Compare commits
4 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
| fbefa6a0ad | |||
| 9c4cdc3e02 | |||
| ba1c1b0fdb | |||
| 876af2e96c |
+41
-39
@@ -49,9 +49,12 @@ import {
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getStatusFromReceiptType,
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getStatusFromReceiptType,
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handleIdentityChange,
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handleIdentityChange,
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hkdf,
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hkdf,
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BAD_MAC_ERROR_TEXT,
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DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG,
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MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT,
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MISSING_KEYS_ERROR_TEXT,
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NACK_REASONS,
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NACK_REASONS,
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NO_MESSAGE_FOUND_ERROR_TEXT,
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NO_MESSAGE_FOUND_ERROR_TEXT,
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RetryReason,
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normalizeKeyLidToPn,
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normalizeKeyLidToPn,
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normalizeMessageJids,
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normalizeMessageJids,
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resolveLidToPn,
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resolveLidToPn,
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@@ -1213,7 +1216,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
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return await query(stanza)
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return await query(stanza)
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}
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}
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const sendRetryRequest = async (node: BinaryNode, forceIncludeKeys = false) => {
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const sendRetryRequest = async (node: BinaryNode, forceIncludeKeys = false, decryptionError?: string) => {
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const { fullMessage } = decodeMessageNode(node, authState.creds.me!.id, authState.creds.me!.lid || '')
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const { fullMessage } = decodeMessageNode(node, authState.creds.me!.id, authState.creds.me!.lid || '')
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const { key: msgKey } = fullMessage
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const { key: msgKey } = fullMessage
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const msgId = msgKey.id!
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const msgId = msgKey.id!
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@@ -1311,39 +1314,39 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
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const { account, signedPreKey, signedIdentityKey: identityKey } = authState.creds
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const { account, signedPreKey, signedIdentityKey: identityKey } = authState.creds
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const fromJid = node.attrs.from!
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const fromJid = node.attrs.from!
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// Check if we should recreate the session
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// Derive the Signal error code from the actual decryption failure message.
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let shouldRecreateSession = false
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// Sent in the retry receipt so the peer (even another InfiniteAPI instance)
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let recreateReason = ''
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// knows the exact failure type and can recreate the session immediately
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// instead of falling back to the 1-hour timeout.
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if (enableAutoSessionRecreation && messageRetryManager && retryCount >= 1) {
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//
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try {
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// Codes mirror RetryReason enum in message-retry-manager.ts:
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// Check if we have a session with this JID
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// 0 = UnknownError | 1 = NoSession | 2 = InvalidKey
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const sessionId = signalRepository.jidToSignalProtocolAddress(fromJid)
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// 3 = InvalidKeyId | 4 = InvalidMessage | 7 = BadMac
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const hasSession = await signalRepository.validateSession(fromJid)
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//
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// Uses DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG error lists (single source of truth in
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// Extract error code from retry node if present (for MAC error detection)
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// decode-wa-message.ts) so additions to those lists are picked up here
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const retryNode = getBinaryNodeChild(node, 'retry')
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// automatically.
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const errorAttr = retryNode?.attrs?.error
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//
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const errorCode = messageRetryManager.parseRetryErrorCode(errorAttr)
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// NOTE: We do NOT delete the session here (receiver side). The Signal Protocol
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// recovers automatically when the sender's pkmsg arrives — it overwrites the
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const result = messageRetryManager.shouldRecreateSession(fromJid, hasSession.exists, errorCode)
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// corrupted session. Deleting prematurely creates a race window where no session
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shouldRecreateSession = result.recreate
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// exists, which can cause "No Session" errors on concurrent messages.
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recreateReason = result.reason
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const retryErrorCode = (() => {
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if (!decryptionError) return RetryReason.UnknownError
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if (shouldRecreateSession) {
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// Bad MAC must be checked first — it is also in corruptedSessionErrors
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logger.debug({ fromJid, retryCount, reason: recreateReason, errorCode }, 'recreating session for retry')
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// but warrants the more specific code 7 over the generic code 4.
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// Delete existing session to force recreation
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if (decryptionError.includes(BAD_MAC_ERROR_TEXT)) return RetryReason.SignalErrorBadMac
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// CRITICAL: Use same transaction key as encrypt/decrypt operations to prevent race
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// MessageCounterError and other corrupted-session variants
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// Using meId ensures this delete serializes with sendMessage() and other session operations
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if (DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG.corruptedSessionErrors.some(e => decryptionError.includes(e))) return RetryReason.SignalErrorInvalidMessage
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await authState.keys.transaction(async () => {
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// Missing / invalid session record
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await authState.keys.set({ session: { [sessionId]: null } })
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if (DECRYPTION_RETRY_CONFIG.sessionRecordErrors.some(e => decryptionError.includes(e)) ||
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}, authState.creds.me?.id || 'session-operation')
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/no\s+(open\s+)?sessions?/i.test(decryptionError)) return RetryReason.SignalErrorNoSession
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forceIncludeKeys = true
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// PreKey / key-id errors
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}
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if (/pre\s*key/i.test(decryptionError)) return RetryReason.SignalErrorInvalidKeyId
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} catch (error) {
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// Identity / key errors
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logger.warn({ error, fromJid }, 'failed to check session recreation')
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if (/invalid\s*key|untrusted\s*identity/i.test(decryptionError)) return RetryReason.SignalErrorInvalidKey
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}
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return RetryReason.UnknownError
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}
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})()
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if (retryCount <= 2) {
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if (retryCount <= 2) {
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// Use new retry manager for phone requests if available
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// Use new retry manager for phone requests if available
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@@ -1384,8 +1387,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
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id: node.attrs.id!,
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id: node.attrs.id!,
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t: node.attrs.t!,
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t: node.attrs.t!,
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v: '1',
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v: '1',
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// ADD ERROR FIELD
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error: retryErrorCode.toString()
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error: '0'
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}
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}
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},
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},
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{
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{
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@@ -1404,7 +1406,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
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receipt.attrs.participant = node.attrs.participant
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receipt.attrs.participant = node.attrs.participant
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}
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}
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if (retryCount > 1 || forceIncludeKeys || shouldRecreateSession) {
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if (retryCount > 1 || forceIncludeKeys) {
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const { update, preKeys } = await getNextPreKeys(authState, 1)
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const { update, preKeys } = await getNextPreKeys(authState, 1)
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const [keyId] = Object.keys(preKeys)
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const [keyId] = Object.keys(preKeys)
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@@ -2507,7 +2509,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
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}
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}
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const encNode = getBinaryNodeChild(node, 'enc')
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const encNode = getBinaryNodeChild(node, 'enc')
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await sendRetryRequest(node, !encNode)
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await sendRetryRequest(node, !encNode, errorMessage)
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if (retryRequestDelayMs) {
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if (retryRequestDelayMs) {
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await delay(retryRequestDelayMs)
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await delay(retryRequestDelayMs)
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}
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}
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@@ -2516,7 +2518,7 @@ export const makeMessagesRecvSocket = (config: SocketConfig) => {
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// Still attempt retry even if pre-key upload failed
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// Still attempt retry even if pre-key upload failed
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try {
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try {
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const encNode = getBinaryNodeChild(node, 'enc')
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const encNode = getBinaryNodeChild(node, 'enc')
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await sendRetryRequest(node, !encNode)
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await sendRetryRequest(node, !encNode, errorMessage)
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} catch (retryErr) {
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} catch (retryErr) {
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logger.error({ retryErr }, 'Failed to send retry after error handling')
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logger.error({ retryErr }, 'Failed to send retry after error handling')
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}
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}
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