
this.resetTimer = undefined
}
// State-specific actions
switch (newState) {
case 'closed':
this.consecutiveFailures = 0
this.consecutiveSuccesses = 0
this.failureRecords = []
this.options.onClose()
this.emit('close')
break
case 'open':
this.consecutiveSuccesses = 0
this.options.onOpen()
this.emit('open')
// Record circuit breaker trip metric
if (this.options.collectMetrics) {
metrics.circuitBreakerTrips?.inc({ name: this.options.name })
}
// Schedule transition to HALF_OPEN
this.resetTimer = setTimeout(() => {
this.transitionTo('half-open')
}, this.options.resetTimeout)
break
case 'half-open':
this.consecutiveSuccesses = 0
this.consecutiveFailures = 0
this.options.onHalfOpen()
this.emit('half-open')
break
}
this.options.onStateChange(oldState, newState)
this.emit('state-change', { from: oldState, to: newState })
}
/**
* Manually trip the circuit to OPEN state
*/
trip(): void {
this.transitionTo('open')
}
/**
* Manually reset the circuit to CLOSED state
*/
reset(): void {
this.transitionTo('closed')
}
/**
* Get current circuit state
*/
getState(): CircuitState {
return this.state
}
/**
* Check if circuit is OPEN
*/
isOpen(): boolean {
return this.state === 'open'
}
/**
* Check if circuit is CLOSED
*/
isClosed(): boolean {
return this.state === 'closed'
}
/**
* Check if circuit is HALF_OPEN
*/
isHalfOpen(): boolean {
return this.state === 'half-open'
}
/**
* Get circuit breaker statistics
*/
getStats(): CircuitBreakerStats {
this.cleanOldFailures()
const failureRate = this.totalCalls > 0 ? (this.totalFailures / this.totalCalls) * 100 : 0
return {
state: this.state,
failures: this.failureRecords.length,
successes: this.consecutiveSuccesses,
consecutiveFailures: this.consecutiveFailures,
consecutiveSuccesses: this.consecutiveSuccesses,
totalCalls: this.totalCalls,
totalFailures: this.totalFailures,
totalSuccesses: this.totalSuccesses,
totalRejected: this.totalRejected,
failureRate,
lastFailureTime: this.lastFailureTime,
lastSuccessTime: this.lastSuccessTime,
lastStateChange: this.lastStateChange,
isOpen: this.isOpen(),
isClosed: this.isClosed(),
isHalfOpen: this.isHalfOpen()
}
}
/**
* Get circuit breaker name
*/
getName(): string {
return this.options.name
}
/**
* Destroy circuit breaker and clean up resources
*/
destroy(): void {
if (this.resetTimer) {
clearTimeout(this.resetTimer)
}
this.failureRecords = []
this.removeAllListeners()
}
}
/**
* Factory function to create a circuit breaker
*/
export function createCircuitBreaker(options: CircuitBreakerOptions): CircuitBreaker {
return new CircuitBreaker(options)
}
/**
* Registry for managing multiple circuit breakers
*/
export class CircuitBreakerRegistry {
private breakers: Map<string, CircuitBreaker> = new Map()
/**
* Get or create a circuit breaker by name
*/
get(name: string, options?: Omit<CircuitBreakerOptions, 'name'>): CircuitBreaker {
if (!this.breakers.has(name)) {
const breaker = new CircuitBreaker({ ...options, name })
this.breakers.set(name, breaker)
}
return this.breakers.get(name)!
}
/**
* Check if a circuit breaker exists
*/
has(name: string): boolean {
return this.breakers.has(name)
}
/**
* Remove a circuit breaker
*/
remove(name: string): boolean {
const breaker = this.breakers.get(name)
if (breaker) {
breaker.destroy()
return this.breakers.delete(name)
}
return false
}
/**
* Get all circuit breakers
*/
getAll(): Map<string, CircuitBreaker> {
return new Map(this.breakers)
}
/**
* Get statistics for all circuit breakers
*/
getAllStats(): Record<string, CircuitBreakerStats> {
const stats: Record<string, CircuitBreakerStats> = {}
for (const [name, breaker] of this.breakers) {
stats[name] = breaker.getStats()
}
return stats
}
/**
* Reset all circuit breakers to CLOSED state
*/
resetAll(): void {
for (const breaker of this.breakers.values()) {
breaker.reset()
}
}
/**
* Destroy all circuit breakers
*/
destroyAll(): void {
for (const breaker of this.breakers.values()) {
breaker.destroy()
}
this.breakers.clear()
}
}
/**
* Global circuit breaker registry instance
*/
export const globalCircuitRegistry = new CircuitBreakerRegistry()
/**
* Decorator to protect a method with circuit breaker
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* class MyService {
* @circuitBreaker({ failureThreshold: 3 })
* async fetchData() {
* return await api.getData()
* }
* }
* ```
*/
export function circuitBreaker(options: Omit<CircuitBreakerOptions, 'name'> & { name?: string } = {}) {
return function (
_target: unknown,
propertyKey: string,
descriptor: TypedPropertyDescriptor<(...args: unknown[]) => unknown>
) {
const originalMethod = descriptor.value
if (!originalMethod) return descriptor
const name = options.name || propertyKey
const breaker = globalCircuitRegistry.get(name, options)
descriptor.value = async function (...args: unknown[]): Promise<unknown> {
return breaker.execute(() => originalMethod.apply(this, args))
}
return descriptor
}
}
/**
* Wrap a function with circuit breaker protection
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const protectedFetch = withCircuitBreaker(
* fetchData,
* { name: 'api-fetch', failureThreshold: 5 }
* )
* ```
*/
// eslint-disable-next-line space-before-function-paren
export function withCircuitBreaker<T extends (...args: unknown[]) => unknown>(
fn: T,
options: CircuitBreakerOptions
): T {
const breaker = new CircuitBreaker(options)
return (async (...args: Parameters<T>): Promise<ReturnType<T>> => {
return breaker.execute(() => fn(...args)) as Promise<ReturnType<T>>
}) as unknown as T
}
/**
* Get health status of all circuit breakers
*/
export function getCircuitHealth(): {
healthy: boolean
openCircuits: string[]
stats: Record<string, CircuitBreakerStats>
} {
const stats = globalCircuitRegistry.getAllStats()
const openCircuits: string[] = []
for (const [name, stat] of Object.entries(stats)) {
if (stat.isOpen) {
openCircuits.push(name)
}
}
return {
healthy: openCircuits.length === 0,
openCircuits,
stats
}
}
/**
* Create a pre-configured circuit breaker for WhatsApp PreKey operations
*
* This circuit breaker is optimized for handling encryption/session errors
* that commonly occur with WhatsApp's Signal protocol implementation.
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* const preKeyBreaker = createPreKeyCircuitBreaker()
*
* async function sendEncryptedMessage(msg) {
* return preKeyBreaker.execute(async () => {
* return await encryptAndSend(msg)
* })
* }
* ```
*/
export function createPreKeyCircuitBreaker(customOptions?: Partial<CircuitBreakerOptions>): CircuitBreaker {
const preKeyErrorPatterns = ['prekey', 'pre-key', 'session', 'signal', 'encrypt', 'decrypt', 'cipher', 'key']
return new CircuitBreaker({
name: 'prekey-operations',
failureThreshold: 5,
failureWindow: 60000,
resetTimeout: 30000,
successThreshold: 2,
shouldCountError: (error: Error) => {
const message = error.message.toLowerCase()
return preKeyErrorPatterns.some(pattern => message.includes(pattern))
},
...customOptions
})
}
/**
* Create a circuit breaker for WebSocket connection operations
*/
export function createConnectionCircuitBreaker(customOptions?: Partial<CircuitBreakerOptions>): CircuitBreaker {
const connectionErrorPatterns = [
'econnrefused',
'econnreset',
'etimedout',
'enotfound',
'socket',
'websocket',
'connection',
'network'
]
// Normal WS lifecycle status codes that must NEVER trip the query circuit breaker.
// These are transient events that happen on every reconnect and carry no information
// about persistent server-side failures. The reconnection logic in makeSocket handles
// them independently.
const WS_LIFECYCLE_STATUS_CODES = new Set([
428, // connectionClosed
408, // connectionLost / timedOut
440, // connectionReplaced
])
return new CircuitBreaker({
name: 'connection-operations',
failureThreshold: 3,
failureWindow: 30000,
resetTimeout: 60000,
successThreshold: 1,
shouldCountError: (error: Error) => {
// CircuitTimeoutError messages embed the circuit name (e.g. "socket-query"), which
// accidentally matches the "socket" pattern below and causes a self-reinforcing loop
// where the breaker's own timeouts keep tripping the breaker. Exclude them explicitly.
if (error instanceof CircuitTimeoutError) return false
// Exclude normal WS reconnect events (Connection Closed, Connection Lost, Timed Out, etc.).
// These are not server-side failures — they happen on every restart/redeploy and should
// never cause the circuit to open. If we counted them, the 3 concurrent parallel
// post-login queries (sendPassiveIq, uploadPreKeysToServerIfRequired, digestKeyBundle) could all
// fail simultaneously when the WS drops, instantly opening the circuit and blocking
// profile-picture fetches and message delivery for the next 30 s.
const statusCode = (error as { output?: { statusCode?: number } })?.output?.statusCode
if (statusCode !== undefined && WS_LIFECYCLE_STATUS_CODES.has(statusCode)) return false
const message = error.message.toLowerCase()
const code = (error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code?.toLowerCase() || ''
return connectionErrorPatterns.some(pattern => message.includes(pattern) || code.includes(pattern))
},
...customOptions
})
}
/**
* Create a circuit breaker for message sending operations
*/
export function createMessageCircuitBreaker(customOptions?: Partial<CircuitBreakerOptions>): CircuitBreaker {
return new CircuitBreaker({
name: 'message-operations',
failureThreshold: 5,
failureWindow: 60000,
resetTimeout: 15000,
successThreshold: 2,
timeout: 30000,
...customOptions
})
}
export default CircuitBreaker
+44 -2
View File
@@ -58,7 +58,11 @@ export const BAD_MAC_ERROR_TEXT = 'Bad MAC'
export const DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG = {
maxRetries: 3,
baseDelayMs: 100,
sessionRecordErrors: ['No session record', 'SessionError: No session record'],
// 'No matching sessions found' is the libsignal error when decryptWithSessions exhausts
// all stored sessions for a JID. Same recovery flow (retry receipt → pkmsg → new session)
// — categorise it as session-record so the caller logs DEBUG on retry, ERROR only when
// retries are exhausted (instead of dumping the full stack as an unknown error).
sessionRecordErrors: ['No session record', 'SessionError: No session record', 'No matching sessions found'],
corruptedSessionErrors: ['Bad MAC', 'MessageCounterError', MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT]
}
@@ -242,10 +246,14 @@ export function decodeMessageNode(stanza: BinaryNode, meId: string, meLid: strin
const key: WAMessageKey = {
remoteJid: chatId,
remoteJidAlt: !isJidGroup(chatId) ? addressingContext.senderAlt : undefined,
remoteJidUsername: !isJidGroup(chatId)
? stanza.attrs.peer_recipient_username || stanza.attrs.recipient_username
: undefined,
fromMe,
id: msgId,
participant,
participantAlt: isJidGroup(chatId) ? addressingContext.senderAlt : undefined,
participantUsername: stanza.attrs.participant ? stanza.attrs.participant_username : undefined,
addressingMode: addressingContext.addressingMode,
...(msgType === 'newsletter' && stanza.attrs.server_id ? { server_id: stanza.attrs.server_id } : {})
}
@@ -392,6 +400,23 @@ export const decryptMessageNode = (
} else {
fullMessage.message = msg
}
// Detect view-once media on stanza 1 received by linked device.
// viewOnceMessage wrapper is also used for interactive messages
// (interactiveMessage, listMessage, nativeFlowMessage) -- those do NOT have
// imageMessage.viewOnce / videoMessage.viewOnce / audioMessage.viewOnce = true.
// Only real view-once media carries viewOnce: true on the inner media message.
const viewOnceInner =
msg.viewOnceMessage?.message ||
msg.viewOnceMessageV2?.message ||
msg.viewOnceMessageV2Extension?.message
if (
viewOnceInner?.imageMessage?.viewOnce ||
viewOnceInner?.videoMessage?.viewOnce ||
viewOnceInner?.audioMessage?.viewOnce
) {
fullMessage.key.isViewOnce = true
}
} catch (err: any) {
// Check if this is a final failure after all retries exhausted
const isRetryExhausted = err instanceof RetryExhaustedError
@@ -400,9 +425,26 @@ export const decryptMessageNode = (
const isCorrupted = isCorruptedSessionError(originalError)
const isSessionRecord = isSessionRecordError(originalError)
// Slim error projection — keep name/message/type for diagnosis,
// drop `stack` which adds 4-5 lines of node_modules paths per log
// for known-recoverable libsignal errors.
//
// CRITICAL: only slim for KNOWN-RECOVERABLE categories (corrupted /
// session-record). The unknown-error branch keeps the full Error so
// protobuf/parsing/runtime bugs still emit a stack trace where it
// matters most. Catches Copilot/Codex P2 review on PR #391.
const slimErr = originalError
? {
name: (originalError as { name?: string }).name,
message: (originalError as { message?: string }).message,
type: (originalError as { type?: string }).type
}
: undefined
const isRecoverableCategory = isCorrupted || isSessionRecord
const errorContext = {
key: fullMessage.key,
err: originalError,
err: isRecoverableCategory ? slimErr : originalError,
messageType: tag === 'plaintext' ? 'plaintext' : attrs.type,
sender,
author,
+28
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import EventEmitter from 'events'
import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js'
import type {
BaileysEvent,
BaileysEventEmitter,
@@ -890,6 +891,7 @@ const makeBufferData = (): BufferedEventData => {
chats: {},
messages: {},
contacts: {},
pastParticipants: {},
isLatest: false,
empty: true
},
@@ -967,6 +969,28 @@ function append<E extends BufferableEvent>(
}
}
// Merge pastParticipants with deduplication by groupJid and by userJid within each group.
// Multiple HistorySync chunks can carry the same group -- we merge rather than concatenate
// to avoid duplicate entries in the final event delivered to the consumer.
for (const group of (eventData.pastParticipants ?? []) as proto.IPastParticipants[]) {
const groupJid = group.groupJid
if (!groupJid) continue
if (!data.historySets.pastParticipants[groupJid]) {
data.historySets.pastParticipants[groupJid] = []
}
const existing = data.historySets.pastParticipants[groupJid]
const seenJids = new Set(existing.map(p => p.userJid).filter(Boolean))
for (const participant of (group.pastParticipants ?? []) as proto.IPastParticipant[]) {
if (participant.userJid && !seenJids.has(participant.userJid)) {
existing.push(participant)
seenJids.add(participant.userJid)
}
}
}
data.historySets.empty = false
data.historySets.syncType = eventData.syncType
data.historySets.progress = eventData.progress
@@ -1292,6 +1316,10 @@ function consolidateEvents(data: BufferedEventData) {
chats: Object.values(data.historySets.chats),
messages: Object.values(data.historySets.messages),
contacts: Object.values(data.historySets.contacts),
// Convert dedup map back to array. Each entry has groupJid + participants (all unique userJids).
pastParticipants: Object.entries(data.historySets.pastParticipants).map(
([groupJid, participants]) => ({ groupJid, pastParticipants: participants })
),
syncType: data.historySets.syncType,
progress: data.historySets.progress,
isLatest: data.historySets.isLatest,
+6 -39
View File
@@ -6,11 +6,12 @@
* @module Utils/health-status
*/
import { globalCircuitRegistry } from './circuit-breaker.js'
import { getVersionCacheStatus } from './version-cache.js'
/**
* Circuit breaker health information
* Circuit breaker health information (kept for k8s probe schema stability
* always reports an empty list now that circuit breakers were removed in
* favour of bounded-retry).
*/
export interface CircuitBreakerHealth {
name: string
@@ -105,44 +106,10 @@ export function getHealthStatus(): HealthStatus {
})
}
// 2. Check circuit breakers
// 2. Circuit breakers were removed in favour of bounded-retry.
// Keep the field for backward-compat with k8s probe schema, always empty.
const circuitBreakers: CircuitBreakerHealth[] = []
let openCircuits = 0
for (const [name, breaker] of globalCircuitRegistry.getAll()) {
const stats = breaker.getStats()
const state = breaker.getState()
circuitBreakers.push({
name,
state,
failures: stats.totalFailures,
successes: stats.totalSuccesses,
totalCalls: stats.totalCalls
})
if (state === 'open') {
openCircuits++
}
}
if (openCircuits > 0) {
checks.push({
name: 'circuit_breakers',
status: openCircuits > 2 ? 'fail' : 'warn',
message: `${openCircuits} circuit breaker(s) are open`
})
if (openCircuits > 2) {
overallStatus = 'unhealthy'
} else if (overallStatus === 'healthy') {
overallStatus = 'degraded'
}
} else {
checks.push({
name: 'circuit_breakers',
status: 'pass'
})
}
checks.push({ name: 'circuit_breakers', status: 'pass' })
// 3. Check memory usage (warn if > 90%)
const memUsage = process.memoryUsage()
+46 -13
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import { pipeline } from 'stream/promises'
import { promisify } from 'util'
import { inflate } from 'zlib'
import { createInflate, inflate } from 'zlib'
import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js'
import type { Chat, Contact, LIDMapping, WAMessage } from '../Types'
import { WAMessageStubType } from '../Types'
@@ -15,7 +16,8 @@ import {
import { toNumber } from './generics'
import type { ILogger } from './logger.js'
import { normalizeMessageContent } from './messages'
import { downloadContentFromMessage } from './messages-media'
import { DEFAULT_ORIGIN } from '../Defaults'
import { downloadContentFromMessage, getUrlFromDirectPath } from './messages-media'
const inflatePromise = promisify(inflate)
@@ -28,16 +30,15 @@ const inflatePromise = promisify(inflate)
*/
export const downloadHistory = async (msg: proto.Message.IHistorySyncNotification, options: RequestInit) => {
const stream = await downloadContentFromMessage(msg, 'md-msg-hist', { options })
const bufferArray: Buffer[] = []
for await (const chunk of stream) {
bufferArray.push(chunk)
}
let buffer: Buffer = Buffer.concat(bufferArray)
// decompress buffer
buffer = await inflatePromise(buffer)
// Pipe decrypted stream directly through zlib inflate.
// Avoids allocating an intermediate buffer for the compressed payload —
// memory peaks during 50MB history syncs drop ~50% (PR upstream #2333).
const inflater = createInflate()
const chunks: Buffer[] = []
inflater.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => chunks.push(chunk))
await pipeline(stream, inflater)
const buffer = Buffer.concat(chunks)
const syncData = proto.HistorySync.decode(buffer)
return syncData
}
@@ -314,6 +315,7 @@ export const processHistoryMessage = (item: proto.IHistorySync, logger?: ILogger
contacts.push({
id: chatId,
name: chat.displayName || chat.name || chat.username || undefined,
username: chat.username || undefined,
lid: chat.lidJid || chat.accountLid || undefined,
phoneNumber: chat.pnJid || undefined
})
@@ -359,7 +361,7 @@ export const processHistoryMessage = (item: proto.IHistorySync, logger?: ILogger
}
}
chats.push({ ...chat })
chats.push(chat)
}
break
@@ -374,10 +376,25 @@ export const processHistoryMessage = (item: proto.IHistorySync, logger?: ILogger
// Convert Map back to array for return
const lidPnMappings = Array.from(lidPnMap.values())
// Normalize pastParticipants: resolve LID userJids → PN so the consumer always
// receives a phone number, never an opaque LID identifier.
// Uses the lidPnMap built above (populated from phoneNumberToLidMappings + conversations).
// If a LID cannot be resolved, the original value is kept rather than dropping the participant.
const pastParticipants: proto.IPastParticipants[] = (item.pastParticipants ?? []).map(group => ({
groupJid: group.groupJid,
pastParticipants: (group.pastParticipants ?? []).map(participant => {
const userJid = participant.userJid
if (!userJid || !isAnyLidUser(userJid)) return participant
const mapping = lidPnMap.get(jidNormalizedUser(userJid))
return mapping?.pn ? { ...participant, userJid: mapping.pn } : participant
})
}))
return {
chats,
contacts,
messages,
pastParticipants,
lidPnMappings,
syncType: item.syncType,
progress: item.progress
@@ -408,7 +425,23 @@ export const downloadAndProcessHistorySyncNotification = async (
historyMsg = await downloadHistory(msg, options)
}
return processHistoryMessage(historyMsg, logger)
const result = processHistoryMessage(historyMsg, logger)
// Mirror WA Desktop behaviour: DELETE the CDN blob only after processing succeeds.
// Doing this earlier (e.g. inside downloadHistory) risks permanent history loss if
// processing throws — the server copy would be gone and retry after reconnect would fail.
if (msg.directPath) {
const cdnUrl = getUrlFromDirectPath(msg.directPath)
fetch(cdnUrl, {
...options,
method: 'DELETE',
headers: { ...((options as RequestInit).headers ?? {}), Origin: DEFAULT_ORIGIN }
}).catch(() => {
// non-fatal — server will expire it anyway
})
}
return result
}
/**
+23
View File
@@ -57,6 +57,16 @@ export type IdentityChangeContext = {
debounceCache: NodeCache<boolean>
/** Logger instance for debugging and monitoring */
logger: ILogger
/**
* Invoked right before `assertSessions` is called for an existing-session identity
* change. Used to kick off fire-and-forget side effects (e.g. tctoken re-issuance)
* in the same order WA Web does i.e. before the E2E session is re-established.
* Must not throw; implementations are responsible for their own error handling.
*
* Skipped when the refresh itself is skipped (no_identity_node, invalid_notification,
* skipped_companion_device, skipped_self_primary, debounced, skipped_offline).
*/
onBeforeSessionRefresh?: (jid: string) => void
}
// ============================================================================
@@ -170,6 +180,19 @@ export async function handleIdentityChange(
// This ensures we don't incorrectly debounce when we exit early (offline, etc.)
ctx.debounceCache.set(from, true)
// Fire-and-forget side effects (e.g. tctoken re-issuance) BEFORE the session is
// re-established. WA Web runs these in parallel with the session refresh —
// running afterwards would race with the next outbound send and risk error 463.
//
// Wrapped in try/catch so a misbehaving consumer callback cannot abort identity
// change recovery. We log and continue — assertSessions still runs so the E2E
// session always gets refreshed.
try {
ctx.onBeforeSessionRefresh?.(from)
} catch (error) {
ctx.logger.warn({ error, jid: from }, 'onBeforeSessionRefresh callback threw — continuing with session refresh')
}
// Attempt session refresh/creation
try {
await ctx.assertSessions([from], true)
+1 -1
View File
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ export * from './trace-context'
export * from './prometheus-metrics'
// Resilience and performance
export * from './bounded-retry'
export * from './cache-utils'
export * from './circuit-breaker'
export * from './retry-utils'
// Telemetry and detection mitigation
+33 -7
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,13 @@ import { join } from 'path'
import { Readable, Transform } from 'stream'
import { URL } from 'url'
import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js'
import { DEFAULT_ORIGIN, MEDIA_HKDF_KEY_MAPPING, MEDIA_PATH_MAP, type MediaType } from '../Defaults'
import {
DEFAULT_ORIGIN,
MEDIA_HKDF_KEY_MAPPING,
MEDIA_PATH_MAP,
type MediaType,
NEWSLETTER_MEDIA_PATH_MAP
} from '../Defaults'
import type {
BaileysEventMap,
DownloadableMessage,
@@ -612,7 +618,7 @@ export const downloadEncryptedContent = async (
const output = new Transform({
transform(chunk, _, callback) {
let data = Buffer.concat([remainingBytes, chunk])
let data = remainingBytes.length ? Buffer.concat([remainingBytes, chunk]) : chunk
const decryptLength = toSmallestChunkSize(data.length)
remainingBytes = data.slice(decryptLength)
@@ -681,6 +687,10 @@ type MediaUploadResult = {
meta_hmac?: string
ts?: number
fbid?: number
thumbnail_info?: {
thumbnail_sha256?: string
thumbnail_direct_path?: string
}
}
export type UploadParams = {
@@ -825,11 +835,21 @@ export const getWAUploadToServer = (
{ customUploadHosts, fetchAgent, logger, options }: SocketConfig,
refreshMediaConn: (force: boolean) => Promise<MediaConnInfo>
): WAMediaUploadFunction => {
return async (filePath, { mediaType, fileEncSha256B64, timeoutMs }) => {
return async (filePath, { mediaType, fileEncSha256B64, timeoutMs, newsletter }) => {
// send a query JSON to obtain the url & auth token to upload our media
let uploadInfo = await refreshMediaConn(false)
let urls: { mediaUrl: string; directPath: string; meta_hmac?: string; ts?: number; fbid?: number } | undefined
let urls:
| {
mediaUrl: string
directPath: string
meta_hmac?: string
ts?: number
fbid?: number
thumbnailDirectPath?: string
thumbnailSha256?: string
}
| undefined
const hosts = [...customUploadHosts, ...uploadInfo.hosts]
fileEncSha256B64 = encodeBase64EncodedStringForUpload(fileEncSha256B64)
@@ -851,7 +871,11 @@ export const getWAUploadToServer = (
logger.debug(`uploading to "${hostname}"`)
const auth = encodeURIComponent(uploadInfo.auth)
const url = `https://${hostname}${MEDIA_PATH_MAP[mediaType]}/${fileEncSha256B64}?auth=${auth}&token=${fileEncSha256B64}`
const mediaPath = (newsletter ? NEWSLETTER_MEDIA_PATH_MAP[mediaType] : undefined) || MEDIA_PATH_MAP[mediaType]
let url = `https://${hostname}${mediaPath}/${fileEncSha256B64}?auth=${auth}&token=${fileEncSha256B64}`
if (newsletter) {
url += '&server_thumb_gen=1'
}
let result: MediaUploadResult | undefined
try {
@@ -868,11 +892,13 @@ export const getWAUploadToServer = (
if (result?.url || result?.direct_path) {
urls = {
mediaUrl: result.url!,
mediaUrl: result.url || result.direct_path!,
directPath: result.direct_path!,
meta_hmac: result.meta_hmac,
fbid: result.fbid,
ts: result.ts
ts: result.ts,
thumbnailDirectPath: result.thumbnail_info?.thumbnail_direct_path,
thumbnailSha256: result.thumbnail_info?.thumbnail_sha256
}
break
} else {
+46 -14
View File
@@ -196,10 +196,11 @@ export const prepareWAMessageMedia = async (
)
const fileSha256B64 = fileSha256.toString('base64')
const { mediaUrl, directPath } = await options.upload(filePath, {
const { directPath, thumbnailDirectPath, thumbnailSha256 } = await options.upload(filePath, {
fileEncSha256B64: fileSha256B64,
mediaType: mediaType,
timeoutMs: options.mediaUploadTimeoutMs
timeoutMs: options.mediaUploadTimeoutMs,
newsletter: true
})
await fs.unlink(filePath)
@@ -207,10 +208,12 @@ export const prepareWAMessageMedia = async (
const obj = WAProto.Message.fromObject({
// todo: add more support here
[`${mediaType}Message`]: (MessageTypeProto as any)[mediaType].fromObject({
url: mediaUrl,
// url intentionally omitted — newsletters use directPath only
directPath,
fileSha256,
fileLength,
thumbnailDirectPath,
thumbnailSha256: thumbnailSha256 ? Buffer.from(thumbnailSha256, 'base64') : undefined,
...uploadData,
media: undefined
})
@@ -236,7 +239,7 @@ export const prepareWAMessageMedia = async (
const requiresDurationComputation = mediaType === 'audio' && typeof uploadData.seconds === 'undefined'
const requiresThumbnailComputation =
(mediaType === 'image' || mediaType === 'video') && typeof uploadData['jpegThumbnail'] === 'undefined'
const requiresWaveformProcessing = mediaType === 'audio' && uploadData.ptt === true
const requiresWaveformProcessing = mediaType === 'audio' && uploadData.ptt === true && typeof uploadData.waveform === 'undefined'
const requiresAudioBackground = options.backgroundColor && mediaType === 'audio' && uploadData.ptt === true
const requiresOriginalForSomeProcessing = requiresDurationComputation || requiresThumbnailComputation
const { mediaKey, encFilePath, originalFilePath, fileEncSha256, fileSha256, fileLength } = await encryptedStream(
@@ -254,7 +257,9 @@ export const prepareWAMessageMedia = async (
(async () => {
const result = await options.upload(encFilePath, {
fileEncSha256B64,
mediaType,
// Use mediaTypeOverride for upload path (e.g. 'viewonce-image' → /o1/mms/image)
// Encryption already used the override via encryptedStream above
mediaType: options.mediaTypeOverride || mediaType,
timeoutMs: options.mediaUploadTimeoutMs
})
logger?.debug({ mediaType, cacheableKey }, 'uploaded media')
@@ -292,7 +297,7 @@ export const prepareWAMessageMedia = async (
logger?.debug('computed audio duration')
}
if (requiresWaveformProcessing) {
if (requiresWaveformProcessing && !uploadData.waveform) {
uploadData.waveform = await getAudioWaveform(filePath, logger)
logger?.debug('processed waveform')
}
@@ -1747,22 +1752,49 @@ export const generateWAMessageContent = async (
}
}
} else {
m = await prepareWAMessageMedia(message, options)
// For view-once media, upload to the one-time CDN (/o1/mms/*) instead of regular CDN
// WA Web view-once messages always have directPath: /o1/v/t24/... (not /v/t62.7118-24/...)
// Using the wrong CDN causes WA server to flag the account and breaks view-once capability
const isViewOnce = hasOptionalProperty(message, 'viewOnce') && !!message.viewOnce
const viewOnceTypeMap: Record<string, string> = {
image: 'viewonce-image',
video: 'viewonce-video',
audio: 'viewonce-audio'
}
const viewOnceOverride = isViewOnce
? viewOnceTypeMap[Object.keys(message).find(k => k in viewOnceTypeMap) || '']
: undefined
m = await prepareWAMessageMedia(message, {
...options,
mediaTypeOverride: (viewOnceOverride as any) || options.mediaTypeOverride
})
}
if (hasOptionalProperty(message, 'viewOnce') && !!message.viewOnce) {
m = { viewOnceMessage: { message: m } }
// Also set viewOnce=true on the inner media message (required by WA app to render as view-once)
if (m.imageMessage) m.imageMessage.viewOnce = true
else if (m.videoMessage) m.videoMessage.viewOnce = true
else if (m.audioMessage) m.audioMessage.viewOnce = true
// Use viewOnceMessageV2 (field 55) — modern WA clients use this wrapper
// viewOnceMessage (field 37) is the old format which WA server no longer accepts with view_once_write
m = { viewOnceMessageV2: { message: m } }
}
if (hasOptionalProperty(message, 'mentions') && message.mentions?.length) {
if (
(hasOptionalProperty(message, 'mentions') && message.mentions?.length) ||
(hasOptionalProperty(message, 'mentionAll') && message.mentionAll)
) {
const messageType = Object.keys(m)[0] as Extract<keyof proto.IMessage, MessageWithContextInfo>
if (messageType) {
const key = m[messageType]
if (key && 'contextInfo' in key && !!key.contextInfo) {
key.contextInfo.mentionedJid = message.mentions
} else if (key) {
key.contextInfo = {
mentionedJid: message.mentions
if (key && 'contextInfo' in key) {
key.contextInfo = key.contextInfo || {}
if (message.mentions?.length) {
key.contextInfo.mentionedJid = message.mentions
}
if (message.mentionAll) {
key.contextInfo.nonJidMentions = 1
}
}
}
+196 -1
View File
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ import { getKeyAuthor, toNumber } from './generics'
import { downloadAndProcessHistorySyncNotification } from './history'
import type { ILogger } from './logger'
import { metrics, recordHistorySyncMessages } from './prometheus-metrics.js'
import { buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite } from './tc-token-utils'
type ProcessMessageContext = {
shouldProcessHistoryMsg: boolean
@@ -62,6 +63,163 @@ const REAL_MSG_STUB_TYPES = new Set([
const REAL_MSG_REQ_ME_STUB_TYPES = new Set([WAMessageStubType.GROUP_PARTICIPANT_ADD])
/**
* Extract tctoken / tcTokenTimestamp / tcTokenSenderTimestamp from history-sync chats
* and persist them to the `tctoken` store. Mirrors WA Web's `bulkCreateOrMerge` pass
* over the chat table during history sync.
*
* Why this matters: when a user logs in on a new device, the multi-device history sync
* is the only way that device learns about tctokens issued/received on the original
* device. Without this pass, the new device sends 1:1 messages with no tctoken until
* the contact triggers a fresh notification which surfaces as error 463 in production.
*
* Monotonicity: we only overwrite an existing entry if the incoming timestamp is
* STRICTLY newer (`incoming > existing`). Equal timestamps are skipped to avoid
* reverting senderTimestamp / realIssueTimestamp set by other layers (e.g. a
* reissue that fired between history-sync chunks).
*
* Index hygiene: every JID we write here is added to the persistent prune index
* (TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY) via buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite, so the 24h prune sweep in
* messages-recv picks them up across sessions.
*/
/**
* Single-concurrency queue for `storeTcTokensFromHistorySync` calls.
*
* Why: the function does read-then-write merges (`keyStore.get('tctoken', ...)`
* compute `keyStore.set(...)`) which are NOT atomic at the store level. If two
* history-sync chunks invoke this concurrently (common during reconnect / QR
* scan), an older chunk that started first can `keyStore.set` AFTER a newer
* chunk, overwriting the newer entry and worse, the merged `__index` write
* can drop JIDs the other chunk just added. Result: stale tcTokens / repeat 463
* sends until the next opportunistic refetch.
*
* Serialising via a chained Promise keeps the runs ordered while still freeing
* the calling `processMessage` to emit `messaging-history.set` immediately
* (the chain is fire-and-forget at the call site). Errors don't break the chain
* each `catch` resets it to `Promise.resolve()` so a single failure can't
* stall future runs.
*
* The chain is module-scoped (one per Node process). Multiple Baileys instances
* sharing this module will serialise across instances too, but their writes
* target different keyStores so there's no correctness gain only a tiny loss
* of inter-instance parallelism for tcToken syncs, which is acceptable given
* how rarely this runs vs. how rare cross-instance contention is.
*/
let historyTcTokenChain: Promise<void> = Promise.resolve()
function scheduleHistoryTcTokenSync(
chats: Chat[],
signalRepository: SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore,
keyStore: SignalKeyStoreWithTransaction,
logger?: ILogger
): void {
historyTcTokenChain = historyTcTokenChain
.catch(() => {
/* swallow prior error so chain stays alive */
})
.then(() => storeTcTokensFromHistorySync(chats, signalRepository, keyStore, logger))
.catch(err => {
logger?.warn({ err }, 'background tctoken history-sync persistence failed')
})
}
async function storeTcTokensFromHistorySync(
chats: Chat[],
signalRepository: SignalRepositoryWithLIDStore,
keyStore: SignalKeyStoreWithTransaction,
logger?: ILogger
) {
// Cheap filter first — most chats in a sync chunk don't carry tcToken at all,
// and we want to avoid spinning up promises for them.
const tokenChats = chats.filter(chat => {
const ts = chat.tcTokenTimestamp ? toNumber(chat.tcTokenTimestamp) : 0
return !!chat.tcToken?.length && ts > 0
})
if (!tokenChats.length) {
return
}
// Pre-normalize so the rest of the pipeline is a synchronous join.
const normalized = tokenChats.map(chat => ({
chat,
ts: toNumber(chat.tcTokenTimestamp!),
jid: jidNormalizedUser(chat.id!)
}))
// BATCHED LID resolution. The previous shape called getLIDForPN once per
// chat (sequential await inside a for-of), which became the bottleneck
// during heavy history sync — every cold-cache hit was a DB round-trip,
// stalling messaging-history.set and spilling into the event-buffer.
// `getLIDsForPNs` resolves a deduped list in ONE batched query (and shares
// USync retry across PNs that miss cache), turning O(N) round-trips into 1.
//
// LID inputs (and `@hosted.lid`) skip the lookup entirely — they're already
// the storage form. Failures degrade gracefully: a missing mapping just
// stores under the original jid, matching `resolveTcTokenJid`'s null branch.
const pnsToResolve = [...new Set(normalized.filter(({ jid }) => !isLidUser(jid)).map(({ jid }) => jid))]
const pnToLid = new Map<string, string>()
if (pnsToResolve.length) {
try {
const mappings = await signalRepository.lidMapping.getLIDsForPNs(pnsToResolve)
// Flat loop (continue-on-skip) keeps max nesting depth at 4 for lint.
for (const { pn, lid } of mappings ?? []) {
if (!pn || !lid) continue
pnToLid.set(jidNormalizedUser(pn), lid)
}
} catch (err) {
// Per-chat fallback below (storageJid := jid). Don't abort the chunk —
// CodeRabbit noted that all-or-nothing rejection here would drop every
// tctoken in the batch AND prevent messaging-history.set from firing.
logger?.warn({ err }, 'storeTcTokensFromHistorySync: getLIDsForPNs batch failed; falling back to per-chat jid')
}
}
const candidates = normalized.map(({ chat, ts, jid }) => ({
storageJid: pnToLid.get(jid) ?? jid,
token: Buffer.from(chat.tcToken!),
ts,
senderTs: chat.tcTokenSenderTimestamp ? toNumber(chat.tcTokenSenderTimestamp) : undefined
}))
const jids = candidates.map(c => c.storageJid)
const existing = await keyStore.get('tctoken', jids)
const entries: Record<string, { token: Buffer; timestamp?: string; senderTimestamp?: number }> = {}
for (const c of candidates) {
// Same-batch dedup: when two chats resolve to the same storageJid (e.g. PN+LID
// aliases collapsing through resolveTcTokenJid, or duplicate chunks across
// retries), prefer the value already written by an earlier iteration so a
// lower-ts entry can't overwrite a higher-ts one captured from `existing`.
const existingEntry = entries[c.storageJid] ?? existing[c.storageJid]
const existingTs = existingEntry?.timestamp ? Number(existingEntry.timestamp) : 0
// Strict > guard: equal timestamps are skipped so we never clobber
// senderTimestamp written by other layers (issuance after send, etc).
if (existingTs > 0 && existingTs >= c.ts) {
continue
}
entries[c.storageJid] = {
...existingEntry,
token: c.token,
timestamp: String(c.ts),
...(c.senderTs !== undefined ? { senderTimestamp: c.senderTs } : {})
}
}
if (Object.keys(entries).length) {
logger?.debug({ count: Object.keys(entries).length }, 'storing tctokens from history sync')
try {
// Include updated __index so cross-session pruning picks these JIDs up.
const indexWrite = await buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite(keyStore, Object.keys(entries))
await keyStore.set({ tctoken: { ...entries, ...indexWrite } })
} catch (err) {
logger?.warn({ err }, 'failed to store tctokens from history sync')
}
}
}
/** Cleans a received message to further processing */
export const cleanMessage = (message: WAMessage, meId: string, meLid: string) => {
// ensure remoteJid and participant doesn't have device or agent in it
@@ -418,6 +576,12 @@ const processMessage = async (
// Emit LID-PN mappings from history sync
// This is how WhatsApp Web learns mappings for chats with non-contacts
//
// MUST run BEFORE storeTcTokensFromHistorySync — otherwise resolveTcTokenJid()
// can't resolve PN→LID for fresh-device chats (mapping cache is empty), tokens
// get persisted under PN keys, and the send path (which resolves to LID first)
// misses them — exactly the error 463 scenario this whole change is meant to
// prevent. Catches Codex P1 review on PR #386.
if (data.lidPnMappings?.length) {
logger?.debug({ count: data.lidPnMappings.length }, 'processing LID-PN mappings from history sync')
// eslint-disable-next-line max-depth
@@ -442,6 +606,29 @@ const processMessage = async (
}
}
// Persist tctokens carried by history-sync chats in BACKGROUND, serialised.
//
// Originally awaited (PR #386) to avoid 463 on first multi-device send, but in
// production this drained the event buffer per-chunk and added visible delivery
// latency (especially after restart / QR scan when many chunks arrived at once).
//
// `scheduleHistoryTcTokenSync` enqueues onto a single-concurrency promise chain
// (see definition above) — chunks persist sequentially in the order they were
// emitted, preserving timestamp monotonicity AND keeping the `__index` write
// safe from concurrent merge clobbers. The call returns immediately so the
// `messaging-history.set` emit is not blocked.
//
// TRADE-OFF: a listener that fires an outbound send IMMEDIATELY after the emit
// may race the still-pending persistence and get a 463 on that specific send.
// The existing 463 handler in messages-recv.ts triggers a getPrivacyTokens()
// refetch that auto-recovers within seconds. Net result is much better UX than
// per-chunk stalls.
//
// DO NOT add `await` back here without re-evaluating production latency, AND
// DO NOT call storeTcTokensFromHistorySync directly — it must go through the
// chain to preserve write ordering across overlapping chunks.
scheduleHistoryTcTokenSync(data.chats, signalRepository, keyStore, logger)
ev.emit('messaging-history.set', {
...data,
isLatest: histNotification.syncType !== proto.HistorySync.HistorySyncType.ON_DEMAND ? isLatest : undefined,
@@ -763,12 +950,19 @@ const processMessage = async (
id: jid,
author: message.key.participant!,
authorPn: message.key.participantAlt!,
authorUsername: message.key.participantUsername!,
participants,
action
})
const emitGroupUpdate = (update: Partial<GroupMetadata>) => {
ev.emit('groups.update', [
{ id: jid, ...update, author: message.key.participant ?? undefined, authorPn: message.key.participantAlt }
{
id: jid,
...update,
author: message.key.participant ?? undefined,
authorPn: message.key.participantAlt,
authorUsername: message.key.participantUsername
}
])
}
@@ -777,6 +971,7 @@ const processMessage = async (
id: jid,
author: message.key.participant!,
authorPn: message.key.participantAlt!,
authorUsername: message.key.participantUsername!,
participant: participant.lid,
participantPn: participant.pn,
action,
-23
View File
@@ -1570,26 +1570,6 @@ export const metrics = {
new Counter('socket_reconnects_total', 'Total socket reconnection attempts', ['reason'])
),
// ========== Circuit Breaker Metrics ==========
circuitBreakerState: baileysMetrics.register(
new Gauge('circuit_breaker_state', 'Circuit breaker state (0=closed, 1=open, 2=half-open)', ['name'])
),
circuitBreakerTrips: baileysMetrics.register(
new Counter('circuit_breaker_trips_total', 'Total circuit breaker trips', ['name'])
),
circuitBreakerRecoveries: baileysMetrics.register(
new Counter('circuit_breaker_recoveries_total', 'Total circuit breaker recoveries', ['name'])
),
circuitBreakerRejections: baileysMetrics.register(
new Counter('circuit_breaker_rejections_total', 'Total requests rejected by circuit breaker', ['name'])
),
circuitBreakerSuccesses: baileysMetrics.register(
new Counter('circuit_breaker_successes_total', 'Total successful requests through circuit breaker', ['name'])
),
circuitBreakerFailures: baileysMetrics.register(
new Counter('circuit_breaker_failures_total', 'Total failed requests through circuit breaker', ['name'])
),
// ========== Encryption Metrics ==========
encryptionOperations: baileysMetrics.register(
new Counter('encryption_operations_total', 'Total encryption operations', ['operation'])
@@ -2167,9 +2147,6 @@ function initializeMetricsWithLabels(): void {
metrics.messageFailures?.inc({ type: 'text', reason: 'max_retries' }, 0)
metrics.messageFailures?.inc({ type: 'other', reason: 'max_retries' }, 0)
// Circuit breaker metric
metrics.circuitBreakerTrips?.inc({ name: 'main' }, 0)
console.log('[Prometheus] Initialized metrics with labels')
} catch (error) {
console.error('[Prometheus] Error initializing metrics with labels:', error)
+13 -148
View File
@@ -6,15 +6,21 @@
* - Jitter to avoid thundering herd
* - Configurable max attempts
* - Customizable retry predicates
* - Circuit breaker integration
* - Event hooks
* - Cancellation support
* - Cancellation support (AbortSignal)
*
* Used by `decode-wa-message.ts` for Bad MAC retry recovery on the decrypt
* path. For socket-operation retries (uploadPreKeys etc.) prefer
* `withBoundedRetry` from `./bounded-retry.ts`, which is empirically
* aligned with WhatsApp Android's per-operation backoff.
*
* NOTE: the previous `circuitBreaker` integration option, the `withRetry`
* decorator, the `retryable` wrapper and the `RetryManager` class were
* removed when the socket-level circuit breaker was retired see PR #393
* for the rationale.
*
* @module Utils/retry-utils
*/
import { EventEmitter } from 'events'
import type { CircuitBreaker } from './circuit-breaker.js'
import { metrics } from './prometheus-metrics.js'
/**
@@ -59,8 +65,6 @@ export interface RetryOptions {
operationName?: string
/** Collect metrics */
collectMetrics?: boolean
/** Circuit breaker for integration */
circuitBreaker?: CircuitBreaker
/** Callback before each retry */
onRetry?: (error: Error, attempt: number, delay: number) => void | Promise<void>
/** Callback on success */
@@ -283,7 +287,6 @@ export async function retry<T>(
timeout: options.timeout,
operationName: options.operationName ?? 'operation',
collectMetrics: options.collectMetrics ?? true,
circuitBreaker: options.circuitBreaker,
onRetry: options.onRetry ?? (() => {}),
onSuccess: options.onSuccess ?? (() => {}),
onFailure: options.onFailure ?? (() => {}),
@@ -313,11 +316,6 @@ export async function retry<T>(
throw new RetryAbortedError(attempt)
}
// Check circuit breaker
if (config.circuitBreaker?.isOpen()) {
throw new Error(`Circuit breaker "${config.circuitBreaker.getName()}" is open`)
}
try {
// Execute operation
let result: T
@@ -425,138 +423,6 @@ export function createRetrier(defaultOptions: RetryOptions = {}) {
}
}
/**
* Decorator to add retry to method
*/
export function withRetry(options: RetryOptions = {}) {
return function (
_target: unknown,
propertyKey: string,
descriptor: TypedPropertyDescriptor<(...args: unknown[]) => unknown>
) {
const originalMethod = descriptor.value
if (!originalMethod) return descriptor
descriptor.value = async function (...args: unknown[]): Promise<unknown> {
return retry(() => originalMethod.apply(this, args), {
...options,
operationName: options.operationName || propertyKey
})
}
return descriptor
}
}
/**
* Wrapper for function with retry
*/
// eslint-disable-next-line space-before-function-paren
export function retryable<T extends (...args: unknown[]) => unknown>(
fn: T,
options: RetryOptions = {}
): (...args: Parameters<T>) => Promise<ReturnType<T>> {
return async (...args: Parameters<T>): Promise<ReturnType<T>> => {
return retry(() => fn(...args), options) as Promise<ReturnType<T>>
}
}
/**
* Class to manage retries with state
*/
export class RetryManager extends EventEmitter {
private activeRetries: Map<string, { cancel: () => void; context: RetryContext }> = new Map()
private defaultOptions: RetryOptions
constructor(defaultOptions: RetryOptions = {}) {
super()
this.defaultOptions = defaultOptions
}
/**
* Execute operation with retry
*/
async execute<T>(
id: string,
operation: (context: RetryContext) => T | Promise<T>,
options?: RetryOptions
): Promise<T> {
// Cancel previous retry with same ID
this.cancel(id)
const abortController = new AbortController()
const mergedOptions = { ...this.defaultOptions, ...options, abortSignal: abortController.signal }
const retryPromise = retry(context => {
this.activeRetries.set(id, {
cancel: () => abortController.abort(),
context
})
this.emit('attempt', { id, attempt: context.attempt })
return operation(context)
}, mergedOptions)
try {
const result = await retryPromise
this.emit('success', { id })
return result
} catch (error) {
this.emit('failure', { id, error })
throw error
} finally {
this.activeRetries.delete(id)
}
}
/**
* Cancel in-progress retry
*/
cancel(id: string): boolean {
const active = this.activeRetries.get(id)
if (active) {
active.cancel()
this.activeRetries.delete(id)
this.emit('cancelled', { id })
return true
}
return false
}
/**
* Cancel all retries
*/
cancelAll(): void {
for (const [id, active] of this.activeRetries) {
active.cancel()
this.emit('cancelled', { id })
}
this.activeRetries.clear()
}
/**
* Check if there is an active retry
*/
isActive(id: string): boolean {
return this.activeRetries.has(id)
}
/**
* Return active retry context
*/
getContext(id: string): RetryContext | undefined {
return this.activeRetries.get(id)?.context
}
/**
* Return active retry IDs
*/
getActiveIds(): string[] {
return Array.from(this.activeRetries.keys())
}
}
/**
* Common predicates for shouldRetry
*/
@@ -660,9 +526,8 @@ export const retryConfigs = {
* Uses fixed delay array: 1s, 2s, 5s, 10s, 20s (with ±15% jitter)
*
* NOTE: Values are hardcoded instead of referencing RETRY_BACKOFF_DELAYS/RETRY_JITTER_FACTOR
* to prevent "Cannot access before initialization" errors in ESM environments.
* This occurs when modules are loaded in specific orders due to indirect circular imports
* (e.g., via prometheus-metrics.ts -> circuit-breaker.ts chain).
* to prevent "Cannot access before initialization" errors in ESM environments
* caused by indirect circular imports through prometheus-metrics.ts.
* Keep these values in sync with the constants above (lines 25, 31).
*/
rsocket: {
+23 -97
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,9 @@
* - Configurable log levels (trace, debug, info, warn, error, fatal)
* - JSON formatting for log analysis
* - Hierarchical context with child loggers
* - External system integration via hooks with circuit breaker
* - External system integration via fire-and-forget hooks (failures
* counted in hookFailures metric; no per-hook circuit breaker chronic
* breakage is visible to operators via the metric)
* - Logging metrics with Prometheus integration
* - Sensitive data sanitization
* - Log buffering for batch writes
@@ -73,10 +75,6 @@ export interface StructuredLoggerConfig {
maxLogsPerSecond?: number
/** Enable async logging queue (default: false) */
enableAsyncQueue?: boolean
/** Circuit breaker failure threshold for external hooks (default: 5) */
circuitBreakerThreshold?: number
/** Circuit breaker reset timeout in ms (default: 30000) */
circuitBreakerResetMs?: number
/** Enable Prometheus metrics integration (default: false) */
enableMetrics?: boolean
}
@@ -155,8 +153,6 @@ export interface LoggerMetrics {
bufferFlushes: number
/** External hook failures */
hookFailures: number
/** Circuit breaker trips */
circuitBreakerTrips: number
/** Average log processing time in ms */
avgProcessingTimeMs: number
}
@@ -169,8 +165,6 @@ export interface LoggerStatistics extends LoggerMetrics {
bufferSize: number
/** Rate limiter tokens available */
rateLimiterTokens: number
/** Circuit breaker state */
circuitBreakerState: 'closed' | 'open' | 'half-open'
/** Queue size (if async enabled) */
queueSize: number
/** Created timestamp */
@@ -242,69 +236,6 @@ class RateLimiter {
}
}
// ============================================================================
// CIRCUIT BREAKER
// ============================================================================
/**
* Circuit breaker for external hook protection
*/
class CircuitBreaker {
private failures = 0
private lastFailure = 0
private state: 'closed' | 'open' | 'half-open' = 'closed'
constructor(
private readonly threshold: number,
private readonly resetTimeoutMs: number
) {}
async execute<T>(operation: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T | null> {
if (this.state === 'open') {
if (Date.now() - this.lastFailure > this.resetTimeoutMs) {
this.state = 'half-open'
} else {
return null // Circuit is open, skip
}
}
try {
const result = await operation()
this.onSuccess()
return result
} catch (error) {
this.onFailure()
throw error
}
}
private onSuccess(): void {
this.failures = 0
this.state = 'closed'
}
private onFailure(): void {
this.failures++
this.lastFailure = Date.now()
if (this.failures >= this.threshold) {
this.state = 'open'
}
}
getState(): 'closed' | 'open' | 'half-open' {
// Check if should transition from open to half-open
if (this.state === 'open' && Date.now() - this.lastFailure > this.resetTimeoutMs) {
this.state = 'half-open'
}
return this.state
}
getFailures(): number {
return this.failures
}
}
// ============================================================================
// ASYNC LOG QUEUE
// ============================================================================
@@ -403,8 +334,6 @@ export class StructuredLogger implements ILogger {
private rateLimiter: RateLimiter | null = null
// Circuit breaker for external hook
private circuitBreaker: CircuitBreaker | null = null
// Async queue
private asyncQueue: AsyncLogQueue | null = null
@@ -435,8 +364,6 @@ export class StructuredLogger implements ILogger {
enableRateLimiting: config.enableRateLimiting ?? envConfig.enableRateLimiting ?? false,
maxLogsPerSecond: config.maxLogsPerSecond ?? envConfig.maxLogsPerSecond ?? 1000,
enableAsyncQueue: config.enableAsyncQueue ?? envConfig.enableAsyncQueue ?? false,
circuitBreakerThreshold: config.circuitBreakerThreshold ?? 5,
circuitBreakerResetMs: config.circuitBreakerResetMs ?? 30000,
enableMetrics: config.enableMetrics ?? envConfig.enableMetrics ?? false
}
@@ -455,7 +382,6 @@ export class StructuredLogger implements ILogger {
droppedLogs: 0,
bufferFlushes: 0,
hookFailures: 0,
circuitBreakerTrips: 0,
avgProcessingTimeMs: 0
}
@@ -464,11 +390,6 @@ export class StructuredLogger implements ILogger {
this.rateLimiter = new RateLimiter(this.config.maxLogsPerSecond)
}
// Initialize circuit breaker for external hook
if (this.config.externalHook) {
this.circuitBreaker = new CircuitBreaker(this.config.circuitBreakerThreshold, this.config.circuitBreakerResetMs)
}
// Initialize async queue
if (this.config.enableAsyncQueue) {
this.asyncQueue = new AsyncLogQueue()
@@ -569,19 +490,27 @@ export class StructuredLogger implements ILogger {
this.output(entry)
}
// External hook with circuit breaker
// External hook — fire-and-forget. Failures are counted in
// hookFailures metric so chronic breakage is visible to operators
// who can fix their hook. We do not gate further calls — that is
// the consumer's responsibility (consistent with the rest of the
// codebase after the circuit-breaker removal).
const externalHook = this.config.externalHook
if (externalHook && this.circuitBreaker) {
this.circuitBreaker
.execute(async () => {
await Promise.resolve(externalHook(entry))
})
.catch(() => {
this.metrics.hookFailures++
if (this.circuitBreaker?.getState() === 'open') {
this.metrics.circuitBreakerTrips++
}
})
if (externalHook) {
try {
const hookResult = externalHook(entry) as unknown
// Use Promise.resolve().catch() so any thenable (including
// Promise-likes that only implement .then) is handled
// safely — calling .catch directly would throw on such
// objects (Copilot review on PR #393).
if (hookResult && typeof (hookResult as PromiseLike<unknown>).then === 'function') {
void Promise.resolve(hookResult as PromiseLike<unknown>).catch(() => {
this.metrics.hookFailures++
})
}
} catch {
this.metrics.hookFailures++
}
}
// Track processing time
@@ -834,7 +763,6 @@ export class StructuredLogger implements ILogger {
...this.metrics,
bufferSize: this.buffer.length,
rateLimiterTokens: this.rateLimiter?.getTokens() ?? 0,
circuitBreakerState: this.circuitBreaker?.getState() ?? 'closed',
queueSize: this.asyncQueue?.getSize() ?? 0,
createdAt: this.createdAt,
uptimeMs: Date.now() - this.createdAt
@@ -860,7 +788,6 @@ export class StructuredLogger implements ILogger {
droppedLogs: 0,
bufferFlushes: 0,
hookFailures: 0,
circuitBreakerTrips: 0,
avgProcessingTimeMs: 0
}
this.totalProcessingTime = 0
@@ -893,7 +820,6 @@ export class StructuredLogger implements ILogger {
// Clear references
this.rateLimiter = null
this.circuitBreaker = null
this.metricsModule = null
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ export const processContactAction = (
{
id,
name: action.fullName || action.firstName || action.username || undefined,
username: action.username || undefined,
lid: lidJid || undefined,
phoneNumber
}
+119 -2
View File
@@ -1,12 +1,86 @@
import type { SignalKeyStoreWithTransaction } from '../Types'
import type { BinaryNode } from '../WABinary'
import { getBinaryNodeChild, getBinaryNodeChildren, isLidUser, jidNormalizedUser } from '../WABinary'
import {
getBinaryNodeChild,
getBinaryNodeChildren,
isAnyLidUser,
isAnyPnUser,
isHostedLidUser,
isHostedPnUser,
isJidMetaAI,
isLidUser,
isPnUser,
jidNormalizedUser
} from '../WABinary'
/** 7 days in seconds — matches WA Web AB prop tctoken_duration */
const TC_TOKEN_BUCKET_DURATION = 604800
/** 4 buckets → ~28-day rolling window — matches WA Web AB prop tctoken_num_buckets */
const TC_TOKEN_NUM_BUCKETS = 4
/**
* Sentinel key under the `tctoken` store holding a JSON array of tracked storage JIDs
* for cross-session pruning. Mirrors WA Web's CLEAN_TC_TOKENS index lookup.
*
* Exported so other modules (messages-recv, messages-send, process-message) reference
* the same constant. The fork previously inlined this string in messages-recv.ts;
* keep the value identical (`'__index'`) for backward compatibility with persisted state.
*/
export const TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY = '__index'
// Phone-number pattern matching WABinary's isJidBot, applied against the user part so
// the check is invariant to @c.us ↔ @s.whatsapp.net normalization.
const BOT_PHONE_REGEX = /^1313555\d{4}$|^131655500\d{2}$/
/**
* Mirrors WA Web's `Wid.isRegularUser()` (user ¬PSA ¬Bot). Used to gate tctoken
* storage against malformed notifications WA Web filters server-side but we
* defend here for parity with `WAWebSetTcTokenChatAction.handleIncomingTcToken`.
* Works for both pre- and post-normalized JIDs (`@c.us` vs `@s.whatsapp.net`).
*/
export function isRegularUser(jid: string | undefined): boolean {
if (!jid) return false
const user = jid.split('@')[0] ?? ''
if (user === '0') return false // PSA
if (BOT_PHONE_REGEX.test(user)) return false // Bot by phone pattern
if (isJidMetaAI(jid)) return false // MetaAI (@bot server)
return !!(isPnUser(jid) || isLidUser(jid) || isHostedPnUser(jid) || isHostedLidUser(jid) || jid.endsWith('@c.us'))
}
/** Read the persisted tctoken JID index and return its entries (never contains the sentinel key itself). */
export async function readTcTokenIndex(keys: SignalKeyStoreWithTransaction): Promise<string[]> {
const data = await keys.get('tctoken', [TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY])
const entry = data[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY]
if (!entry?.token?.length) return []
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(entry.token).toString())
if (!Array.isArray(parsed)) return []
return parsed.filter((j): j is string => typeof j === 'string' && j.length > 0 && j !== TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY)
} catch {
return []
}
}
/**
* Build a SignalDataSet fragment that writes the merged index (persisted added)
* under the sentinel key. Lets callers update the index without clobbering writes
* made by other layers (history sync, concurrent sessions on the same store).
*/
export async function buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite(
keys: SignalKeyStoreWithTransaction,
addedJids: Iterable<string>
): Promise<{ [TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY]: { token: Buffer } }> {
const persisted = await readTcTokenIndex(keys)
const merged = new Set(persisted)
for (const jid of addedJids) {
if (jid && jid !== TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY) merged.add(jid)
}
return {
[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY]: { token: Buffer.from(JSON.stringify([...merged])) }
}
}
/**
* Check if a received token is expired using WA Web's rolling bucket algorithm.
* Reference: WAWebTrustedContactsUtils.isTokenExpired
@@ -63,6 +137,43 @@ export async function resolveTcTokenJid(
return lid ?? normalized
}
/**
* Resolve target JID for issuing privacy token based on AB prop 14303
* (`lid_trusted_token_issue_to_lid`). When the prop is on, issuance goes to
* the LID; when off, it goes to the PN. Returns the original JID if no
* mapping is found in either direction.
*
* Normalizes the JID upfront and uses the `isAny*` helpers so callers can pass
* `@c.us`, `@s.whatsapp.net`, `@hosted`, `@hosted.lid`, `@lid` or device-specific
* forms `LIDMappingStore.getLIDForPN` early-returns unless `isAnyPnUser`,
* so unnormalized inputs would silently bypass routing.
*
* Reference: WAWebTrustedContactsManager.issuePrivacyTokens
*/
export async function resolveIssuanceJid(
jid: string,
issueToLid: boolean,
getLIDForPN: (pn: string) => Promise<string | null>,
getPNForLID?: (lid: string) => Promise<string | null>
): Promise<string> {
const normalized = jidNormalizedUser(jid)
if (issueToLid) {
if (isAnyLidUser(normalized)) return normalized
if (!isAnyPnUser(normalized)) return normalized
const lid = await getLIDForPN(normalized)
return lid ?? normalized
}
if (!isAnyLidUser(normalized)) return normalized
if (getPNForLID) {
const pn = await getPNForLID(normalized)
return pn ?? normalized
}
return normalized
}
type TcTokenParams = {
jid: string
baseContent?: BinaryNode[]
@@ -135,7 +246,13 @@ export async function storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
continue
}
const rawJid = jidNormalizedUser(tokenNode.attrs.jid || fallbackJid)
// In notifications, tokenNode.attrs.jid is OUR own device JID, not the sender's.
// Prefer fallbackJid (resolved from notification's `from` / `sender_lid`) so the
// token is stored under the peer's JID, never under self.
const rawJid = jidNormalizedUser(fallbackJid || tokenNode.attrs.jid)
// Defense against malformed notifications (PSA WID '0', bots, MetaAI). WA Web
// filters these server-side; we mirror Wid.isRegularUser() locally.
if (!isRegularUser(rawJid)) continue
const storageJid = await resolveTcTokenJid(rawJid, getLIDForPN)
const existingTcData = await keys.get('tctoken', [storageJid])
const existingEntry = existingTcData[storageJid]
+7 -39
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
*/
import type { BinaryNode } from '../WABinary/types.js'
import { CircuitBreaker, CircuitOpenError, createConnectionCircuitBreaker } from './circuit-breaker.js'
import type { ILogger } from './logger.js'
import { metrics } from './prometheus-metrics.js'
@@ -58,8 +57,6 @@ export interface UnifiedSessionOptions {
enabled?: boolean
/** Logger instance for debugging */
logger?: ILogger
/** Enable circuit breaker protection for send operations */
enableCircuitBreaker?: boolean
/** Function to send binary nodes to WhatsApp */
sendNode?: (node: BinaryNode) => Promise<void>
}
@@ -93,7 +90,9 @@ export type UnifiedSessionTrigger = 'login' | 'pairing' | 'presence' | 'manual'
* Manages the unified_session telemetry feature with:
* - Server time synchronization
* - Rate limiting (prevents spam)
* - Circuit breaker protection
* - Best-effort send semantics (failures are swallowed and counted
* telemetry is non-critical so a single attempt with the underlying
* sendNode timeout is enough; no retry, no circuit breaker)
* - Prometheus metrics integration
* - Structured logging
*
@@ -121,7 +120,6 @@ export class UnifiedSessionManager {
}
private readonly options: Required<UnifiedSessionOptions>
private circuitBreaker: CircuitBreaker | null = null
/** Minimum interval between unified_session sends (1 minute) */
private static readonly MIN_SEND_INTERVAL_MS = TimeMs.Minute
@@ -130,7 +128,6 @@ export class UnifiedSessionManager {
this.options = {
enabled: options.enabled ?? true,
logger: options.logger ?? (console as unknown as ILogger),
enableCircuitBreaker: options.enableCircuitBreaker ?? true,
sendNode:
options.sendNode ??
(async () => {
@@ -138,25 +135,6 @@ export class UnifiedSessionManager {
})
}
// Initialize circuit breaker if enabled
if (this.options.enableCircuitBreaker) {
this.circuitBreaker = createConnectionCircuitBreaker({
name: 'unified-session',
failureThreshold: 3,
failureWindow: 60000,
resetTimeout: 30000,
successThreshold: 1,
timeout: 10000,
onStateChange: (from, to) => {
this.options.logger.debug?.({ from, to }, 'Unified session circuit breaker state changed')
},
onOpen: () => {
this.options.logger.warn?.('Unified session circuit breaker OPENED')
metrics.circuitBreakerTrips?.inc({ name: 'unified-session' })
}
})
}
this.state.isInitialized = true
this.options.logger.debug?.('UnifiedSessionManager initialized')
}
@@ -292,20 +270,12 @@ export class UnifiedSessionManager {
}
try {
// Execute with circuit breaker if available
if (this.circuitBreaker) {
await this.circuitBreaker.execute(sendOperation)
} else {
await sendOperation()
}
// Telemetry is non-critical: a single send attempt with the
// underlying sendNode timeout is enough. No retry/circuit needed.
await sendOperation()
} catch (error) {
const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
if (error instanceof CircuitOpenError) {
this.options.logger.warn?.({ trigger, circuitState: error.state }, 'Unified session blocked by circuit breaker')
} else {
this.options.logger.warn?.({ trigger, error: errorMessage }, 'Failed to send unified session telemetry')
}
this.options.logger.warn?.({ trigger, error: errorMessage }, 'Failed to send unified session telemetry')
// Record failure metric
metrics.errors?.inc({ category: 'unified_session', code: 'send_failed' })
@@ -331,7 +301,6 @@ export class UnifiedSessionManager {
sendCount: 0,
isInitialized: true
}
this.circuitBreaker?.reset()
this.options.logger.debug?.('UnifiedSessionManager reset')
}
@@ -339,7 +308,6 @@ export class UnifiedSessionManager {
* Destroy the manager and clean up resources.
*/
destroy(): void {
this.circuitBreaker?.destroy()
this.state.isInitialized = false
this.options.logger.debug?.('UnifiedSessionManager destroyed')
}
+5 -1
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { createHash } from 'crypto'
import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js'
import {
KEY_BUNDLE_TYPE,
PROTOCOL_MODE,
WA_ADV_ACCOUNT_SIG_PREFIX,
WA_ADV_DEVICE_SIG_PREFIX,
WA_ADV_HOSTED_ACCOUNT_SIG_PREFIX
@@ -58,7 +59,10 @@ const getClientPayload = (config: SocketConfig) => {
userAgent: getUserAgent(config)
}
payload.webInfo = getWebInfo(config)
// Native protocol (WAM\x05) does not use WebInfo — only web protocol does
if (PROTOCOL_MODE !== 'native') {
payload.webInfo = getWebInfo(config)
}
return payload
}
+29 -3
View File
@@ -13,11 +13,37 @@ export class USyncContactProtocol implements USyncQueryProtocol {
}
getUserElement(user: USyncUser): BinaryNode {
//TODO: Implement type / username fields (not yet supported)
if (user.phone) {
return {
tag: 'contact',
attrs: {},
content: user.phone
}
}
if (user.username) {
return {
tag: 'contact',
attrs: {
username: user.username,
...(user.usernameKey ? { pin: user.usernameKey } : {}),
...(user.lid ? { lid: user.lid } : {})
}
}
}
if (user.type) {
return {
tag: 'contact',
attrs: {
type: user.type
}
}
}
return {
tag: 'contact',
attrs: {},
content: user.phone
attrs: {}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
import type { USyncQueryProtocol } from '../../Types/USync'
import { assertNodeErrorFree, type BinaryNode } from '../../WABinary'
import { USyncUser } from '../USyncUser'
export class USyncUsernameProtocol implements USyncQueryProtocol {
name = 'username'
getQueryElement(): BinaryNode {
return {
tag: 'username',
attrs: {}
}
}
getUserElement(user: USyncUser): BinaryNode | null {
void user
return null
}
parser(node: BinaryNode): string | null {
if (node.tag === 'username') {
assertNodeErrorFree(node)
return typeof node.content === 'string' ? node.content : null
}
return null
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ export * from './USyncDeviceProtocol'
export * from './USyncContactProtocol'
export * from './USyncStatusProtocol'
export * from './USyncDisappearingModeProtocol'
export * from './USyncUsernameProtocol'
+22 -9
View File
@@ -6,11 +6,12 @@ import {
USyncContactProtocol,
USyncDeviceProtocol,
USyncDisappearingModeProtocol,
USyncStatusProtocol
USyncStatusProtocol,
USyncUsernameProtocol
} from './Protocols'
import { USyncUser } from './USyncUser'
export type USyncQueryResultList = { [protocol: string]: unknown; id: string }
export type USyncQueryResultList = { [protocol: string]: unknown; id: string; rawId?: number }
export type USyncQueryResult = {
list: USyncQueryResultList[]
@@ -68,10 +69,8 @@ export class USyncQuery {
//TODO: see if there are any errors in the result node
//const resultNode = getBinaryNodeChild(usyncNode, 'result')
const listNode = usyncNode ? getBinaryNodeChild(usyncNode, 'list') : undefined
if (listNode?.content && Array.isArray(listNode.content)) {
queryResult.list = listNode.content.reduce((acc: USyncQueryResultList[], node) => {
const parseNodeList = (content: BinaryNode[]): USyncQueryResultList[] =>
content.reduce((acc: USyncQueryResultList[], node) => {
const id = node?.attrs.jid
if (id) {
const data = Array.isArray(node?.content)
@@ -89,15 +88,24 @@ export class USyncQuery {
.filter(([, b]) => b !== null) as [string, unknown][]
)
: {}
acc.push({ ...data, id })
const rawIdAttr = node?.attrs?.['raw_id']
const rawId = rawIdAttr !== undefined ? Number(rawIdAttr) : undefined
acc.push({ ...data, id, ...(rawId !== undefined && !isNaN(rawId) ? { rawId } : {}) })
}
return acc
}, [])
const listNode = usyncNode ? getBinaryNodeChild(usyncNode, 'list') : undefined
if (listNode?.content && Array.isArray(listNode.content)) {
queryResult.list = parseNodeList(listNode.content)
}
const sideListNode = usyncNode ? getBinaryNodeChild(usyncNode, 'side_list') : undefined
if (sideListNode?.content && Array.isArray(sideListNode.content)) {
queryResult.sideList = parseNodeList(sideListNode.content)
}
//TODO: implement side list
//const sideListNode = getBinaryNodeChild(usyncNode, 'side_list')
return queryResult
}
@@ -130,4 +138,9 @@ export class USyncQuery {
this.protocols.push(new USyncLIDProtocol())
return this
}
withUsernameProtocol() {
this.protocols.push(new USyncUsernameProtocol())
return this
}
}
+12
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ export class USyncUser {
id?: string
lid?: string
phone?: string
username?: string
usernameKey?: string
type?: string
personaId?: string
@@ -20,6 +22,16 @@ export class USyncUser {
return this
}
withUsername(username: string) {
this.username = username
return this
}
withUsernameKey(usernameKey: string) {
this.usernameKey = usernameKey
return this
}
withType(type: string) {
this.type = type
return this
@@ -297,4 +297,52 @@ describe('Identity Change Handling', () => {
expect(result.device).toBe(5)
})
})
describe('onBeforeSessionRefresh callback', () => {
it('fires before assertSessions when a session refresh is about to run', async () => {
mockValidateSession.mockResolvedValue({ exists: true })
const callOrder: string[] = []
mockAssertSessions.mockImplementation(async () => {
callOrder.push('assertSessions')
return true
})
const onBeforeSessionRefresh = jest.fn((jid: string) => {
callOrder.push(`before:${jid}`)
})
const node = createIdentityChangeNode('user@s.whatsapp.net')
const ctx = { ...createContext(), onBeforeSessionRefresh }
const result = await handleIdentityChange(node, ctx)
expect(result.action).toBe('session_refreshed')
expect(callOrder).toEqual(['before:user@s.whatsapp.net', 'assertSessions'])
})
it('does not fire when the refresh is skipped (no_identity / offline / self)', async () => {
const onBeforeSessionRefresh = jest.fn()
// no identity node
const noIdentityNode: BinaryNode = {
tag: 'notification',
attrs: { from: 'a@s.whatsapp.net', type: 'encrypt' },
content: []
}
await handleIdentityChange(noIdentityNode, { ...createContext(), onBeforeSessionRefresh })
// offline notification
mockValidateSession.mockResolvedValue({ exists: true })
await handleIdentityChange(createIdentityChangeNode('b@s.whatsapp.net', '0'), {
...createContext(),
onBeforeSessionRefresh
})
// self primary
await handleIdentityChange(createIdentityChangeNode(mockMeId!), {
...createContext(),
onBeforeSessionRefresh
})
expect(onBeforeSessionRefresh).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
})
})
+391
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
import { jest } from '@jest/globals'
import {
withBoundedRetry,
BoundedRetryGiveUpError,
BoundedRetryAbortedError,
WHATSAPP_BACKOFF_DELAYS,
DEFAULT_TTL_MS
} from '../../Utils/bounded-retry'
// All tests use very short real delays (1-50ms) so they run fast.
// This sidesteps the fragility of jest fake timers + async chains.
describe('bounded-retry — WhatsApp-aligned per-operation retry', () => {
test('default delay sequence matches WhatsApp Android empirical capture', () => {
// Frida trace: 3000 -> 10000 -> 60000 -> ~64000 -> 120000 ms
expect(WHATSAPP_BACKOFF_DELAYS).toEqual([3000, 10000, 60000, 60000, 120000])
})
test('default TTL is 10 minutes (matches empirical stabilisation + safety buffer)', () => {
expect(DEFAULT_TTL_MS).toBe(600_000)
})
test('first-attempt success returns immediately, no retries', async () => {
const op = jest.fn<() => Promise<string>>().mockResolvedValue('ok')
const result = await withBoundedRetry(op, { name: 'fast-success' })
expect(result).toBe('ok')
expect(op).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
})
test('retries with the configured delay sequence after failures', async () => {
const op = jest
.fn<() => Promise<number>>()
.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('try1'))
.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('try2'))
.mockResolvedValueOnce(42)
const onRetry = jest.fn<(err: Error, attempt: number, delayMs: number) => void>()
const result = await withBoundedRetry(op, {
name: 'three-tries',
delays: [10, 20, 40],
jitter: 0,
onRetry
})
expect(result).toBe(42)
expect(op).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3)
expect(onRetry).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
expect(onRetry.mock.calls[0]![2]).toBe(10)
expect(onRetry.mock.calls[1]![2]).toBe(20)
})
test('TTL exhaustion throws BoundedRetryGiveUpError (no infinite retries)', async () => {
const op = jest.fn<() => Promise<string>>().mockRejectedValue(new Error('always-fails'))
await expect(
withBoundedRetry(op, {
name: 'ttl-test',
delays: [10],
jitter: 0,
ttlMs: 50
})
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BoundedRetryGiveUpError)
// Should have tried multiple times before giving up
expect(op.mock.calls.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(2)
})
test('per-attempt timeout fires for slow operations', async () => {
const slowOp = jest.fn<() => Promise<string>>(() => new Promise(() => {})) // hangs
await expect(
withBoundedRetry(slowOp, {
name: 'slow',
delays: [5],
jitter: 0,
ttlMs: 200,
perAttemptTimeoutMs: 30
})
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BoundedRetryGiveUpError)
// Multiple attempts should have been tried (each timed out at 30ms)
expect(slowOp.mock.calls.length).toBeGreaterThan(1)
})
test('shouldRetry predicate can short-circuit retries', async () => {
const op = jest
.fn<() => Promise<string>>()
.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('transient'))
.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('FATAL: do not retry'))
await expect(
withBoundedRetry(op, {
name: 'predicate-test',
delays: [1],
jitter: 0,
shouldRetry: err => !err.message.startsWith('FATAL')
})
).rejects.toThrow('FATAL: do not retry')
expect(op).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
})
test('AbortSignal cancels in-flight retry sleep', async () => {
const op = jest.fn<() => Promise<string>>().mockRejectedValue(new Error('fail'))
const ctrl = new AbortController()
const promise = withBoundedRetry(op, {
name: 'abort-test',
delays: [10_000], // long sleep so abort can happen during it
jitter: 0,
signal: ctrl.signal
})
// First attempt fires immediately; sleep starts
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 10))
ctrl.abort()
await expect(promise).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BoundedRetryAbortedError)
})
test('two concurrent retry chains do NOT interfere with each other (per-op isolation)', async () => {
// Key advantage over circuit breaker: failures in one chain do not
// block another chain. With circuit breaker, 5 failures from chain A
// would block chain B too. With bounded-retry, B is independent.
const flakyOp = jest
.fn<() => Promise<string>>()
.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('a1'))
.mockResolvedValueOnce('a-ok')
const fastOp = jest.fn<() => Promise<string>>().mockResolvedValue('b-ok')
// Start a (will retry once after 30ms) and b (immediate)
const aPromise = withBoundedRetry(flakyOp, { name: 'a', delays: [30], jitter: 0 })
const bPromise = withBoundedRetry(fastOp, { name: 'b', delays: [30], jitter: 0 })
// b should resolve right away
const bResult = await bPromise
expect(bResult).toBe('b-ok')
expect(fastOp).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
// a still running — wait for it
const aResult = await aPromise
expect(aResult).toBe('a-ok')
expect(flakyOp).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
})
test('delay sequence caps at last value (no unbounded growth)', async () => {
const op = jest.fn<() => Promise<string>>().mockRejectedValue(new Error('fail'))
const onRetry = jest.fn<(err: Error, attempt: number, delayMs: number) => void>()
await expect(
withBoundedRetry(op, {
name: 'cap-test',
delays: [5, 10, 15], // 3 distinct steps; 4th+ retry should reuse 15
jitter: 0,
ttlMs: 300,
onRetry
})
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BoundedRetryGiveUpError)
// Find delays >= 4th retry — all should be capped at 15
const lateRetries = onRetry.mock.calls.filter(c => c[1] >= 4)
expect(lateRetries.length).toBeGreaterThan(0)
for (const call of lateRetries) {
expect(call[2]).toBeLessThanOrEqual(15)
}
})
test('jitter randomises delay within +/- factor', async () => {
const op = jest.fn<() => Promise<string>>().mockRejectedValue(new Error('fail'))
const observed: number[] = []
// Single run, capture multiple onRetry calls (each with different jitter)
await withBoundedRetry(op, {
name: 'jitter-test',
delays: [50], // base delay
jitter: 0.3, // +/- 30% -> [35, 65]
ttlMs: 1000, // ttl high enough for ~10 retries
perAttemptTimeoutMs: 5,
onRetry: (_, __, d) => observed.push(d)
}).catch(() => {})
expect(observed.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(3)
const unique = new Set(observed)
expect(unique.size).toBeGreaterThan(1)
// Every observed delay must be within jitter window — but the LAST one
// may be capped by remaining ttl budget, so check all but the last
const inWindow = observed.slice(0, -1)
for (const d of inWindow) {
expect(d).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(35)
expect(d).toBeLessThanOrEqual(65)
}
})
test('delay does not exceed remaining TTL budget', async () => {
const op = jest.fn<() => Promise<string>>().mockRejectedValue(new Error('fail'))
const onRetry = jest.fn<(err: Error, attempt: number, delayMs: number) => void>()
await withBoundedRetry(op, {
name: 'budget-cap',
delays: [200], // would exceed ttl
jitter: 0,
ttlMs: 50, // very short
onRetry
}).catch(() => {})
// All scheduled delays should be capped to remaining budget
for (const call of onRetry.mock.calls) {
expect(call[2]).toBeLessThanOrEqual(50)
}
})
// ─── Tests for fixes from PR #393 review ──────────────────────────────
test('TTL is enforced BEFORE the next attempt (not just after)', async () => {
// Regression: previously TTL was only checked after a failure, so a
// new attempt could start with 0ms remaining and run for the full
// per-attempt timeout, overshooting wall-clock budget by that much.
const slowOp = jest.fn<() => Promise<string>>(() => new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(() => resolve('late'), 200)))
const start = Date.now()
await expect(
withBoundedRetry(slowOp, {
name: 'ttl-strict',
delays: [10],
jitter: 0,
ttlMs: 50,
perAttemptTimeoutMs: 1000 // huge, must be capped by TTL
})
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BoundedRetryGiveUpError)
const elapsed = Date.now() - start
// With strict TTL enforcement, total runtime should be very close to ttlMs.
// Allow up to 100ms slack for Node timer + microtask scheduling.
expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(150)
})
test('per-attempt timeout is capped by remaining TTL budget', async () => {
// If user passes perAttemptTimeoutMs > ttlMs, the cap should apply.
const slowOp = jest.fn<() => Promise<string>>(() => new Promise(() => {})) // hangs forever
const start = Date.now()
await expect(
withBoundedRetry(slowOp, {
name: 'attempt-cap',
delays: [1],
jitter: 0,
ttlMs: 30,
perAttemptTimeoutMs: 5000 // way bigger than ttl
})
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BoundedRetryGiveUpError)
const elapsed = Date.now() - start
expect(elapsed).toBeLessThan(150) // not 5000ms!
})
test('operation receives an AbortSignal that is aborted on per-attempt timeout', async () => {
// New API: operation can opt into cancellation via the signal arg.
const aborts: boolean[] = []
const opThatRespectsSignal = jest.fn(
(signal?: AbortSignal) =>
new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
const timer = setTimeout(() => resolve('late'), 100)
signal?.addEventListener('abort', () => {
clearTimeout(timer)
aborts.push(true)
reject(new Error('aborted by signal'))
})
})
)
await withBoundedRetry(opThatRespectsSignal, {
name: 'signal-aware',
delays: [1],
jitter: 0,
ttlMs: 80,
perAttemptTimeoutMs: 20 // smaller than 100ms op duration
}).catch(() => {})
expect(aborts.length).toBeGreaterThan(0) // at least one attempt was aborted
})
test('sleep listener is removed when timeout completes normally (no leak)', async () => {
// Regression: sleep used signal.addEventListener with { once: true } but
// never removed the listener on timer-resolve. With many retries on a
// shared signal, listeners would accumulate.
//
// Make the failure mode observable by spying on add/removeEventListener
// directly so the assertion fails if cleanup is removed.
const ctrl = new AbortController()
const realAdd = ctrl.signal.addEventListener.bind(ctrl.signal)
const realRemove = ctrl.signal.removeEventListener.bind(ctrl.signal)
let addCount = 0
let removeCount = 0
ctrl.signal.addEventListener = ((type: string, listener: never, opts?: never) => {
if (type === 'abort') addCount++
return realAdd(type, listener, opts)
}) as typeof ctrl.signal.addEventListener
ctrl.signal.removeEventListener = ((type: string, listener: never, opts?: never) => {
if (type === 'abort') removeCount++
return realRemove(type, listener, opts)
}) as typeof ctrl.signal.removeEventListener
const op = jest
.fn<() => Promise<string>>()
.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('1'))
.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('2'))
.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('3'))
.mockResolvedValueOnce('ok')
const result = await withBoundedRetry(op, {
name: 'no-leak',
delays: [5],
jitter: 0,
ttlMs: 500,
signal: ctrl.signal
})
expect(result).toBe('ok')
expect(op).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(4)
// If sleep() leaks listeners, addCount > removeCount. Each retry adds
// listeners (1 sleep + 1 outer-abort forwarding) and must remove the
// same number on settlement.
expect(addCount).toBeGreaterThan(0)
expect(addCount).toBe(removeCount)
})
test('logger receives structured logs for retry, give-up, and recovery', async () => {
const debugCalls: unknown[][] = []
const infoCalls: unknown[][] = []
const warnCalls: unknown[][] = []
const fakeLogger = {
debug: (...args: unknown[]) => debugCalls.push(args),
info: (...args: unknown[]) => infoCalls.push(args),
warn: (...args: unknown[]) => warnCalls.push(args),
error: () => {},
fatal: () => {},
trace: () => {},
child: () => fakeLogger,
level: 'debug'
}
const op = jest
.fn<() => Promise<string>>()
.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('boom'))
.mockResolvedValueOnce('ok')
const result = await withBoundedRetry(op, {
name: 'logged-op',
delays: [5],
jitter: 0,
ttlMs: 200,
logger: fakeLogger as never
})
expect(result).toBe('ok')
// Should have logged the scheduling at debug level
expect(debugCalls.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1)
// Should have logged the recovery at info level
expect(infoCalls.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1)
})
test('logger reports give-up via warn when TTL exceeded', async () => {
const warnCalls: unknown[][] = []
const fakeLogger = {
debug: () => {},
info: () => {},
warn: (...args: unknown[]) => warnCalls.push(args),
error: () => {},
fatal: () => {},
trace: () => {},
child: () => fakeLogger,
level: 'debug'
}
const op = jest.fn<() => Promise<string>>().mockRejectedValue(new Error('always-fails'))
await expect(
withBoundedRetry(op, {
name: 'logged-fail',
delays: [5],
jitter: 0,
ttlMs: 30,
logger: fakeLogger as never
})
).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(BoundedRetryGiveUpError)
expect(warnCalls.length).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1)
})
})
-371
View File
@@ -1,371 +0,0 @@
/**
* Testes unitários para circuit-breaker.ts
*/
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from '@jest/globals'
import {
CircuitBreaker,
CircuitBreakerRegistry,
CircuitOpenError,
type CircuitState,
CircuitTimeoutError,
createCircuitBreaker,
getCircuitHealth,
globalCircuitRegistry,
withCircuitBreaker
} from '../../Utils/circuit-breaker.js'
describe('CircuitBreaker', () => {
let breaker: CircuitBreaker
beforeEach(() => {
breaker = createCircuitBreaker({
name: 'test',
failureThreshold: 3,
successThreshold: 2,
resetTimeout: 100,
timeout: 1000,
volumeThreshold: 3,
collectMetrics: false
})
})
afterEach(() => {
breaker.destroy()
})
describe('initial state', () => {
it('should start in closed state', () => {
expect(breaker.getState()).toBe('closed')
expect(breaker.isClosed()).toBe(true)
expect(breaker.isOpen()).toBe(false)
expect(breaker.isHalfOpen()).toBe(false)
})
})
describe('successful operations', () => {
it('should execute successful operations', async () => {
const result = await breaker.execute(() => 'success')
expect(result).toBe('success')
})
it('should execute async operations', async () => {
const result = await breaker.execute(async () => {
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 10))
return 'async success'
})
expect(result).toBe('async success')
})
it('should track successful calls in stats', async () => {
await breaker.execute(() => 'success')
await breaker.execute(() => 'success')
const stats = breaker.getStats()
expect(stats.totalCalls).toBe(2)
expect(stats.totalSuccesses).toBe(2)
expect(stats.totalFailures).toBe(0)
})
})
describe('failure handling', () => {
it('should open after reaching failure threshold', async () => {
const failingOp = () => {
throw new Error('Failure')
}
// Reach failure threshold
for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
await expect(breaker.execute(failingOp)).rejects.toThrow('Failure')
}
expect(breaker.isOpen()).toBe(true)
})
it('should not open before reaching threshold', async () => {
const failingOp = () => {
throw new Error('Failure')
}
// Below threshold
for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
await expect(breaker.execute(failingOp)).rejects.toThrow('Failure')
}
expect(breaker.isClosed()).toBe(true)
})
it('should reset failure count on success', async () => {
const failingOp = () => {
throw new Error('Failure')
}
await expect(breaker.execute(failingOp)).rejects.toThrow()
await expect(breaker.execute(failingOp)).rejects.toThrow()
// Success resets failures
await breaker.execute(() => 'success')
// Only 1 more failure needed (already have 2 in window, need 3 total)
await expect(breaker.execute(failingOp)).rejects.toThrow()
// Should open now (3 failures in window)
expect(breaker.isOpen()).toBe(true)
})
})
describe('open state', () => {
beforeEach(async () => {
// Force open
breaker.trip()
})
it('should reject operations when open', async () => {
await expect(breaker.execute(() => 'success')).rejects.toThrow(CircuitOpenError)
})
it('should transition to half-open after reset timeout', async () => {
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 150))
expect(breaker.isHalfOpen()).toBe(true)
})
})
describe('half-open state', () => {
beforeEach(async () => {
breaker.trip()
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 150))
})
it('should close after success threshold', async () => {
expect(breaker.isHalfOpen()).toBe(true)
// Success threshold is 2
await breaker.execute(() => 'success')
await breaker.execute(() => 'success')
expect(breaker.isClosed()).toBe(true)
})
it('should reopen on failure', async () => {
expect(breaker.isHalfOpen()).toBe(true)
await expect(
breaker.execute(() => {
throw new Error('Failure')
})
).rejects.toThrow()
expect(breaker.isOpen()).toBe(true)
})
})
describe('manual controls', () => {
it('should force open with trip()', () => {
breaker.trip()
expect(breaker.isOpen()).toBe(true)
})
it('should force close with reset()', async () => {
breaker.trip()
breaker.reset()
expect(breaker.isClosed()).toBe(true)
})
})
describe('timeout', () => {
it('should timeout slow operations', async () => {
const slowBreaker = createCircuitBreaker({
name: 'slow',
timeout: 50,
collectMetrics: false
})
await expect(slowBreaker.execute(() => new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 200)))).rejects.toThrow(
CircuitTimeoutError
)
slowBreaker.destroy()
})
})
describe('events', () => {
it('should emit state-change event', async () => {
const stateChanges: Array<{ from: CircuitState; to: CircuitState }> = []
breaker.on('state-change', change => {
stateChanges.push(change)
})
breaker.trip()
breaker.reset()
expect(stateChanges).toHaveLength(2)
expect(stateChanges[0]).toEqual({ from: 'closed', to: 'open' })
expect(stateChanges[1]).toEqual({ from: 'open', to: 'closed' })
})
it('should emit success and failure events', async () => {
let successCount = 0
let failureCount = 0
breaker.on('success', () => successCount++)
breaker.on('failure', () => failureCount++)
await breaker.execute(() => 'success')
await expect(
breaker.execute(() => {
throw new Error()
})
).rejects.toThrow()
expect(successCount).toBe(1)
expect(failureCount).toBe(1)
})
})
describe('isFailure predicate', () => {
it('should use custom isFailure predicate', async () => {
const customBreaker = createCircuitBreaker({
name: 'custom',
failureThreshold: 1,
volumeThreshold: 1,
shouldCountError: (error: any) => error.message !== 'Ignored',
collectMetrics: false
})
// This error should be ignored
await expect(
customBreaker.execute(() => {
throw new Error('Ignored')
})
).rejects.toThrow()
expect(customBreaker.isClosed()).toBe(true)
// This should trip the breaker
await expect(
customBreaker.execute(() => {
throw new Error('Real failure')
})
).rejects.toThrow()
expect(customBreaker.isOpen()).toBe(true)
customBreaker.destroy()
})
})
describe('sync operations', () => {
it('should execute sync operations', () => {
const result = breaker.executeSync(() => 'sync result')
expect(result).toBe('sync result')
})
it('should handle sync failures', () => {
expect(() =>
breaker.executeSync(() => {
throw new Error('Sync failure')
})
).toThrow('Sync failure')
})
})
})
describe('CircuitBreakerRegistry', () => {
let registry: CircuitBreakerRegistry
beforeEach(() => {
registry = new CircuitBreakerRegistry()
})
afterEach(() => {
registry.destroyAll()
})
it('should create and retrieve circuit breakers', () => {
const breaker1 = registry.get('test1')
const breaker2 = registry.get('test1')
expect(breaker1).toBe(breaker2)
})
it('should check if breaker exists', () => {
registry.get('exists')
expect(registry.has('exists')).toBe(true)
expect(registry.has('notexists')).toBe(false)
})
it('should remove breaker', () => {
registry.get('toRemove')
expect(registry.remove('toRemove')).toBe(true)
expect(registry.has('toRemove')).toBe(false)
})
it('should get all stats', () => {
registry.get('breaker1')
registry.get('breaker2')
const stats = registry.getAllStats()
expect(stats).toHaveProperty('breaker1')
expect(stats).toHaveProperty('breaker2')
})
it('should reset all breakers', async () => {
const breaker = registry.get('test')
breaker.trip()
registry.resetAll()
expect(breaker.isClosed()).toBe(true)
})
})
describe('withCircuitBreaker', () => {
it('should wrap function with circuit breaker', async () => {
let callCount = 0
const protectedFn = withCircuitBreaker(
async () => {
callCount++
return 'result'
},
{
name: 'wrapped-fn',
collectMetrics: false
}
)
const result = await protectedFn()
expect(result).toBe('result')
expect(callCount).toBe(1)
})
})
describe('getCircuitHealth', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
globalCircuitRegistry.destroyAll()
})
it('should report healthy when all circuits closed', () => {
globalCircuitRegistry.get('healthy1')
globalCircuitRegistry.get('healthy2')
const health = getCircuitHealth()
expect(health.healthy).toBe(true)
expect(health.openCircuits).toHaveLength(0)
})
it('should report unhealthy when circuit is open', () => {
const breaker = globalCircuitRegistry.get('unhealthy')
breaker.trip()
const health = getCircuitHealth()
expect(health.healthy).toBe(false)
expect(health.openCircuits).toContain('unhealthy')
})
})
+1 -100
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Testes unitários para retry-utils.ts
*/
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, jest } from '@jest/globals'
import { describe, expect, it, jest } from '@jest/globals'
import {
calculateDelay,
createRetrier,
@@ -11,12 +11,10 @@ import {
retry,
RETRY_BACKOFF_DELAYS,
RETRY_JITTER_FACTOR,
retryable,
RetryAbortedError,
retryConfigs,
type RetryContext,
RetryExhaustedError,
RetryManager,
retryPredicates,
retryWithResult
} from '../../Utils/retry-utils.js'
@@ -315,103 +313,6 @@ describe('createRetrier', () => {
})
})
describe('retryable', () => {
it('should wrap function with retry', async () => {
let attempts = 0
const fn = retryable(
() => {
attempts++
if (attempts < 2) throw new Error('Failing')
return 'wrapped result'
},
{
maxAttempts: 5,
baseDelay: 10,
collectMetrics: false
}
)
const result = await fn()
expect(result).toBe('wrapped result')
expect(attempts).toBe(2)
})
})
describe('RetryManager', () => {
let manager: RetryManager
beforeEach(() => {
manager = new RetryManager({ baseDelay: 200, collectMetrics: false })
})
it('should execute operation with id', async () => {
const result = await manager.execute('op1', () => 'result')
expect(result).toBe('result')
})
it('should cancel active retry', async () => {
let attempt = 0
const promise = manager.execute('cancelable', async () => {
attempt++
if (attempt === 1) {
throw new Error('Temporary failure')
}
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 1000))
return 'result'
})
// Cancel during retry delay
setTimeout(() => manager.cancel('cancelable'), 100)
await expect(promise).rejects.toThrow()
})
it('should check if operation is active', async () => {
let resolve: () => void
const promise = manager.execute(
'active',
() =>
new Promise<string>(r => {
resolve = () => r('done')
})
)
expect(manager.isActive('active')).toBe(true)
resolve!()
await promise
expect(manager.isActive('active')).toBe(false)
})
it('should cancel all operations', async () => {
const promises = [
manager.execute('op1', () => new Promise((_, reject) => setTimeout(() => reject(new Error()), 1000))),
manager.execute('op2', () => new Promise((_, reject) => setTimeout(() => reject(new Error()), 1000)))
]
setTimeout(() => manager.cancelAll(), 20)
await expect(Promise.all(promises)).rejects.toThrow()
})
it('should emit events', async () => {
const events: string[] = []
manager.on('attempt', () => events.push('attempt'))
manager.on('success', () => events.push('success'))
await manager.execute('test', () => 'result')
expect(events).toContain('attempt')
expect(events).toContain('success')
})
})
describe('retryPredicates', () => {
describe('always', () => {
it('should always return true', () => {
+348 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,17 @@
import { jest } from '@jest/globals'
import { DisconnectReason, type SignalKeyStoreWithTransaction } from '../../Types'
import { getErrorCodeFromStreamError, SERVER_ERROR_CODES } from '../../Utils'
import { buildTcTokenFromJid, isTcTokenExpired, shouldSendNewTcToken } from '../../Utils/tc-token-utils'
import {
buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite,
buildTcTokenFromJid,
isRegularUser,
isTcTokenExpired,
readTcTokenIndex,
resolveIssuanceJid,
shouldSendNewTcToken,
storeTcTokensFromIqResult,
TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY
} from '../../Utils/tc-token-utils'
import type { BinaryNode } from '../../WABinary'
/** 7 days in seconds — matches WA Web tctoken_duration */
@@ -848,3 +858,340 @@ describe('tctoken integration scenarios', () => {
})
})
})
// ─── isRegularUser (PSA / bot / MetaAI gating) ─────────────────────────
describe('isRegularUser', () => {
it('rejects undefined / empty', () => {
expect(isRegularUser(undefined)).toBe(false)
expect(isRegularUser('')).toBe(false)
})
it('rejects PSA WID (user "0")', () => {
expect(isRegularUser('0@s.whatsapp.net')).toBe(false)
expect(isRegularUser('0@c.us')).toBe(false)
})
it('rejects bot phone numbers (1313555XXXX, 131655500XX)', () => {
expect(isRegularUser('13135550000@s.whatsapp.net')).toBe(false)
expect(isRegularUser('13135559999@s.whatsapp.net')).toBe(false)
// /^131655500\d{2}$/ — 11 digits: 131655500 + 2 trailing
expect(isRegularUser('13165550000@s.whatsapp.net')).toBe(false)
expect(isRegularUser('13165550099@s.whatsapp.net')).toBe(false)
})
it('rejects MetaAI (@bot server)', () => {
expect(isRegularUser('foo@bot')).toBe(false)
})
it('accepts regular PN users (@s.whatsapp.net, @c.us)', () => {
expect(isRegularUser('5511999999999@s.whatsapp.net')).toBe(true)
expect(isRegularUser('5511999999999@c.us')).toBe(true)
})
it('accepts LID users', () => {
expect(isRegularUser('123456@lid')).toBe(true)
})
it('accepts hosted PN/LID users', () => {
expect(isRegularUser('5511999999999@hosted')).toBe(true)
expect(isRegularUser('123456@hosted.lid')).toBe(true)
})
})
// ─── resolveIssuanceJid (AB prop 14303 routing) ────────────────────────
describe('resolveIssuanceJid', () => {
const PN = '5511999999999@s.whatsapp.net'
const LID = '123456@lid'
const PN_NO_LID = '5511888888888@s.whatsapp.net'
const LID_NO_PN = '999999@lid'
const getLIDForPN = jest.fn<(pn: string) => Promise<string | null>>(async (pn: string) => {
if (pn === PN) return LID
return null
})
const getPNForLID = jest.fn<(lid: string) => Promise<string | null>>(async (lid: string) => {
if (lid === LID) return PN
return null
})
beforeEach(() => {
getLIDForPN.mockClear()
getPNForLID.mockClear()
})
describe('AB prop 14303 ON (issueToLid=true)', () => {
it('returns LID unchanged when input is LID', async () => {
expect(await resolveIssuanceJid(LID, true, getLIDForPN, getPNForLID)).toBe(LID)
expect(getLIDForPN).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('resolves PN to LID via lidMapping', async () => {
expect(await resolveIssuanceJid(PN, true, getLIDForPN, getPNForLID)).toBe(LID)
expect(getLIDForPN).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PN)
})
it('falls back to original PN when no LID mapping exists', async () => {
expect(await resolveIssuanceJid(PN_NO_LID, true, getLIDForPN, getPNForLID)).toBe(PN_NO_LID)
})
})
describe('AB prop 14303 OFF (issueToLid=false)', () => {
it('returns PN unchanged when input is PN', async () => {
expect(await resolveIssuanceJid(PN, false, getLIDForPN, getPNForLID)).toBe(PN)
expect(getPNForLID).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('resolves LID to PN via lidMapping', async () => {
expect(await resolveIssuanceJid(LID, false, getLIDForPN, getPNForLID)).toBe(PN)
expect(getPNForLID).toHaveBeenCalledWith(LID)
})
it('falls back to original LID when no PN mapping exists', async () => {
expect(await resolveIssuanceJid(LID_NO_PN, false, getLIDForPN, getPNForLID)).toBe(LID_NO_PN)
})
it('returns LID unchanged when getPNForLID is omitted', async () => {
expect(await resolveIssuanceJid(LID, false, getLIDForPN)).toBe(LID)
})
})
describe('JID normalization (handles @c.us and hosted forms)', () => {
const PN_CUS = '5511999999999@c.us'
const PN_NORMALIZED = '5511999999999@s.whatsapp.net'
const HOSTED_LID = '999999@hosted.lid'
it('normalizes @c.us before resolving (issueToLid=true)', async () => {
const fn = jest.fn<(pn: string) => Promise<string | null>>(async (pn: string) => {
if (pn === PN_NORMALIZED) return LID
return null
})
const result = await resolveIssuanceJid(PN_CUS, true, fn, getPNForLID)
expect(result).toBe(LID)
// Mapping store called with NORMALIZED form
expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PN_NORMALIZED)
})
it('treats hosted LID as LID input (issueToLid=true returns it unchanged)', async () => {
expect(await resolveIssuanceJid(HOSTED_LID, true, getLIDForPN, getPNForLID)).toBe(HOSTED_LID)
expect(getLIDForPN).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('treats hosted LID as LID input (issueToLid=false converts via getPNForLID)', async () => {
const fn = jest.fn<(lid: string) => Promise<string | null>>(async () => null)
await resolveIssuanceJid(HOSTED_LID, false, getLIDForPN, fn)
expect(fn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(HOSTED_LID)
})
})
})
// ─── readTcTokenIndex / buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite ───────────────────
describe('tctoken cross-session prune index', () => {
it('exports the sentinel key as "__index"', () => {
// Persisted state compatibility — tests freeze the value to catch unintended renames.
expect(TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY).toBe('__index')
})
describe('readTcTokenIndex', () => {
it('returns [] when the index entry is absent', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({})
expect(await readTcTokenIndex(keys)).toEqual([])
})
it('returns [] when the index token buffer is empty', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({ [TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY]: { token: Buffer.alloc(0) } })
expect(await readTcTokenIndex(keys)).toEqual([])
})
it('returns [] when the JSON payload is corrupted', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({ [TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY]: { token: Buffer.from('not-json') } })
expect(await readTcTokenIndex(keys)).toEqual([])
})
it('returns [] when the JSON payload is not an array', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({ [TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY]: { token: Buffer.from('{"a":1}') } })
expect(await readTcTokenIndex(keys)).toEqual([])
})
it('returns the persisted JIDs', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
const stored = ['a@lid', 'b@lid', 'c@s.whatsapp.net']
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({
[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY]: { token: Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(stored)) }
})
expect(await readTcTokenIndex(keys)).toEqual(stored)
})
it('filters out the sentinel key itself, empty strings, and non-strings', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
const stored = ['a@lid', '', TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY, 42, null, 'b@lid']
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({
[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY]: { token: Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(stored)) }
})
expect(await readTcTokenIndex(keys)).toEqual(['a@lid', 'b@lid'])
})
})
describe('buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite', () => {
it('merges added JIDs with the persisted set (de-duplicated)', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({
[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY]: { token: Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(['a@lid', 'b@lid'])) }
})
const write = await buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite(keys, ['b@lid', 'c@lid'])
const decoded = JSON.parse(write[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY].token.toString()) as string[]
expect(decoded.sort()).toEqual(['a@lid', 'b@lid', 'c@lid'])
})
it('drops the sentinel key from the added set', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({})
const write = await buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite(keys, [TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY, 'a@lid'])
const decoded = JSON.parse(write[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY].token.toString()) as string[]
expect(decoded).toEqual(['a@lid'])
})
it('handles empty inputs', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({})
const write = await buildMergedTcTokenIndexWrite(keys, [])
const decoded = JSON.parse(write[TC_TOKEN_INDEX_KEY].token.toString()) as string[]
expect(decoded).toEqual([])
})
})
})
// ─── storeTcTokensFromIqResult — isRegularUser gating + monotonicity ───
describe('storeTcTokensFromIqResult — gating and monotonicity', () => {
const PEER_PN = '5511999999999@s.whatsapp.net'
const PEER_LID = '123456@lid'
const getLIDForPN = jest.fn<(pn: string) => Promise<string | null>>(async (pn: string) => {
if (pn === PEER_PN) return PEER_LID
return null
})
beforeEach(() => {
getLIDForPN.mockClear()
})
const buildIqResult = (jid: string, tokenBytes: Uint8Array, t: string): BinaryNode => ({
tag: 'iq',
attrs: {},
content: [
{
tag: 'tokens',
attrs: {},
content: [
{
tag: 'token',
attrs: { jid, type: 'trusted_contact', t },
content: tokenBytes
}
]
}
]
})
it('skips PSA WID (jid="0") even if returned in tokens block', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({})
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result: buildIqResult('myDeviceJid@s.whatsapp.net', Buffer.from([0x01, 0x02]), '1700000000'),
fallbackJid: '0@s.whatsapp.net',
keys,
getLIDForPN
})
expect(keys.set).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('skips bot phone numbers', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({})
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result: buildIqResult('myDeviceJid@s.whatsapp.net', Buffer.from([0x01, 0x02]), '1700000000'),
fallbackJid: '13135550000@s.whatsapp.net',
keys,
getLIDForPN
})
expect(keys.set).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('skips MetaAI (@bot server)', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({})
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result: buildIqResult('myDeviceJid@s.whatsapp.net', Buffer.from([0x01, 0x02]), '1700000000'),
fallbackJid: 'meta-ai@bot',
keys,
getLIDForPN
})
expect(keys.set).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('uses fallbackJid (NOT the token node jid which is own device) as storage source', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({})
const onNewJidStored = jest.fn()
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result: buildIqResult('myDeviceJid:1@s.whatsapp.net', Buffer.from([0xaa, 0xbb]), '1700000000'),
fallbackJid: PEER_PN,
keys,
getLIDForPN,
onNewJidStored
})
expect(keys.set).toHaveBeenCalled()
const setArgs = (keys.set.mock.calls[0]?.[0] as { tctoken: Record<string, unknown> }).tctoken
expect(Object.keys(setArgs)).toContain(PEER_LID)
expect(onNewJidStored).toHaveBeenCalledWith(PEER_LID)
})
it('skips when incoming timestamp is older than existing (monotonicity)', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({
[PEER_LID]: { token: Buffer.from([0x99]), timestamp: '1800000000' }
})
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result: buildIqResult('myDeviceJid@s.whatsapp.net', Buffer.from([0xaa]), '1700000000'),
fallbackJid: PEER_PN,
keys,
getLIDForPN
})
expect(keys.set).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('skips timestamp-less tokens (would be immediately expired)', async () => {
const keys = createMockKeys()
;(keys.get as any).mockResolvedValue({})
await storeTcTokensFromIqResult({
result: {
tag: 'iq',
attrs: {},
content: [
{
tag: 'tokens',
attrs: {},
content: [
{
tag: 'token',
attrs: { jid: 'd@s.whatsapp.net', type: 'trusted_contact' },
content: Buffer.from([0x01])
}
]
}
]
},
fallbackJid: PEER_PN,
keys,
getLIDForPN
})
expect(keys.set).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
})
+9 -19
View File
@@ -29,8 +29,7 @@ const TimeMs = {
jest.mock('../../Utils/prometheus-metrics.js', () => ({
metrics: {
socketEvents: { inc: jest.fn() },
errors: { inc: jest.fn() },
circuitBreakerTrips: { inc: jest.fn() }
errors: { inc: jest.fn() }
}
}))
@@ -59,7 +58,6 @@ describe('UnifiedSessionManager', () => {
manager = createUnifiedSessionManager({
enabled: true,
logger: mockLogger as any,
enableCircuitBreaker: false, // Disable for simpler testing
sendNode: mockSendNode
})
})
@@ -356,7 +354,11 @@ describe('shouldEnableUnifiedSession', () => {
})
})
describe('UnifiedSessionManager with CircuitBreaker', () => {
describe('UnifiedSessionManager — non-critical send semantics', () => {
// The previous "with CircuitBreaker" suite is gone — telemetry no longer
// uses a circuit breaker. Verify equivalent behavior still holds:
// failures are swallowed (telemetry is non-critical) and don't propagate.
let manager: UnifiedSessionManager
let mockSendNode: MockSendNode
@@ -366,7 +368,6 @@ describe('UnifiedSessionManager with CircuitBreaker', () => {
manager = createUnifiedSessionManager({
enabled: true,
logger: createMockLogger() as any,
enableCircuitBreaker: true,
sendNode: mockSendNode
})
})
@@ -375,24 +376,13 @@ describe('UnifiedSessionManager with CircuitBreaker', () => {
manager.destroy()
})
it('should work with circuit breaker enabled', async () => {
it('should send telemetry once per call', async () => {
await manager.send('login')
expect(mockSendNode).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
})
it('should handle circuit breaker failures gracefully', async () => {
// Make send fail multiple times to trigger circuit breaker
let callCount = 0
mockSendNode.mockImplementation(async () => {
callCount++
if (callCount <= 3) {
throw new Error(`Fail ${callCount}`)
}
})
// These should not throw even with failures
await expect(manager.send('login')).resolves.toBeUndefined()
await expect(manager.send('login')).resolves.toBeUndefined()
it('should swallow send failures gracefully (telemetry is non-critical)', async () => {
mockSendNode.mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error('boom'))
await expect(manager.send('login')).resolves.toBeUndefined()
})
})
+209
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
import Long from 'long'
import $protobuf from 'protobufjs/minimal.js'
const $util = $protobuf.util
// proto implementation
function longToStringOld(value: any, unsigned?: boolean): string {
if (typeof value === 'string') return value
if (typeof value === 'number') return String(value)
if (!$util.Long) return String(value)
const normalized = ($util.Long as any).fromValue(value)
const prepared =
unsigned && normalized && typeof normalized.toUnsigned === 'function' ? normalized.toUnsigned() : normalized
return prepared.toString()
}
// bigint implementation
function longToStringNew(value: any, unsigned?: boolean): string {
if (typeof value === 'string') return value
if (typeof value === 'number') return String(value)
if (value && typeof value.low === 'number' && typeof value.high === 'number') {
const high = value.high | 0
const lo = BigInt(value.low >>> 0)
const hi = BigInt(value.high >>> 0)
const combined = (hi << 32n) | lo
if (!unsigned && high < 0) {
return (combined - (1n << 64n)).toString()
}
return combined.toString()
}
return String(value)
}
function longToNumberOld(value: any, unsigned?: boolean): number {
if (typeof value === 'number') return value
if (typeof value === 'string') return Number(value)
if (!$util.Long) return Number(value)
const normalized = ($util.Long as any).fromValue(value)
const prepared =
unsigned && normalized && typeof normalized.toUnsigned === 'function'
? normalized.toUnsigned()
: typeof normalized.toSigned === 'function'
? normalized.toSigned()
: normalized
return prepared.toNumber()
}
function longToNumberNew(value: any, unsigned?: boolean): number {
if (typeof value === 'number') return value
if (typeof value === 'string') return Number(value)
if (value && typeof value.low === 'number' && typeof value.high === 'number') {
const high = value.high | 0
const lo = BigInt(value.low >>> 0)
const hi = BigInt(value.high >>> 0)
const combined = (hi << 32n) | lo
if (!unsigned && high < 0) {
return Number(combined - (1n << 64n))
}
return Number(combined)
}
return Number(value)
}
describe('BigInt vs Long equivalence validation', () => {
// Test cases: [description, Long value, unsigned flag]
const testCases: [string, Long, boolean][] = [
// Basic values
['zero unsigned', Long.fromNumber(0, true), true],
['zero signed', Long.fromNumber(0, false), false],
['one unsigned', Long.fromNumber(1, true), true],
['one signed', Long.fromNumber(1, false), false],
// Typical WhatsApp timestamps (seconds since epoch)
['timestamp 2023', Long.fromNumber(1700000000, true), true],
['timestamp 2025', Long.fromNumber(1750000000, true), true],
['timestamp as signed', Long.fromNumber(1700000000, false), false],
// File sizes
['small file', Long.fromNumber(1024, true), true],
['medium file 10MB', Long.fromNumber(10485760, true), true],
['large file 2GB', Long.fromNumber(2147483648, true), true],
// Boundary values - 32-bit
['max int32', Long.fromNumber(2147483647, false), false],
['min int32', Long.fromNumber(-2147483648, false), false],
['max uint32', Long.fromNumber(4294967295, true), true],
// Around MAX_SAFE_INTEGER
['MAX_SAFE_INTEGER', Long.fromString('9007199254740991', false), false],
['MAX_SAFE_INTEGER + 1', Long.fromString('9007199254740992', false), false],
['MAX_SAFE_INTEGER unsigned', Long.fromString('9007199254740991', true), true],
// Large unsigned values
['large unsigned', Long.fromString('9999999999999999999', true), true],
['max uint64', Long.fromString('18446744073709551615', true), true],
['max uint64 - 1', Long.fromString('18446744073709551614', true), true],
// Signed negative values
['negative one', Long.fromNumber(-1, false), false],
['negative small', Long.fromNumber(-100, false), false],
['negative large', Long.fromNumber(-2147483648, false), false],
['min int64', Long.fromString('-9223372036854775808', false), false],
['max int64', Long.fromString('9223372036854775807', false), false],
['-1 as signed Long', Long.fromBits(-1, -1, false), false],
// Tricky bit patterns
['high=1, low=0', Long.fromBits(0, 1, true), true],
['high=0, low=-1 (0xFFFFFFFF)', Long.fromBits(-1, 0, true), true],
['high=-1, low=-1 unsigned (max uint64)', Long.fromBits(-1, -1, true), true],
['high=0x7FFFFFFF, low=0xFFFFFFFF (max int64)', Long.fromBits(-1, 0x7fffffff, false), false],
['high=0x80000000, low=0 (min int64)', Long.fromBits(0, -2147483648, false), false],
// Powers of 2
['2^32', Long.fromString('4294967296', true), true],
['2^32 signed', Long.fromString('4294967296', false), false],
['2^48', Long.fromString('281474976710656', true), true],
['2^63', Long.fromString('9223372036854775808', true), true]
]
describe('longToString equivalence', () => {
for (const [desc, longVal, unsigned] of testCases) {
it(`${desc}: Long(${longVal.low}, ${longVal.high}, ${unsigned})`, () => {
const oldResult = longToStringOld(longVal, unsigned)
const newResult = longToStringNew(longVal, unsigned)
expect(newResult).toBe(oldResult)
})
}
})
describe('longToNumber equivalence', () => {
for (const [desc, longVal, unsigned] of testCases) {
it(`${desc}: Long(${longVal.low}, ${longVal.high}, ${unsigned})`, () => {
const oldResult = longToNumberOld(longVal, unsigned)
const newResult = longToNumberNew(longVal, unsigned)
// For large values, both may lose precision equally (Number limitation)
// So we compare string representations
expect(newResult.toString()).toBe(oldResult.toString())
})
}
})
describe('non-Long inputs (fallback paths)', () => {
it('string passthrough', () => {
expect(longToStringNew('12345')).toBe('12345')
expect(longToStringNew('0')).toBe('0')
})
it('number passthrough', () => {
expect(longToStringNew(42)).toBe('42')
expect(longToStringNew(0)).toBe('0')
expect(longToStringNew(-1)).toBe('-1')
})
it('null/undefined fallback', () => {
expect(longToStringNew(null)).toBe('null')
expect(longToStringNew(undefined)).toBe('undefined')
})
it('object without low/high', () => {
expect(longToStringNew({ foo: 'bar' })).toBe('[object Object]')
})
// Defensive: a raw {low, high} JSON object can carry `high` as an
// unsigned 32-bit value (Long.fromBits would normalize via `| 0`,
// but plain JSON deserialization does not). Without `value.high | 0`
// the sign-bit check fails and the result is interpreted as unsigned.
// Upstream Baileys PR #2333 has this latent bug; InfiniteAPI fixes it.
it('signed sign-bit detection on raw unsigned high (-1 as {low: -1, high: 4294967295})', () => {
const raw = { low: -1, high: 0xffffffff }
// signed: -1
expect(longToStringNew(raw, false)).toBe('-1')
// unsigned: max uint64
expect(longToStringNew(raw, true)).toBe('18446744073709551615')
})
it('signed sign-bit detection on raw unsigned high (-4294967296 as {low: 0, high: 4294967295})', () => {
const raw = { low: 0, high: 0xffffffff }
// signed: -4294967296 (high word = -1 after normalization)
expect(longToStringNew(raw, false)).toBe('-4294967296')
// unsigned: 0xFFFFFFFF00000000 = 18446744069414584320
expect(longToStringNew(raw, true)).toBe('18446744069414584320')
})
})
describe('fuzz: random Long values', () => {
it('100 random unsigned values match', () => {
for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
const low = (Math.random() * 0xffffffff) | 0
const high = (Math.random() * 0xffffffff) | 0
const longVal = Long.fromBits(low, high, true)
const oldResult = longToStringOld(longVal, true)
const newResult = longToStringNew(longVal, true)
expect(newResult).toBe(oldResult)
}
})
it('100 random signed values match', () => {
for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
const low = (Math.random() * 0xffffffff) | 0
const high = (Math.random() * 0xffffffff) | 0
const longVal = Long.fromBits(low, high, false)
const oldResult = longToStringOld(longVal, false)
const newResult = longToStringNew(longVal, false)
expect(newResult).toBe(oldResult)
}
})
})
})
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
import { jest } from '@jest/globals'
import { proto, type WAMessage } from '../..'
import { DEFAULT_CONNECTION_CONFIG } from '../../Defaults'
import makeWASocket from '../../Socket'
import { makeSession, mockWebSocket } from '../TestUtils/session'
mockWebSocket()
// chats.ts treats a connection as a reconnection when EITHER signal is true:
// 1. authState.creds.accountSyncCounter > 0
// (at least one full history sync completed in a previous session)
// 2. socketSkippedOfflineBuffer (forwarded from socket.ts as `skipOfflineBuffer`)
// (socket.ts already decided to skip the offline buffer, e.g. because
// routingInfo was stale and was discarded on startup)
// On reconnection, AwaitingInitialSync is skipped and the buffer is flushed
// immediately so live messages are not held in the initial-sync window.
describe('Reconnection Sync Skip', () => {
it('should skip the history sync wait on reconnection (accountSyncCounter > 0)', async () => {
const { state, clear } = await makeSession()
state.creds.me = { id: '1234567890:1@s.whatsapp.net', name: 'Test User' }
// Simulate a session that has already synced before
state.creds.accountSyncCounter = 1
const sock = makeWASocket({
...DEFAULT_CONNECTION_CONFIG,
auth: state
})
const messageListener = jest.fn()
sock.ev.on('messages.upsert', messageListener)
// Simulate receiving pending notifications (triggers AwaitingInitialSync)
sock.ev.emit('connection.update', { receivedPendingNotifications: true })
// Emit a message immediately after — if the wait is skipped,
// the buffer should already be flushed and this message should be delivered.
const msg = proto.WebMessageInfo.fromObject({
key: { remoteJid: '1234567890@s.whatsapp.net', fromMe: false, id: 'MSG_AFTER_RECONNECT' },
messageTimestamp: Date.now() / 1000,
message: { conversation: 'Hello after reconnect' }
}) as WAMessage
sock.ev.emit('messages.upsert', { messages: [msg], type: 'notify' })
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 50))
// Message should be delivered immediately, NOT buffered
expect(messageListener).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
expect(messageListener).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
messages: expect.arrayContaining([expect.objectContaining({ key: msg.key })]),
type: 'notify'
})
)
await sock.end(new Error('Test completed'))
await clear()
})
it('should skip the history sync wait when socketSkippedOfflineBuffer is true (stale routingInfo, accountSyncCounter === 0)', async () => {
const { state, clear } = await makeSession()
state.creds.me = { id: '1234567890:1@s.whatsapp.net', name: 'Test User' }
// Fresh-looking session from the counter perspective
state.creds.accountSyncCounter = 0
// But routingInfo is present and we ask the socket to discard it on start.
// socket.ts will set hadStaleRoutingInfo=true → skipOfflineBuffer=true,
// which chats.ts forwards as socketSkippedOfflineBuffer. Without this
// branch, the buffers would be misaligned (offline buffer skipped while
// AwaitingInitialSync still waits) and live messages would stall.
state.creds.routingInfo = Buffer.from([1, 2, 3, 4])
const sock = makeWASocket({
...DEFAULT_CONNECTION_CONFIG,
auth: state,
clearRoutingInfoOnStart: true
})
const messageListener = jest.fn()
sock.ev.on('messages.upsert', messageListener)
sock.ev.emit('connection.update', { receivedPendingNotifications: true })
const msg = proto.WebMessageInfo.fromObject({
key: { remoteJid: '1234567890@s.whatsapp.net', fromMe: false, id: 'MSG_AFTER_STALE_ROUTING' },
messageTimestamp: Date.now() / 1000,
message: { conversation: 'Hello after stale routing reconnect' }
}) as WAMessage
sock.ev.emit('messages.upsert', { messages: [msg], type: 'notify' })
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 50))
expect(messageListener).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
expect(messageListener).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
messages: expect.arrayContaining([expect.objectContaining({ key: msg.key })]),
type: 'notify'
})
)
await sock.end(new Error('Test completed'))
await clear()
})
it('should still wait for history sync on fresh pairing (both signals false)', async () => {
const { state, clear } = await makeSession()
state.creds.me = { id: '1234567890:1@s.whatsapp.net', name: 'Test User' }
// Fresh pairing — both reconnect signals are false:
// accountSyncCounter is 0 (default) and no stale routingInfo to clear.
state.creds.accountSyncCounter = 0
const sock = makeWASocket({
...DEFAULT_CONNECTION_CONFIG,
auth: state
})
const messageListener = jest.fn()
sock.ev.on('messages.upsert', messageListener)
sock.ev.emit('connection.update', { receivedPendingNotifications: true })
const msg = proto.WebMessageInfo.fromObject({
key: { remoteJid: '1234567890@s.whatsapp.net', fromMe: false, id: 'MSG_DURING_INITIAL_SYNC' },
messageTimestamp: Date.now() / 1000,
message: { conversation: 'Hello during initial sync' }
}) as WAMessage
sock.ev.emit('messages.upsert', { messages: [msg], type: 'notify' })
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 50))
// Message should be BUFFERED (not delivered) because we're waiting for history sync
expect(messageListener).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(0)
// Drain the 2s AwaitingInitialSync timeout (chats.ts:1522) so its callback
// doesn't fire after Jest considers the test done — otherwise we get a
// "Cannot log after tests are done" warning from the post-teardown flush
// and the suite is flagged with --detectOpenHandles. After the timer
// fires, syncState becomes Online and the buffer flushes; that delivery
// is post-assertion and irrelevant to the test goal.
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 2_100))
await sock.end(new Error('Test completed'))
await clear()
}, 10_000)
})
+88
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
import Long from 'long'
import '../index.js'
import { proto } from '../../WAProto/index.js'
@@ -28,4 +29,91 @@ describe('proto serialization', () => {
const json = message.toJSON()
expect(json.message?.imageMessage?.fileLength).toBe('1234567890123456789')
})
it('converts Long objects to strings correctly via BigInt fast path', () => {
const message = proto.WebMessageInfo.fromObject({
key: {
remoteJid: '123@s.whatsapp.net',
id: 'ABC123',
fromMe: false
},
messageTimestamp: Long.fromNumber(1700000000, true),
message: {
imageMessage: {
fileLength: Long.fromString('9876543210', true)
}
}
})
const json = message.toJSON()
expect(json.messageTimestamp).toBe('1700000000')
expect(json.message?.imageMessage?.fileLength).toBe('9876543210')
})
it('handles large unsigned Long values (> MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)', () => {
const message = proto.WebMessageInfo.fromObject({
key: {
remoteJid: '123@s.whatsapp.net',
id: 'ABC123',
fromMe: false
},
messageTimestamp: Long.fromString('18446744073709551615', true), // max uint64
message: {
imageMessage: {
fileLength: Long.fromString('9999999999999999999', true)
}
}
})
const json = message.toJSON()
expect(json.messageTimestamp).toBe('18446744073709551615')
expect(json.message?.imageMessage?.fileLength).toBe('9999999999999999999')
})
it('handles zero and small Long values', () => {
const message = proto.WebMessageInfo.fromObject({
key: {
remoteJid: '123@s.whatsapp.net',
id: 'ABC123',
fromMe: false
},
messageTimestamp: Long.fromNumber(0, true),
message: {
imageMessage: {
fileLength: Long.fromNumber(1, true)
}
}
})
const json = message.toJSON()
expect(json.messageTimestamp).toBe('0')
expect(json.message?.imageMessage?.fileLength).toBe('1')
})
it('roundtrips encode/decode with Long fields preserving values (> MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)', () => {
// Use uint64 values above Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER (2^53 - 1) so the
// roundtrip actually exercises the BigInt fast path on decode->toJSON.
// Safe integers would silently work even if longToString fell back to
// Number(value).
const original = proto.WebMessageInfo.fromObject({
key: {
remoteJid: '123@s.whatsapp.net',
id: 'ABC123',
fromMe: false
},
messageTimestamp: Long.fromString('18446744073709551615', true),
message: {
imageMessage: {
fileLength: Long.fromString('9999999999999999999', true)
}
}
})
const encoded = proto.WebMessageInfo.encode(original).finish()
const decoded = proto.WebMessageInfo.decode(encoded)
const json = decoded.toJSON()
expect(json.messageTimestamp).toBe('18446744073709551615')
expect(json.message?.imageMessage?.fileLength).toBe('9999999999999999999')
})
})
+11 -2
View File
@@ -28,7 +28,16 @@ console.info = function (...args: unknown[]) {
// Track errors by type + JID to avoid duplicates (using Map for better performance)
const _errorTimestamps = new Map<string, number>()
const DEDUP_WINDOW_MS = 150
// Dedup window for repeated decrypt-error console lines (Bad MAC / Counter / etc).
// Was 150ms, but retry attempts of the SAME message are typically ~300-1000ms apart,
// so the second attempt fell outside the window and double-printed.
//
// TRADE-OFF: dedup key is `errorType + JID` (no message-id). With 5s, a burst of
// errors for the SAME JID — even of slightly different categories or different
// messages — collapses to one log line every 5s. This is intentional for a noisy
// production stream; if you need per-message visibility, set BAILEYS_LOG_LEVEL=debug
// to bypass this console-side dedup and see the structured pino logs in full.
const DEDUP_WINDOW_MS = 5000
console.error = function (...args: unknown[]) {
if (args.length > 0 && typeof args[0] === 'string') {
@@ -70,7 +79,7 @@ console.error = function (...args: unknown[]) {
const lastTime = _errorTimestamps.get(dedupeKey)
if (lastTime && now - lastTime < DEDUP_WINDOW_MS) {
return // Skip duplicate within 150ms window
return // Skip duplicate within DEDUP_WINDOW_MS window
}
_errorTimestamps.set(dedupeKey, now)